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The first chapter asserts that we have exhausted our cultural repertoire, careening 
through both modem certainty and postmodem disorder without finding hope-the things 
in and for which we have been told to hope do not keep us from despair. The chapter 
critiques failed definitions of "hope" and proposes boundaries for this work which lead to 
a quest theme, and a series of questions against which to test whatever might be found 
in that quest. 
The second chapter expands the theme of cultural exhaustion, maintaining that, 
if one is to avoid despair, the discovery by an individual of this cultural failure must be 
intentional, the product of a search which involves bringing conscious awareness to what 
are usually automatistic behaviors. The necessary type of consciousness for that search 
is found to occur in an eclectic group of anthropologists, critical theorists, psychologists 
and iconoclasts-a group whose work generally includes a critique of modernist rationality, 
scientism, and control, as well as a critique of the relativism endemic in postmodemism. 
To render this search more generally accessible, a similar type of consciousness 
is sought-and found-in several Christian theologians, of a generally prophetic or liberation 
bent. Others, who stand against such "God talk", are acknowledged, and a path around 
some of their objections sought in a negative theology, requiring the sort of approach most 
familiar as "skillful means" in Zen practice. 
The fourth chapter is a personal narrative of this quest, situating the author's 
sources from mystical traditions and his life experience within the preceding analytical 
frame, and relating his own encounter with the chasm's edge to a transcendental 
experience of unreasonable assurance. 
The final chapter looks back to consider what the preceding analysis and narrative 
might say about how to be a teacher. It asks what sort of pedagogy is implied in what has 
been asserted and whether such a pedagogy might truly make a difference-questions to 
which it responds affirmatively with a pedagogy and a credo grounded in the perennial 
quest for Wisdom through transcendent experience and manifested in a compassionate 
classroom praxis. 
© 1996 by William Moore Mclaurin, Jr. 
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Chapter I. 
MY AGON: SEARCHING FOR HOPE IN THE FACE OF EXPERIENCE. 
In my fifty-second year, well after what I had taken to be my mid-life crisis, I find 
myself struggling to disengage from the world of business and begin an academic 
career. At a time when my survival instincts (and my business associates) tell me 
that a citizen of a nation which is downsizing its expectations should be carefully 
tending to capital gains and wealth conservation, I find myself at the end of a 
decade of trading income opportunities for study time. My journals and my 
recollections tell me that, while I have advanced several different explanations for 
beginning this behavior, all of them seem to be variations on a theme of moral 
nearsightedness. Looking back over thirty years in the marketplace, I recall 
several recurrences of this malady, the main symptom of which is that one 
presumes that conflicts of conscience occurring in one's work world are isolated 
in the immediate instance and not endemic to the entire system. 
My most recent (and the definitive) outbreak occurred at the beginning of my 
decade of study, and centered around the implosion of a firm in which I had held 
a position of considerable responsibility. Acknowledging that the origins of that 
failure lay in the unethical behavior of the principals was difficult for me, since I 
had known them long and well; however, the circumstances were clear and 
undeniable. Still under the sway of my moral myopia, but able to see a little farther 
2 
than previously, I concluded that the industries within which I had worked all my 
!ife must be particularly subject to such problems, and resolved to change fields. 
As a part of this inductive process, I also suspected that if I had been a more 
competent manager, I would have known ways to prevent such problems in a 
business. As a result of both of these "lessons" I decided that I needed to re-
educate myself, a decision that led to a BS in psychology and an MBA, both 
obtained in evening degree programs while remaining employed full-time. For that 
rather large expenditure of life and treasure, I finally came to see clearly a society 
which systematically tolerates (and rewards) behavior which it claims to abhor and 
to realize that I had been seeking meaning in a cultural context which was at best 
indifferent to such a goal. 
And thus to the Academy, seeking to make the process of doctoral study a 
transformative one, a personal quest for a grail whose nature, at this point of 
beginning, I do not fully understand. At the beginning of this paper, which is to be 
both a chronicle and a means, I search for insights which I hope will transform my 
confusion and the pain of living here at the ending of the Second Millennium; 
transform them perhaps into the beginning of Wisdom in the Third. 
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The Problems. 
Bi!! Moyers suggests (1995) that the mark of an educated person is to be deeply 
moved by statistics-then he tests us with these: there were 2. 7 million reported 
incidents of child abuse or neglect last year, between 1986 and 1992, the number 
of children killed by firearms rose by 144 percent; a 1990 survey in Baltimore 
found that 25% of young people had witnessed a murder and 75% knew someone 
who had been shot; a midwestern survey showed that 55% of youth had been 
involved in a violent incident in the past year. 
Ours is becoming a culture of despair, wherein fear of the future is becoming 
married to fear of the now, and cynicism is the common coin of our political 
discourse. And these responses seem, increasingly, to be justified by events. 1 am 
the product of a culture which has considered itself too wise for the faiths of its 
childhood, and now finds itself bereft of its second faith, in critical rationality, a faith 
which has slain itself, falling upon its own deconstructive sword. 
At a loss for other responses, we rush from one to another with stories about our 
pain. Reporting the pervasiveness of this awful triumvirate of despair, fear, and 
cynicism, and the apparent rationality of subscribing to it, occupies much of the 
time and attention of our popular culture. Television, with its vulgate edition of 
"investigative reporting" is a principal organ of cynicism, while the balance of its 
"news" is tilted toward the most marketable (read fearful) items: a condition arising 
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from the readily observable fact that marketing, in its various guises, is the 
dominant user of our burgeoning knowledge of the workings of the human mind. 
These characteristics of electronic journalism have established the standard for 
print media as well, spawning a nationwide epidemic of USA Today look-alikes. As 
a result, most of our conversations have taken on the same coloration: largely 
meaningless sensation, focused upon limbic stimulation. 
Yet, I certainly do not intend to suggest that this crisis is only a product of the 
media, an illusion subject to remedy by a period of total immersion in public radio. 
Rather, I would share the concern of Abraham Heschel, who, commenting on the 
state of our culture, in the context of materialism, environmental degradation, our 
apparent propensity for genocide, and the threat of nuclear weapons, said that we 
are in: 
... a situation that puts the problem of man in a new light. The issue is old, 
yet the perspective is one of emergency. New in this age is an unparalleled 
awareness of the terrifying seriousness of the human situation. Questions 
we ask seriously today would have seemed utterly absurd twenty years 
ago, such as, for example: Are we the last generation? Is this the very last 
hour for Western civilization (1965: 13)? 
And this evaluation is not restricted to those who hold a spiritual brief. David 
Harvey, a historical materialist and a master of much of postmodem thought, 
possessed of a finely honed understanding of how our new-found comprehension 
of the limits of critical rationality has freed us from the oppression of the past 
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without providing us with a ground for meaning, also finds our condition, adrift in 
the chaos of indeterminacy, to be perilous: 
The experience of time and space has changed, the confidence in the 
association between scientific and moral judgements has collapsed, 
aesthetics has triumphed over ethics as a prime focus of social and 
intellectual concern, images dominate narratives, ephemerality and 
fragmentation take precedence over eternal truths and unified politics, and 
explanations have shifted from the realm of material and political-economic 
groundings towards a consideration of autonomous cultural and political 
practices ... (1990: 328) .... cultural life ... brought within the grasp of the cash 
nexus ... the degree of fordism and modernism or of flexibility and 
postmodemism, is bound to vary from time to time and place to place, 
depending on which configuration is profitable and which is not.. . .the 
seemingly infinite capacity to engender products feeds all the illusion of 
freedom and of open paths for personal fulfillment (1990: 344-5). 
Paul and Anne Ehrlich (1991: xii-xiv) describe the effects of such a culture on its 
home: 
A substantial portion of the life that shares Earth with us is now doomed 
to go extinct. Partly as a result, a billion or more people could starve in the 
first few decades of the next century, hundreds of millions of environmental 
refugees could be created, the health and happiness of virtually every 
human being could be compromised, and social breakdown and conflict 
could destroy civilization as we know it.. .. [however] Society's difficulty in 
evaluating its environmental peril has long been recognized. Aldo Leopold 
wrote almost half a century ago: 
One of the penalties of an ecological education is 
that one lives in a wor1d of wounds .... An ecologist 
must either harden his shell and make believe that 
the consequences of science are none of his 
business, or he must be the doctor who sees the 
marks of death in a community that believes itself 
well and does not want to be told otherwise. 
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The consequences of science in the absence of morality and compassion become 
daily more difficult to obscure with make-believe: World Press Review reports from 
India that the theft of kidneys by surgeons during other operations nets the doctor 
$18,000 apiece; China apparently schedules the execution of political prisoners to 
coincide with the airline schedules of westerners seeking heart transplants 
(Hongda, 1995). 
Even the relatively privileged are savaged. Like most of my generation, I have 
found myself so committed to hope in materialism as to be almost beyond hope 
in any other guise; but the children of my generation, through their self-destructive 
struggle against following our path, seem to insist that there must be another way, 
even if the alternatives that we have allowed them (drugs, alcoholism, psychosis, 
cultism, fundamentalism of various stripes) are all as bad or worse than our 
religion of consumerism. Clearly, this paucity of alternatives is a manifestation of 
the self-preservation capacity of our socialization: if our culture admitted to any 
less destructive escape, the young would almost certainly abandon the values of 
our generation. 
Both as an adult student and as a teacher, I have witnessed and experienced the 
fear and the dehumanization that stalk the Academy in these troubled times. I 
have known those who gave their evenings and week-ends to education, having 
been promised either a cure for, a talisman against, the threat of falling from the 
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middle class, or else a hope of entry into it. I have taught seemingly privileged 
students who were beginning their adult lives with the compliant attitudes of those 
already defeated by life. I have seen Admissions converted to Marketing and seen 
the old conflict between research and teaching set aside as grant writing became 
the criteria for success. I have sat with administrators awaiting the outcome of 
state and federal recision bills, contemplating the dismemberment of the work of 
lifetimes. 
And as an MBA who once held hopes of teaming how to mitigate the worst 
excesses of the marketplace, I share a feeling similar to Leopold's angst in the 
Ehrlich piece, as I see the business world cast aside the last shreds of pretense 
of attention to the common good, and unashamedly embrace successful predation 
as definitive of good management. Avoiding the obvious predatory analogies in 
acquisitions, I would note instead the newly acknowledged (as opposed to new} 
relationship of corporations to their employees. According to The Wall Street 
Journal (Murray, 1995}, in a lead article entitled "Thanks, Goodbye: Amid Record 
Profits Companies Continue to Lay Off Employees; Eliminating Salaries Boosts 
Earnings But Also Adds to Anxiety and Disloyalty": 
While corporate profits were surging to record levels last year, the number 
of job cuts approached those seen at the height of the recession .... The 
stock market frequently views layoffs as a bullish signal. After Mobile 
announced the cuts of 9.3% of its work force-just a week after reporting 
profit of $636 million .. .its stock rose to a 52 week high .... At Xerox, a 
company spokesman says the contract between workers and employers 
is fundamentally different from what it had been .... "l know it can sound very 
heartless when you're making these decisions when individual's careers 
are affected, especially when the company's making money. But I think its 
a new reaiityn .... Some workers become burnt-out nihilists, figuring they 
mean nothing to their companies. Others hop onto an ever-accelerating 
treadmill, pushing themselves to work 12 or more hours a day, six or seven 
days a week, out of fear that anything less will make them targets next 
time. And it doesn't help [stress symptoms] when people who are worried 
about losing their jobs have more work dumped on them because co-
workers have been fired ... ln a recent survey by the American Management 
Association, nearly half of the respondents said they feel more 
overwhelmed at work that they did in early 1993-before the economic 
recovery gained full steam. 
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Perhaps the most distressing aspect of this in my own work life has been the 
almost universal acceptance that the-way-things-are is inevitable and immutable, 
both among those who profit and among those who suffer. While there certainly 
are a number of highly cynical individuals who clearly understand this problem and 
use that knowledge to manipulate their environment for personal gain, the majority 
of business people wrestle with (and triumph over) their consciences frequently, 
at least in their early careers. Although I know of only a few who see themselves 
as "bad guys" and find moral concerns amusing, most have fallen far below what 
they might once have hoped to be, hiding their shame in vague rationalizations 
about having to make a living and being realistic about the nature of human 
beings, finally concluding, "Better him than me." I suspect that the resultant thinly 
veiled guilt is directly proportional to the vociferousness with which my colleagues 
in the business world have endorsed the Lunatic Right of Gordon Liddy and Rush 
Limbaugh. 
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My Search for Hope: A Response to these Problems. 
This descriotion of a desoairina world is not offered for the ouroose of ioinina with 
I I '*' I • ~ -
those merchants of cynicism whom I have criticized for deepening that despair. 
Certainly we are right to be afraid of ourselves, certainly the foregoing describes 
a world that cannot, and should not, be sustained; however, it also prompts my 
search for some ground of hope, better than those current in this Hobbesian late 
capitalism that we inhabit. This is the way that I have come to see the quest of 
which I spoke at the beginning: for me I suspect that meaning lies in finding and 
sharing such a hope. 
Although I have spoken of a search for hope, the reader will likely have noticed 
that here I have begun to say that my search is for some ground for hope, rather 
than simply for hope itself, as an acknowledgment that what I am doing implies 
that I am already filled with hope; albeit a hope challenged, belittled, orphaned, 
and homeless in this world of despair. In that sense, my search is perhaps more 
accurately described as a venture into apologetics: how am I to explain to my 
peers (and to myself) why I should be hopeful? 
My experience, both in business and in academia confirms that apologetics is not 
an inappropriate choice of terms. Among certain friends, my preference for positive 
possibilities is considered an endearing eccentricity; among others less well 
disposed to my case, it has been taken for naivete, and even for a lack of courage 
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before the existential precipice, the contemplation of which is fashionable with 
many. Thus. ! am dealing with two different levels in my search: the level of 
apologetics, where I try my faith against the anvil of doubt (both mine and my 
peers); and, the level of pedagogy, of a praxis where I would attempt to engage 
questions about the transmissibility of hope in a forum with the potential for 
mitigating what I have described of our world. 
Yet I did not know of the hope for which I now seek to craft an Apology until I 
contemplated the teaching of hope to others. Whatever else these two levels 
represent, their relationship is obviously dialectic, and so, in the service of both, 
it is my intention that naming the awfulness that surrounds us be the first step 
toward the development of a Credo which speaks to faith and pedagogy: a Credo 
conceived in this Agon. whose gestation is this dissertation and whose form is not 
yet known to me; a Credo which maintains there is yet time and cause for hope, 
a Credo which both faces our condition and engages the Mystery that, despite 
living here, we persist in hope. It is thus intention and hope, not certainty or 
intellection, that says that while this Credo will not avert its eyes from our 
condition, it will also acknowledge that even at these depths, humanity retains its 
capacity for that something more which Doris Lessing senses in her description of 
an all too plausible projection of this world into our future: 
This, then, is the condition of [humans] now, still only a few, but more and 
more, and soon-multitudes. Nothing they handle or see has substance, 
and so they repose in their imaginations on chaos, making strength from 
the possibilities of a creative destruction. They are weaned from everything 
but the knowledge that the universe is a roaring engine of creativity, and 
they are only temporary manifestations of it. Creatures infinitely damaged, 
reduced and dwindled from their origins, degenerate, almost lost-animals 
far removed from what was first envisioned for them by their designers, 
they are driven back and away from everything they had and held and now 
can take a stand nowhere but in the most outrageous extremities of-
patience. It is an ironic, and humble, patience, which learns to look at a 
leaf, perfect for a day, and see it as an explosion of galaxies, and the 
battleground of species. [Humans] are, in their awful and ignoble end, while 
they scuffle and scrabble and scurry among their crumbling and squalid 
artefacts, reaching out with their minds to heights of courage and ... l am 
putting the word faith here. After thought. With caution. And with an exact 
and hopeful respect (1979:203). 
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Hesche! says, "Gazing soberly at the world man is often overcome with a fear of 
action, a fear that, without knowledge of God's ways, turns to despair (1955: 284)." 
It may be becoming obvious which of two paths that Hesche! describes has fallen 
to us: 
There are those who sense the ultimate question in moments of wonder, 
in moments of joy; there are those who sense the ultimate question in 
moments of horror, in moments of despair .... [when] The world is in flames, 
consumed by evil. Is it possible thaf there is no one who cares (1955: 
367)? 
And how is the hazard of this progression from fear to despair related to our 
situation and to the Mystery of why we hope? Speaking to the something more 
which Lessing adds, Hesche! has it that: 
Fear is the expectation of evil or pain, as contrasted with hope, which is 
the anticipation of good. Awe, on the other hand, is the sense of wonder 
and humility inspired by the sublime or felt in the presence of mystery. Fear 
is "a surrender of the succors which reason offers"; awe is the acquisition 
of insights which the world holds in store for us. Awe, unlike fear, does not 
make us shrink from the awe-inspiring object, but, on the contrary, draws 
us near to it. This is why awe is compatible with both love and joy ... .In a 
sense, awe is the antithesis of fear .... Awe precedes faith; it is at the root 
of faith (1955: 76) .... Unless History is a vagary of nonsense, there must be 
a counterpart to the immense power of man to destroy, there must be a 
voice that says NO to man, a voice not vague, faint and inward, like 
qualms of conscience, but equal in spiritual might to man's power to 
destroy. The voice speaks to the spirit of prophetic men in singular 
moments of their lives and cries to the masses through the horror of 
history. The prophets respond, the masses despair (1955: 171) ..... Yet 
almost every true prophet begins with a message of doom, and only after 
long periods of misery and darkness is he able to speak of the dawn and 
to proclaim a message of hope (1955: 225). 
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And thus, though I will certainly listen carefully to hear the voices that would speak 
to my intellect (to, among others, psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, 
biologists, educators, and neuroscientists, to philosophers, historians and 
theologians, even to economists and the purveyors of laws), that which speaks 
only to the intellect is half or less of what must be heard. Other voices speak in 
form: as art, as music, as life narrative, or movement, or caring touch. And yet 
again, I must hear the quiet, almost voiceless ones that Hesche! and Lessing have 
heard: poets, mystics, prophets, gods--and God. 
Bringing Method to Questing. 
With so many voices and with an issue of cosmic proportions, can my own limited 
experience in the search (the struggle, at least, regardless of outcome) yield 
meaning for me and for others? Does so small a subset of such a problem remain 
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the same question? In response to such questions, I have adopted an interpretive 
stance in this work, reporting my own life experience of the search, attempting in 
that process to show how that experience has been shaped by the experiences 
I have borrowed from others, in the spirit that Max van Manen suggests: 
So phenomenological research is a being-given-over to some quest, a true 
task, a deep questioning of something that restores an original sense of 
what it means to be a thinker, a researcher, a theorist. A corollary is that 
phenomenological research does not start or proceed in a disembodied 
fashion. It is always a project of someone: a real person, who, in the 
context of particular individual, social, and historical life circumstances, sets 
out to make sense of a certain aspect of human existence .... A 
phenomenological description is always one interpretation, and no single 
interpretation of human experience will ever exhaust the possibility of yet 
another complementary, or even potentially richer or deeper description 
(1990: 31). 
And in a similar vein, this work will attempt to reflect what David Purpel 
recommends in speaking of the importance not only of situating our work in a 
personal context, but also of bringing the fruits of that personal inquiry into our 
community and into our praxis: 
Not only does moral education involve social, psychological, and 
metaphysical inquiry, but it also requires personal self-reflection and 
individual soul searching. Each of us engages in some form or another in 
the troubling and daunting task of searching for and acting on meaning and 
I believe that those of us who are educators ought to integrate this quest 
into our professional responsibilities. My view is that educators need to 
share that struggle and infuse personal reflection into the intellectual and 
ideological dimensions of their work not only as legitimate self-reflection but 
as a necessary part of genuine dialogue. We all come out of some 
tradition, some life-view, some basic posture towards our existence which 
are, of course, modified and altered by experience and reflection but still 
in some way inform who we are and what we do. Perhaps more to the 
point, we need to share our current struggles and address the basic 
questions of meaning as they influence our ongoing work, and in doing so 
v.-e join self-raflaction, research, learning, and teaching (1995: 156). 
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In such a methodology. the impossibility of being exhaustive is not a barrier to 
beginning. I am at liberty to focus these issues to the limits of my human 
instrument, recognizing that a failure to transcend those limits might prove to be 
instructive in itself. 
Thinking about Some Boundaries of Hope: Recognizing the Quarry. 
To what is this method to be applied? There is certainly no shortage of definitions: 
in this one word we have invested our attitudes toward birthday presents, the 
lottery, financial success, social reconciliation, species survival, spiritual 
understanding, and salvation-a behavior which must be at least unimaginative, if 
not self-defeating. Yet, we seem to understand its usage rather well from context: 
taking hope psychologically, as a motivation based on statistical likelihood, few are 
uncomfortable with speaking of a market economy as driven by the hope for profit, 
or with a parent expressing a hope that children might experience an increasing 
standard of living; and no confusion seems to ensue from that same person then 
saying that he/she has a hope for eternal life so certain that it may be annulled by 
no event. Thus, what has been called hope spans the range of human endeavor, 
the same worn word having been used to describe the most base of motives and 
the most sublime of truths. It can be seen as the epitome of credulity, the poppy 
from which is distilled the opiate of the masses, the Judas-goat which leads the 
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gullible to slaughter. This same word, to others, names the only alternative to 
absolute despair: humanity's only chance to tum aside from an irreversible 
descent. 
As an educator, I do not want to lose sight of this broad usage; the pluralistic 
nature of our culture is nowhere more obvious than when one examines the hopes 
that are stated and implied in the educational enterprise. Whether taken as 
expectation, belief, anticipation, aspiration, refuge, certainty, or sophistry, each of 
the stakeholders (e.g., students, faculty, parents, government, community, the past 
and the future) brings several kinds of hope to our table, many of them 
confounded and conflicted, yet each one dearly held. 
Just as David Purpel ( 1989) has argued that there is no morally neutral curriculum, 
in the same sense (and on the same and similar evidence) I would argue that 
there is no curriculum without hope. The point at issue is not if there is hope, but 
rather, "Hope in and for what?" For example, North Carolina's public school 
curriculum proudly grounds hope in the alleged capacity of the state to shape its 
population to fit the needs of the current economy for labor. (At least we cannot 
be faulted for aiming too high.) 
There are thus visions of hope that do not seem to me likely to contribute either 
to my personal quest nor to the search for a pedagogy of hope. For that reason, 
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I shall narrow what I mean by hope in the context of this work. I shall, in order to 
differentiate that which I seek, and without denying others their use of this 
pervasive term, reserve the word hope for use in the context of those experiences, 
ideas, and feelings which bring us to the awe of which Hesche I spoke, substituting 
for the remainder such useful-but less laden-words as optimism. This is not to 
discount the value of optimism, as I intend to demonstrate in the next chapter; nor 
is it to deny the importance of fear and despair, when they drive us from the 
death-like sleep of an unconsidered life; rather, it is to indicate the need to rescue 
the sign hope from an exhaustion of Heideggerian Alltag/ichkeit (everydayness) 
that has worn away its power. (I am indebted to Walker Percy's discussion (1991: 
353) of this issue in relation to education.) 
Heschel certainly knows what he means by hope, and while I cannot yet confess 
such a faith, I honor it as pointing in the direction that my heart wants to go: 
Over and above the deep sadness of our melodies, fears and 
experience of persecutions, rituals of mourning and memories of sorrow, 
hovers the power of hope. 
Hope is our power. It is a vital quality always at work within a 
person, anticipating freedom from misery. It is a power of perception, an 
intuition, a foreseeing. 
Hope cannot stand alone, It must be morally substantiated, faithfully 
attended. It must not lose the element of constancy and the intensity of 
expectancy. 
Hope is not cheerfulness, a temperamental confidence that all will 
tum out for the best. It is not an inclination to be guided by illusions rather 
than by facts. Hope is a conviction, rooted in trust, trust in Him who issued 
the promise; an ability to soar above the darkness that overshadows the 
divine .... Hope is the creative articulation of faith (1967: 93-4). 
Some Questions in the Context of Apologetics. 
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While I do not wish to gratuitously dichotomize my search, the distinction made 
earlier between what I have named apologetics (the personal quest to understand 
and defend the hope that I find already extant within myself) and a pedagogy of 
hope (concerned with the transmission of hope, which is intended to make the 
personal quest socially meaningful) does seem to require that I engage somewhat 
different questions in considering each. However, it is intended that these 
differences will eventually serve a dialectic purpose, yielding a synthesis superior 
to either. 
First then to apologetics. In attempting to frame my experience of finding hope 
already present in my own heart, I first sought to explain its presence by following 
a trail of life experiences that seemed to lead me to perceive a continuum, from 
despair-through optimism-to hope. I can reconstruct memories and master 
theories which offer to explain how, through a process of proper parenting, genetic 
determinism, and socio-economic good fortune, I have come to hold within myself 
a sense of energy and possibility, rather than of despair. The discovery of such a 
process would provide me with a map of the way back home, were I to fall into 
despair; and, it would prove invaluable as a pedagogy for those who were in 
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despair (or were merely optimistic) and who would wish to follow its procedures 
to find hope. !f that initial impression of my experience were to prove to be 
accurate, if such a continuum were to exist and if I (and others) might move along 
it in a smooth linear fashion from one signpost to another, then apologetics (and 
pedagogy) in the cause of hope would be a rather pedantic exercise. 
If on the other hand, as seems more likely from the continued existence of the 
problem, such is not the case, if I find it necessary to conclude that such a would-
be continuum is actually interrupted, once again the persistence of the problem, 
if nothing else, argues that it would be no small gap, but rather a radical 
discontinuity dealing with questions of the absolute nature of hope: a chasm of 
such proportions as to be bridged only by a Kierkegaardian leap. If such a 
discontinuity does exist, as I suspect that it does, and as I will attempt to show in 
the next chapter, then whole classes of possible answers to, "Hope in what?" 
become less useful. In such a case, what are we to make of our hope in 
ideologies, in political change, rational argument, scientific and technical progress, 
and human evolution? Similarly, the things we would hope for would need to 
undergo reconsideration. Would we still hope for material success, psychological 
states, political and social goals? My decades of failure in the effort to hope in and 
for such things add the weight of personal conviction to the dichotomous side of 
the scales. 
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Were I uninterested in the opinions of others, or in the condition of my community, 
such a separation would be a welcome release from concern with the mundane: 
however, such is not the response of my conscience to the problems we face. 
Much of the work required of my apology is then to be in the attempt to bridge this 
chasm, in a way that recognizes the absolute foundational nature of the ground of 
hope, while maintaining the capacity to say that how one lives one's life is 
important and has meaningful consequences. It is to say that history and tradition 
are important, meaningful, pragmatically useful tools for navigating the path to 
hope; and, at the same time, to deny that they define the ground for hope. This 
problem might be more recognizable in one of its religious forms: the perennial 
question of spiritual authority between tradition and mystical experience; the 
schism over the gnostic question of the worthiness of the world; or the struggle to 
reconcile immanence and transcendence. 
Education offers a similar opposition that illustrates this problem. Recasting the 
question of traditional authority and mystical knowledge in an academic mold, 
would substitute critical rationality as our tradition, and set opposite the authority 
of that tradition our struggle for a praxis that give more than lip service to a 
pluralism capable of questioning that rationality. Our dedication to that struggle, 
with so little success thus far, is an acknowledgement of our perceived need for 
a brand of pluralism which would protect us from being the cultural imperialists that 
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our history sets us up to be, a pluralism that recognizes the possibility of many 
paths to God. 
It seems to me that the crux of each of these problems illustrates a very difficult 
issue in the search for such wisdom: the claim by many (if not all) of those whom 
I find to be credible representatives of some degree of attainment in a spiritual 
tradition to have acquired in that process some "special knowledge" not available 
to those who maintain their prejudice toward a linear view of reality: a knowledge 
that resolves such dichotomies, showing them to be false, but false only from a 
transcendent viewpoint. That knowledge rests in what I might call the "radical 
foundationalism" of those mystics, who claim that one's range of perception is 
radically expanded by their experiences on the Path, that "only one who tastes, 
knows." This will obviously be a major sticking point for many who wish to have 
all answers judged in peer reviewed journals. Yet it is the core of the reason why 
the need for verbalizing a consensus is not felt among such persons. They 
apparently see the real commonalities as transcending what we are able to say, 
and acknowledge that attempts to draw back together various schisms through 
negotiation, compromise and argument, while pragmatically useful as "skillful 
means," are not in themselves paths to truth. 
This argument seems so contrary to the position currently fashionable in the 
Academy (and found in its more extreme form among radical postmodemists) that 
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I feel the need to point out how far the two positions travel together. I will argue 
that the deconstructive process so important to postmodemism is not an invention 
of the last century of European philosophy; rather, it appears perennially as a part 
of the pedagogy of most spiritual teaching traditions. What is unique to the current 
deconstructionists is a lack of understanding of the context in which this work has 
previously been done-they find themselves in the situation described by a Middle-
Eastern teaching story, wherein Moses, having thunderously berated a simple 
shepherd for idolatry after coming upon the man offering, in prayer, to comb the 
hair of God, is in turn reprimanded by God for having taken away the man's faith 
without having first given thought to his inability to offer a replacement. 
It is an appeal to experience rather than to tradition or theory that distinguishes the 
view that I am proposing. I acknowledge the difficulty of defining "experience" so 
as to simultaneously satisfy phenomenologists, psychologists, mystics and other 
interested parties. The issue is explored with great skill and sympathy by Harvey 
Cox (1995), and by Franklin Merreii-Wolff (1994), while a strong critique of this 
thesis is to be found in Wayne Proudfoot (1985), whom I obviously feel has missed 
the point in attempting to constrain experience within language. In any case, 
considerable care is required to avoid unnecessary confusion through assuming 
that our "common sense" understanding of the word is meaningful. While the next 
chapter will deal with experience in more detail, the recent book by Harvey Cox 
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(cited above) focused upon American Pentacostalism, offers a model of the future 
of religion that provides a social context for this position: 
As both scientific modernity and conventional religion progressively lose 
their ability to provide a source of spiritual meaning, two new contenders 
are stepping forward-"fundamentalism" and for lack of a better word, 
"experientialism." Both present themselves as authentic links to the sacred 
past. Both embody efforts to reclaim what is valuable from previous ages 
in order to apply it to the present and Mure. Which of the two rivals 
eventually prevails will be decided in large measure by which one grasps 
the nature of the change we are living through .... The proof for me [that 
experientialism is becoming an important force] is that there are so many 
ordinary people who ... are no longer content with either one-dimensional 
modernity or with stagnant religious practices. Though they might not use 
the words, they are more trustful of intuition and immediacy, and they are 
looking for ways to participate instead of observing. They are attracted to 
archaic and mystical modes of perception but do not want to surrender the 
more inductive ways of thinking recent history has evolved. Their worlds 
include both acupuncture and open-heart surgery, both meditation and 
international e-mail. They are fumbling for a new consciousness but do not 
want to live in a monk's cave. They appreciate a measure of material well 
being but they envision a more equitable and inclusive society too. Which 
of the two challengers-fundamentalism or experientialism-seems more 
likely to touch their inmost aspirations (1995:300-302)? 
And once again, this consciousness is not new to our time. D. T. Suzuki relates 
a teaching exchange from the Zen tradition, speaking to the difference between 
discourse and the experience of Satori (self-realization): 
[Student]: Is it not that thinking comes from hearing and that by thinking 
and reasoning one comes to perceive what Suchness is? Is this not self-
realization? 
[Teacher]: That is not so. Self-realization never comes from mere listening 
and thinking. 0 son of a good family, I will illustrate the matter by analogy. 
Listen! In a great desert there are no springs or wells; in the spring-time or 
in the summer when it is warm, a traveler comes from the west going 
eastward.; he meets a man coming from the east and asks him: I am 
terribly thirsty; prey tell me where I can find a spring and a cool refreshing 
spring where I may drink, bathe, rest, and get thoroughly revived? 
The man of the east gives the traveler, as desired, all the 
information in detail, saying: When you go farther east the road divides into 
two, right and left. You take the right one, and going steadily further on you 
will surely come to a fine spring and a refreshing shade. Now, son of a 
good family, do you think that the thirsty traveler from the west, listening 
to the talk about the spring and the shady trees, and thinking of going to 
that place as quickly as possible, can be relieved of thirst and heat and get 
refreshed? 
[Student]: No, he cannot; because he is relieved of thirst and heat and gets 
refreshed only when, as directed by the other, he actually reaches the 
fountain and drinks of it and bathes in it. 
[Teacher]: Son of a good family, even so with the Bodhisattva. By merely 
listening to it, thinking of it, and intellectually understanding it, you will 
never come to the realization of any truth (1994:13). 
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Following that exchange, the teacher removes any doubt that what he is describing 
is entirely apart from academic disciplines, doctrine, oral tradition or any of the 
fundamentalist verities which Cox discussed previously: 
The truth of self-realization [and Reality itself] are neither one nor 
two ... Reality itself has neither form nor no-form; like space it is beyond 
knowledge and understanding; it is too subtle to be expressed in words 
and letters .... Why? Because it is beyond the realm of letters, words, 
speeches, mere talk, discriminative intellection, inquiring and speculative 
reflection; and again it is beyond the realm of the understanding which 
belongs to the ignorant, beyond all evil things which are in accordance with 
evil desires. Because it is neither this nor that, it is beyond all mentation; 
it is formless, without form ... (1994: 14-15). 
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Nor is this claim strictly an eastern phenomena. It may be presented in a quite 
formidable fashion by one who masters western philosophy, such as Franklin 
Merrell-Wolff: 
Truth is a complex of two determinants: form and substance. In the empiric 
realm, the form is logic, and the substance comes from sense experience. 
I contend that the same holds true on the metaphysical level-that there is 
substantive Truth attained only by the function of introceptional Realization 
and that there is a logical form in which it is enrobed. The logical form 
without the Realization becomes, with respect to metaphysical material, 
only speculation-but, in combination with the introceptional content, it 
becomes a transcriptive presentation of a Transcendent Reality (1995: 
305). 
And in the Christian tradition, John Sanford, in his commentary on the Gospel of 
John, says: 
As long as our awareness is limited by that of our senses we cannot 
imagine any way that the soul could live except in this earthly existence 
and framework. Jesus points out that there are many possible abodes 
r'many mansions'1 in which the soul can exist; he tells how he will go 
before the disciples into a spiritual realm unseen by them in order to 
prepare a place for them in a realm of reality that the ego in its fleshly 
state, limited as it is to sense impression and ego-awareness, cannot 
perceive. This spiritual realm of which Jesus speaks is, in fact, only 
apprehensible through inner experiences such as visions and ecstatic 
experiences, like the experience Paul describes in 2 Corinthians 12:1-4, in 
which he tells of being caught up into paradise and hearing things that 
cannot be put into any ordinary human language (1993: 266). 
Yet these teachers work with great energy in the world, in the marketplace, not 
retreating into caves. To attempt to explain why this is and as a keystone in the 
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aforementioned bridge that I must build, I will introduce here a concept known as 
"skillful means," a concept to which I will return at length: 
All of the Buddha's teaching are a finger pointing to the moon. To 
see the moon, we use the finger, but we must not mix up the finger and 
the moon. The finger is not the moon. "Skillful means"-in Sanskrit, upaya-
are methods created to guide people toward awakening. But if these 
methods are taken as a description of awakening or as awakening itself, 
they become a kind of prison. As soon as we think that the finger is the 
moon, we no longer look in the direction the finger is pointing. 
Skillful means can be a verbal declaration or a simple gesture. 
Great masters possess what Buddhism calls the Wisdom of the Skillful 
Ways (upaya-jnana), or the capacity to create and employ different 
methods suitable for different personalities and different occasions .... 
But these means are only skillful if they are suitable to the particular 
circumstances. For them to be effective, they must fulfill the real needs and 
particular mentalities of those they seek to guide. If a master is not capable 
of understanding the mentality of the student, he or she will not be able to 
create skillful or effective means .... Zen underlines the importance of 
effectiveness and skill in bringing disciples to awakening (Hahn, 1995: 51-
2). 
Questions in the Context of Pedagogy. 
It seems to me that the search for a pedagogy thus becomes one of finding a way 
to invite one's students to this personal quest; a way of bringing my own search 
for an apologetics of hope into the public context of the classroom. One of the 
obvious hazards is the deterioration of such an effort into indoctrination, with 
students either uncritically adopting the teacher's life experience as their own, or 
resisting such an indoctrination and finding further ground for the endemic 
cynicism. Yet to allow such hazards to preempt any effort toward a pedagogy of 
hope is to isolate the personal quest in introspection or intellectual enclaves. 
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Refusing to make this effort affirms the pretense that our hidden curriculum does 
not already contain the "hidden hopes" t.l1at were discussed eart!er. 
Aside from the feasibility of transmitting hope, there is the more important question 
of whether or not it should be done. Certainly if one is a merchant of the hopes 
of the marketplace or of those which, in the previous discussion, I have attempted 
to set aside from my search, the moral ground ranges from ambiguous to absent. 
Central to the current effort is the question of conveying that hope which is 
associated with the feelings of awe expressed by Hesche! in the previous quote, 
with the numinous by Rudolf Otto (1923), and with similar reports of spiritual 
experience. In the course of this work, I shall pursue an intuition gained from my 
exposure to many traditions, that both the question of the technical feasibility of 
transmitting hope and the larger moral issue of its permissibility may both be 
resolved in a classroom where the teacher is a student of such ideas; that in such 
a situation, with a teacher concerned to avoid indoctrination yet willing to take the 
risk of avowing a personal path, students may "catch" hope in a form compatible 
with their own traditions. 
Remembering the pedagogical importance of questions, and the rarity of good 
ones, I have compiled the following list to hold before this inquiry and, if they prove 
to have any of that rare quality, to be recommended to students. To these 
questions, I would solicit, either from myself or from students, not answers, but 
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responses, believing that such questions, to the extent that they touch upon 
important issues, also touch upon a mystery that should be encountered, not 
resolved. It is the change that such an encounter makes in our lives that is the 
determinant of quality in a question; to answer such a question is to throw away 
a good tool prior to completion of the task. 
What is the nature of hope? Is there a developmental continuum along which one 
might move toward hope? If so, does it range from despair-through optimism-to 
hope? Is fear more appropriate as hope's opposite on that continuum than 
despair? (Fear sometimes has the redeeming feature of prompting flight from its 
cause, unless that cause lies within oneself, in which case the response is, 
perhaps, despair. Despair has the air of permanency, its characteristic paralysis 
of the will seemingly requiring the intervention of some outside agency for release.} 
From where comes the will to move along such a continuum toward hope? If there 
are discontinuities here, rather than a continuum, then does this mean that 
optimism (a teachable trait} is of no use in the search for hope, is perhaps a snare 
rather than a steppingstone? Does an absolute hope that cannot be lost have any 
meaning in the world? That is, if there is no risk, is there meaning? Marcel (1962} 
says that hope must be absolute, that any hope that is for something or in 
something is a contract with despair, yet Heschel tells me (1955: 125} that, " ... an 
idea of the absolute-devoid of life, devoid of freedom-is an issue for science or 
metaphysics rather than a concern for the soul or the conscience." 
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Is hope a necessary part of our humanity? Do some actually continue to exist 
without hope? How sma!! can tl'le spark be, without going out? !s there some 
biological drive that is less than hope which moves us when hope is gone? Can 
those who have fallen that far be brought back? How? (c.f. Turnbull's The 
Mountain People (1968)) Is millenarianism in lieu of hope: a fierce joy at the 
world's just ending? 
How do we come to hope? What is the relationship between "knowing" and hope? 
Do we come to hope on the basis of experience or despite it? What does it mean 
to lose hope? Why doesn't what we claim to know lead us to behave in ways that 
might contribute to the realization of what we claim to hope? How does an 
individual's hope relate to his/her concept of human nature, and is it possible that 
the intentional use of cognitive processes, aimed at changing a dark concept of 
human nature, might engender hope? Is something more than human effort 
required? Can such an inquiry be sustained if confronted by an unspeakable 
mystery, a mystery in Heschel's sense that it is " ... not a synonym for the unknown, 
but rather a name for a meaning which stands in relation to God (1955: 74)"? In 
that event, can we, as he requires, " ... celebrate the mystery, rather than to 
penetrate or to explain it (1995: 185)"? 
How might we engender hope in others, and may we, if we can? How can I speak 
each of these questions to a frightened child, to a student, or to a weary friend, so 
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that such a one leaves my presence with more hope than before? If that should 
happen, what has happened? 
Where Are We Going? 
In the next chapter, I shall introduce several new sources and call again on others 
already mentioned, in order to support and enlarge upon several themes 
introduced in this chapter: the dialectic relationship of my apology and pedagogy; 
the virtues of optimism, as well as its limits; the discontinuity which implies a 
radical foundationalism that absolutizes hope; the knowledge claims of spiritual 
experience, and my questions concerning the transmissibility of hope. In keeping 
with the method described above, it is my intention to relate the story of my 
encounter with these themes and sources, rather than to present an analytical 
recital. 
From there, I shall attempt to illustrate, by mirroring the works of iconoclasts and 
mystics, how two seemingly opposed views of our way home might rather be seen 
as complementary and mutually supporting. This is to be followed by a synthesis 
intended to prepare the way for the promised Credo. 
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Chapter II. 
THE CHASM 
This chapter (along with the next) attempts to integrate some important members 
of the intellectual and spiritual company that has shaped the development of my 
concern with hope and in which I travel upon my quest, with my explication of the 
themes which were begun in Chapter One. These chapters are to be less a survey 
of the literature or an attempt to represent the positions of this company with such 
brief excerpts than they are to be a description: of how encounters with each 
member of this company have fed the spark of hope in my life, and of how each 
of these encounters has shaped my questions and prepared me to respond. 
Although the work of many of these sources spans several fields, I shall introduce 
them among their most widely recognized peers. Among scientists, I shall draw 
upon: the sociology of Peter Berger; the psychology of Ornstein, Deikman, 
Maslow, and Seligman; the anthropology of Hall and Turnbull. Modernists (and 
their heirs) will include Adam Smith, Freud, and Marx; while the representatives 
of postmodemism, critical theory and prophetic pragmatism will be, respectively, 
Harvey, Shapiro, and West. Aesthetic sources, which, in these cases, are for me 
explicitly spiritual, will include: Walt Whitman, Henry David Thoreau, Dag 
Hammarskjold, and Doris Lessing. Among Christian theologians, there will be 
Moltmann, Cobb, Marcel, Fox, Brueggemann and Solie. Characterized as 
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pragmatic mystics will be ldries Shah, Franklin Merreii-Wolff, Thomas Merton, and 
Beatrice Bruteau. The fourth of these divisions of the spiritual, prophets in the 
tradition of Abraham Heschel, will acknowledge David Purpel. 
It is to these encounters and to the work of this company that I shall now turn, 
both in enlarging upon one of the themes introduced in the first chapter and in 
redeeming several promises for further development of positions provisionally 
taken. Chapter Two confronts the discontinuity which I perceive between hope and 
the means our culture advocates for its attainment, a discontinuity which I name 
the chasm. Some of these sources speak at great length on this issue, while 
others will be more helpful in later chapters, with other themes. As a result, the 
organization of what follows is a matrix of the contributions of individuals with 
efforts to report my own experience, which sometimes requires returning several 
times to an author. 
In addition to this main theme of the chasm, many of the other themes from 
Chapter One will recur to a greater or lesser extent in this chapter (and all will be 
revisited by the conclusion of Three and Four). To spare the memory of the reader, 
they are recapitulated here, with the principal theme of this chapter being the 
second listed. Thus far, I have demonstrated, or asserted, or called attention to: 
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• The condition of our world, which is such that it cannot, and should not, endure 
unchanged. with pain and meaninglessness as its defining characteristics. 
• My perception, growing our of that pain and meaninglessness, of a chasm which 
seems to interrupt the paths to hope prescribed by our cultural repertoire and 
which calls me to the search for a bridge across that chasm. Some preliminary 
findings in that search: the sometimes helpful but always incomplete nature of 
what we can know intellectually (e.g., optimism), and of many traditional 
formulations (e.g., religions, democratic governance); the failure of critical 
rationality; and the failure of many of our best minds to find a way past the chasm 
of despair, as exemplified by the compensatory glorification of greed in the 
marketplace, of despair in the Academy and of cynicism in popular culture. 
• The conviction that, as a response to the condition of our world and the 
inadequacy of our generally accepted means for dealing with it, my path to 
meaning lies in finding a ground for hope (my quest) and sharing it (my pedagogy) 
in a form which is sustainable within such a world of despair. My hope that such 
meaning would contribute to the lessening of pain, of the vast sea of unnecessary 
suffering which we inflict upon ourselves. 
• The discovery that my quest has become an effort in apologetics, because, in 
searching, I have found within myself a reservoir of hope that I had not previously 
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acknowledged. My awareness that, despite the hope which is in my heart, I am 
confronted by the paradox of not knowing how to defend its presence 
(apologetics), or how to describe to others how it might be attained (pedagogy). 
• The hope that a path may lie in a return to Wisdom as the goal of education. The 
paradox of a creature defined by its language arguing for (apologetics) and 
teaching about (pedagogy) that which is generally portrayed by its best 
practitioners as inaccessible through language. The issue of special knowledge 
and the way of skillful means. 
Expecting a Continuum and Finding the Chasm. 
The dogma of early modernism, still preserved in the stasis which is our political 
discourse (as well as at Epcot Center), asserts that our system of trade, our 
system of governance, our technical capacities and our intellectual cleverness will 
inevitably create for us, through progress, a better world. Having succeeded the 
older religions and the various idealisms, these beliefs have provided the ground 
of certainty and hope for several generations. The Great American Modernism 
asserts that the continuum for which I sought in Chapter One exists in these 
dogmas. Given the proper reverence for, and application of, critical rationality and 
hard work, all things are held to be possible (and some even hold, inevitable). 
Answers and success are considered to lie along a linear projection of what is 
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known and believed, a continuum along which we may move, assured that hope 
is justified. 
It is apparently the case that we can sustain ambiguity in only a small portion of 
our lives; thus, as events have begun to present an increasingly unarguable case 
against this modernist faith, the consequent removal of our previous grounding and 
the absence of any credible alternative in our cultural repertoire has caused us to 
behave with a seldom acknowledged inconsistency-we seem to renounce this 
faith, while continuing to behave in ways that show us to be devout believers. Our 
self-deception in refusing to acknowledge this inconsistency leaves us with the 
worst of both cases: by denying that there is a problem, we continue to suffer the 
consequences yet can give no conscious attention to their cause. For example, 
although this faith has been effectively deconstructed by the Academy and is 
generally patronized as naive among its intellectuals, because it remains the 
dominant structure of our society, it is still the organizing force in the personal lives 
of its members-few readings of Foucault are strong enough to result in the refusal 
of an offer of tenure, no matter how convincingly the offering institution incarnates 
oppression. Similarly, the compensatory glorification of greed in the marketplace, 
although demonstrably inadequate to its assigned task of replacing hope and 
clearly culpable in much of our suffering, is unchallenged in any promising way--it 
continues to exacerbate our problems and to absorb the energies of many of those 
who might have served in better ways. And the skepticism with which we 
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modernists sought to free ourselves from old tyrannies has itself become a prison, 
in the shape of the cynicism of popular culture. This generalized cynicism, which 
is seemingly able to corrode and destroy anything except itself, supports and is 
supported by that daily litany in which we each have some level of complicity, by 
saying in some fashion, "All politicians are corrupt; no one acts from any motive 
but self-interest; if I refrain from taking personal advantage, someone will get 
ahead of me by doing so; I'm sorry, but 'business-is-business' and must stand 
apart from any constraint except competitive survival." Thus, the tools with which 
we thought to rule our world have instead proved to be a bag-of-tricks, empty of 
substance, yet still powerful in diverting our attention. Such a culture with only 
emptiness at its core seems unlikely to find any other end than despair; still 
denying the exhaustion of our cultural repertoire, we seem destined to awaken 
without warning upon a precipice, staring without hope into an unbridgeable 
chasm. 
I wish to reexamine this terrain, hoping that in the process I might find some 
opportunity to tum aside from that ending. In this process, I am willing to stipulate 
(in the legal sense of agreeing to an opponent's points without contest) the 
success of the deconstruction both of modernism and of the various 
equivocations, such as dogmatic religion and less-than-radical deconstructionism, 
by which we have sought to shelter our constructed selves. However, this chapter 
offers what I consider to be an alternate path to the conclusions of the 
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deconstructionists, one which, as a result of having traveled by a different way, 
allows for a wav oast their limitations. Similarly to the "reconstructive 
postmodemism" of Suzi Gablik (1994: 209), I propose that the worst of their 
limitations is that, while offering us the freedom associated with the knowledge that 
our socially constructed world is only one of many possible worlds, their very 
effectiveness at demolition has left the deconstructionists (and the rest of us) with 
unacknowledged burdens at least as great as those from which we seem to have 
been freed: 
Yet the freedom that comes with such insights and awareness carries with 
it a paradoxical burden-"an unbearable lightness of being." Into what are 
we being freed? In a world that is shown more and more to be arbitrary-
one among many possibilities, where reality is always and only the illusory 
effect of images and symbols and where all such realities are undergirded 
by power-emancipation seems only to offer more of the same. Freedom 
becomes nothing more than the endless task of doubting-and challenging-
the veracity of whatever "regime of truth," as Foucault calls it, we find 
ourselves living in. Freedom offers little more than the never-ending 
opportunity of deconstructing the beliefs, assumptions, commitments, and 
ideologies that structure our world. A kind of freedom that formats what 
Peter Mclaren calls "the restless subjectivities" of those with "broader 
identities." Yet such emancipation without grounding, freedom without 
anchorage, surely offers a nightmarish prospect. Endless doubt about what 
we see, hear, feel, and know is surely the royal route to what the 
contemporary German scholar Peter Sloterdijk calls "cynical 
consciousness" (the dominant consciousness, he asserts, in the modem 
world). It as a consciousness without conviction about the possibilities of 
a truly different and better world and without the commitment to struggle 
for it. Freedom brings with it only the possibility of being different from what 
we are today-but for what reason and to what benefit. ... It is, of course, into 
this emancipatory cul-de-sac that conservative commentators have so 
effectively injected themselves .... with a call to the epistemological order of 
yesteryear (Purpel and Shapiro, 1995:xx-xxi). 
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Much of the uncertainty of our postmodem lived world can be related to the price 
of this freedom: subjective detachment and the consequent changability of our 
identities. In fact, as Rosenau (1992) tells us, to the postmodemists of the most 
skeptical persuasion, that which we assume to possess an identity, the subject, is 
less than necessary, merely an "effect of discourse:" 
The skeptics question the value of a unified, coherent subject such as a 
human being, a person, as a concrete reference point...The subject, they 
contend, is fictitious, in the extreme a mere construction ... , "only a mask, 
a role, a victim, at worst an ideological construct, at best a nostalgic 
effigy." .... They argue that personal identity of this sort, if it ever existed, 
was only an illusion, and it is no longer possible today, in a postmodem 
context (p. 42-3) 
In a less radical, but none the less disturbing view, while analyzing the mechanism 
by which individuals are convinced to labor in industrial environments for the 
financial benefit of persons other than themselves and their families, David Harvey 
talks about forces that act upon the identity of each of us, buffeting our self-
concepts and emphasizing how we might conclude that the aforementioned 
cynicism and despair has come to be perceived as required by our environment, 
simply to survive: 
Education, training, persuasion, the mobilization of certain social 
sentiments (the work ethic, company loyalty, national or local pride) and 
psychological propensities (the search for identity through work, individual 
initiative, or social solidarity) all play a role and are plainly mixed with the 
formation of dominant ideologies, cultivated by the mass media, religious 
and educational institutions, the various arms of the state apparatus, and 
asserted by simple articulation of their experience on the part of those who 
do the work (1990: 124). 
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Regardless of the need for such flexibility, Harvey recognizes the costs of such a 
strategy. He suspects that we are approaching a time where the general state of 
the metaphors of "self-in-context (Fitzgerald, 1995)" used by individuals in our 
society will be non-adaptive, ''There is an omni-present danger that our mental 
maps will not match current realities (Harvey, 1990: 305)." Speaking of street 
"cultures" in the contemporary city, Harvey uses language that might easily be 
generalized to be what he foresees for much of our society: 
Dazed and distracted characters wander through these worlds without a 
clear sense of location, wondering "Which world am I in and which one of 
my personalities do I deploy?" .... Our postmodem ontological landscape, 
" ... is unprecedented in human history-at least in the degree of its pluralism 
(1990: 301)." 
It is this panorama of ruined possibilities, subjective dislocation, and cultural chaos, 
in the absence any apparent opportunity for further progress, which allows us to 
perceive the outlines of my chasm, yet the chasm is something more than the sum 
of those problems, which are only its symptoms. These symptoms tell us of the 
chasm, in much the same way that we may perceive a magnetic field with a 
sprinkling of iron filings. They are radical discontinuities where life-ways, once 
trusted and sure, fail. One who travels the various paths to hope which our culture 
prescribes, will at some point suffer such symptoms, in finding each of those roads 
to end at a precipice. This precipice, this exhaustion of the possibilities inherent 
in a particular path is the edge of a chasm unbridgeable by the means at hand. 
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I assert here that the radical discontinuity between relativist optimism and the 
absolute nature of hope with which I was contending in the previous chapter is this 
very chasm, whose symptoms extend across our entire cultural landscape, 
interrupting every path upon which we are accustomed to rely. I acknowledge that 
such a position implies a radical and unfashionable foundationalism, a "skepticism 
about skepticism" that is no more comfortable with the solipsism implicit in yielding 
the field to this gadfly than to the deconstructionists (see Chapter Three for an 
expansion of this position on the absolute nature of hope). 
At the same time, I have chosen to stand in the agentic tradition, wanting to affirm 
that human agency is both efficacious and meaningful, and thus am disposed to 
seek to build bridges over such a chasm, and willing to attempt to build them in 
the face of an unresolved paradox. I gave some general shape to that paradox in 
the last chapter, it now appears, in the light of the preceding discussion of the 
unacknowledged inconsistency in our culture's relation to faith and action, that it 
(my own inconsistency, if you will) consists more specifically of affirming the 
absolute nature of the chasm (thus suggesting the impossibility of bridging it) while 
insisting that choices about the path one follows make a critically important 
difference in one's chance of building a bridge over what Kierkegaard would leap! 
To compound the problem, I acknowledge that the tool of skepticism is invaluable 
in making those choices, that the obstructions of dogmatism can often be removed 
in no other way. Although the burden of formulating my response to that paradox 
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falls primarily to Chapter Four, it would only be fair to forewarn the reader that it 
will hinae uoon a defense of the noetic aualitv of ineffable SPiritual experience . ..., . . . . . 
Another presumption critical to the quest for hope is that outcomes other than 
despair can be associated with perceiving the chasm. How one comes to the edge 
shapes one's options before the chasm: the path one chooses shapes the 
destination. One element which seems to me to predispose any path to despair 
is a lack of humility: if a path claims that its dogma is exhaustive, then when it is 
exhausted, the adherent appears to be devoid of further possibilities--beyond hope. 
Among the multitude of such hubristic paths which have made these claims, 
become exhausted and then left their adherents in such a desperate state, some 
of the more popular are: scientism, dogmatic Christianity, TV-psychic mysticism, 
fossilized schools of spirituality looted from other cultures, naturalism, and free-
market economics. Such hubris may consist of taking, intellectually, a spiritual 
position that one has not yet grown enough to support. Simply put, believing that 
one knows Truth, when that is not the case, is a denial of possibility that is likely 
to lead to despair when that belief fails. In other words, if one comes by way of 
disillusionment or cynicism to feel that all our cultural responses are exhausted, 
one's options at the edge of that chasm would seem to be considerably more 
truncated than if one reached the same point as the result of a search informed 
by a world view which, for example, sees such an exhaustion both as a necessity, 
and as a waystation, rather than as a terminus. To retain the possibility of a 
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positive outcome in the discovery of the chasm, it may well be critical to remember 
how wei! humility serves here, in retaining the willingness to let go of the means 
that are so important in freeing ourselves of illusions, once they have served their 
purpose, and in helping to make sure that claims about how to find the edge of the 
chasm do not escalate into claims about the unlanguagable other side. 
Attempting to maintain certainty on the basis of an exhausted means in the face 
of the chasm presents the opportunity for the cynicism previously discussed, for 
helplessness and despair. This is the point where one has the opportunity to make 
one of those critical choices-in-the-face-of-paradox which was mentioned earlier: 
the decision to seek the edge of the chasm, rather than to attempt to evade the 
knowledge of its existence. It is certainly fair to ask to begin, why we should have 
any interest in bothering with such a choice at all? It might seem that the most 
prudent choice one might make would be to simply "stay home," to avoid any 
encounter with such precipitous edges; after all, fear of falling is one of our few 
well documented "instincts." Surely whatever method we might find to limit our 
anxiety over the issues we have discussed would be preferable to engaging them? 
By "staying home" one may avoid this problem for much of a life, perhaps even 
managing to die without acknowledging the pointlessness of traveling a road to 
nowhere. Flight from anxiety, or its suppression, is the function of a large part of 
popular psychology and religion. To offer an explanation for my own decision to 
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seek the edge, I shall tum to the existentialists' consideration of Angst. As David 
r nnnor f 1 OOQ\ c:avc:· 
---,...-• \ ·-- I- ¥-· 
It is the very nature of Angst, hardly a pleasing feeling, that people should 
generally endeavor to avoid it by "fleeing" into bad faith and the comforting 
embrace of the "they." .... ln the first instance, Angst is the disturbing and 
"uncanny mood which summons a person to reflect on his individual 
existence and its "possibilities." It is this which people are more than ready 
to pass off as a "funny tum," returning with relief to the "tranquilizing" ways 
of the "they." But suppose that a person faces up to his Angst, accepting 
the truths about his existence which it intimates. Then a number of options 
appears, including modulation into that resolute, sober and joyful Angst to 
which Heidegger refers (p. 128) .... Jaspers describes metaphysical fear 
r·metaphysical fear'' is Jasper's translation of Angst] as "the vertigo and 
trepidation of freedom facing a choice." Vertigo requires the presence of an 
abyss, the absence of a supporting ground. Angst likewise is the 
experience of groundlessness .... lt is then the appreciation that none of the 
exigencies, values, and commitments with which we find ourselves 
embroiled in everyday life furnishes sufficient grounding for the attitudes, 
interpretations and behavior we adopt (p. 130) .... The usual meanings of 
things and actions fade as the everyday framework within they have their 
slots become "uncanny" (p. 131). 
How very much we resemble, in our worlds of business, education and popular 
culture, those whom Cooper says are "fleeing into bad faith." The self-contradiction 
of our disavowing the modernist faith while claiming its rewards is clearly reflected 
in those who tum away from their Angst. Yet this sketch of Cooper's description 
gives us no ground for finding that engaging Angst is preferable to evading it. For 
that ground, I prefer Walter Davis' (1989) argument, which, although complex and 
extensive, generally takes the form that anxiety (his translation of Angst) requires 
(and enables) us to take responsibility for Being. He says: 
... anxiety calls us back from our involvement in practical matters to a 
deeper and prior concem ... anxiety restores our contact with that which is 
indefinite (p. 129) .... Anxiety reveals my subjectivity as something that IS 
fully at issue and for which I am totally responsible .... However tranquilized 
we may be, anxiety has the power to tell us how things stand with respect 
to a humanity from which we are never delivered .... The deepest lesson 
anxiety teaches us is not that we exist, but that we must act (p. 
131) .... From Aristotle through Wittgenstein the general assumption has 
been that if there is no answer it isn't a question. Existentialism argues, in 
contrast, that the "correct" relationship with the fundamental questions is 
to keep them alive and deepen our relationship to them as questions. A 
question is a great hole in being, a rupture with positivity, an experience of 
nothing as prior to and more profound than something (p. 138) .... The 
existential focus on nothingness suggests, in fact, that our responsibility 
extends to being in general or "the whole of things" (p. 139). 
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Thus we encounter another paradox (a seemingly indispensable symptom of a 
useful question): what we claim to find intolerable about our world and what is so 
easily blamed for our condition-the dawning of a perception that our cultural 
means are failing us-is an indispensable step along our way home. We must 
choose to encounter the nothingness that underlies the verities upon which we 
have for too long grounded our hopes; now we must stand upon the edge of the 
chasm--in the hope that our anxiety points the way to our salvation. 
Opportunities to encounter that nothingness are increasingly frequent. In a 
terrifying account of the social disintegration of the lk, a tribal group which, 
confined to an inadequate reservation, collapsed into the utmost depths of 
barbarism, Colin Turnbull delivered a picture of an entire culture which has been 
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swept along by inexorable forces, has unexpectedly encountered and gone over 
the edge, and has demonstrating the fragility of the structures which we seek to 
understand. He has also demonstrated the price which may be extracted from us 
if we fail to encounter the chasm consciously and intentionally. He argues that 
what we consider human virtues are social constructs which we must strive to 
maintain, not ineradicable characteristics of human beings. He assures us that, 
"Most of us are unlikely to admit readily that we can sink as low as the Ik, but 
many of us do, and with far Jess cause (1972: 12)." In his conclusion he deals 
plainly with the question of our prospects as we approach the chasm at the end 
of our own cultural repertoires: 
If we grant, as the evidence indicates we should, that the lk were not 
always as they are, and that they once possessed in full measure those 
values that we all hold to be basic to humanity, indispensable for both 
survival and sanity, then what the lk are telling us is that these qualities are 
not inherent in humanity at all, they are not a necessary part of human 
nature. Those values which we cherish so highly and which some use to 
point to our infinite superiority over other forms of animal life may indeed 
be basic to human society, but not to humanity, and that means that the 
lk clearly show that society itself is not indispensable for man's survival, 
that man is not the social animal he has always thought himself to be, and 
that he is perfectly capable of associating for purposes of survival without 
being social. The lk have successfully abandoned useless appendages, by 
which I refer to those "basic" qualities such as family, cooperative sociality, 
belief, love, hope and so forth, for the very good reason that in their 
context these militated against survivai....Such interaction as there is within 
this system is one of mutual exploitation. This is the relationship between 
all, old and young, parent and child, brother and sister, husband and wife, 
friend and friend. That is how it already is with the lk. They are brought 
together by self-interest alone, and the system takes care that such 
association is of a temporary nature and cannot flourish into anything as 
dysfunctional as affection or trust. Does that sound so very different from 
our own society? In our own world the very mainstays of a society based 
en a tru!y social sense of mutuality are breaking down, indicating that 
perhaps society itself as we know it has outworn its usefulness, and that 
by clinging to an outworn system more proper to the neolithic age we are 
bringing about our own destruction. We have tinkered with society, 
patching it up to cope with two thousand years of change, but it shows 
signs of collapse almost everywhere, and the signs are more violent where 
the society is more "advanced" (1972: 288-93). 
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The culture of the lk doesn't sound unfamiliar at all. In fact it sounds much like a 
rational projection of our own postmodemity, where Harvey's "dazed and distracted 
characters" are the citizens. As Turnbull sees it: 
Family, economy, government and religion, the basic categories of social 
activity and behavior, despite our tinkering ... are no longer structured in 
such a way as to create any sense of social unity involving a shared and 
mutual responsibility between all members of our society ... .It is the world 
of the individual, as is the world of the lk .... We pursue ... trivial, idiotic 
technological encumbrances and imagine them to be the luxuries that 
make life worth living, and all the time we are losing our potential for social 
rather than individual survival, for hating as well as loving, losing perhaps 
our last chance to enjoy life with all the passion that is our nature and 
being (1972: 293-95). 
Unfortunately, we do not need to search nearly so far afield to find what might 
become further evidence that, as Turnbull said above, "by clinging to an outworn 
system ... we are bringing about our own destruction." If we have thus far been able 
to fend off the conviction that our society is on the brink of discovering the chasm 
involuntarily, even the most cursory reading of Cornel West on "Nihilism in Black 
America" should put us over that edge: 
we must delve into the depths where neither liberals nor conservatives 
dare to tread, namely, into the murky waters of despair and dread that now 
flood the streets of black America. To talk about the depressing statistics 
of unemployment, infant mortality, incarceration, teenage pregnancy, and 
violent crime is one thing. But to face up to the monumental eclipse of 
hope, the unprecedented collapse of meaning, the incredible disregard for 
human (especially black) life and property in much of black America is 
something else ... The liberal/conservative discussion conceals the most 
basic issue now facing black America: the nihilistic threat to its very 
existence (1993: 12). 
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What is this nihilism? Is what West is talking about some intermediate stage 
between the collapse of the lk culture and the dis-ease of those still privileged in 
America? 
The proper starting point for the crucial debate about the prospects for 
black America is an examination of the nihilism that increasingly pervades 
black communities. Nihilism is to be understood here not as a philosophical 
doctrine that there is no rational grounds for legitimate standards or 
authority; it is, far more, the lived experience of coping with a life of 
horrifying meaninglessness, hopelessness, and (most important) 
lovelessness. The frightening result is a numbing detachment from others 
and a self-destructive disposition toward the world. Life without meaning, 
hope, and love breeds a coldhearted, mean-spirited outlook that destroys 
both the individual and others (West, 1993: 13-4). 
Can any of us, in the present climate of down-sizing and recision of entitlements, 
assert that our own lived-worlds are proof against a future similar to the present 
which West describes? 
Black people have always lived in America's wilderness in search of a 
promised land. Yet many black folk now reside in a jungle ruled by a 
cutthroat market morality devoid of any faith in deliverance or hope of 
freedom. Contrary to the superficial claims of conservative behaviorists, 
these jungles are not primarily the result of pathological behavior. Rather, 
this behavior is the tragic response of a people bereft of resources in 
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same as asserting that individual black people are not responsible for their 
actions-black murderers and rapists should go to jail. But it must be 
recognized that the nihilistic threat contributes to criminal behavior. It is a 
threat that feeds on poverty and shattered cultural institutions and grows 
more powerful as the armors to ward against it are weakened (1993: 16). 
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Within the unexamined assumptions of our popular culture, armor against the 
nihilism which West describes is a tragic necessity. Those who lose it no longer 
find even a minimal safety-net in our society, which is now stripped down "to 
compete and win in a global economy." But, is maintaining and increasing our 
individual armor our only choice? Why do we not consider other possibilities? Why 
do we continue to allow our fellows to fall individually into the chasm, attending 
seriously to their plight only when their absence makes us the next in line? Why 
do we not choose to behave differently? 
CONSCIOUSLY CHOOSING WAYS TO THE EDGE. 
What is it that causes us to cling so tenaciously to formulations which have so 
clearly failed the least advantaged; which seem to be preparing for immanent 
failure for the middle class; and which, if judged by any standard higher than 
barbarism, have already failed us all? Isn't it the case that we humans are 
supposed to be the evolutionary incarnation of adaptiveness? Have we, as 
Turnbull said, already sulk as low as the lk? In an earlier citation, Purpel and 
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Shapiro (1995) warned of the risk of making simplistic and fundamentalist 
responses to the postrnodem "emancipatory cu!-de-sac." a piece of rhetorical 
topography which is probably analogous to what I am calling "the edge of the 
chasm." Certainly our culture has generally erred in the direction of such simplistic 
responses. I propose that the reason we have so frequently done so, placing 
ourselves in the present non-adaptive situation, is our tendency to consistently 
underestimate the strength of what I shall refer to in various contexts (and using 
terms whose authorship is to be credited as we proceed) as either false 
consciousness, the commanding self, or the ego (in the pejorative sense). Under 
the influence of this construction, it is not possible to be right (except possibly by 
accident)! The quite appropriate reverence we have for human beings is 
transferred to this false consciousness; we honor what is basically a parasite upon 
the human spirit, instead of the spirit itself. We are almost all similarly disabled 
by such parasites; however, such a confession does not serve to mitigate the 
problem. We still face the problem of disengaging enough from this false 
consciousness to be able to be able to perceive the chasm, to see that our cultural 
means have failed us and to see that in a way that does not result in paralysis. 
Somehow we need to find a way to separate them (the person and the 
construction) withoutfalling into dogmatism and despair (or fascism). As discussed 
in the previous chapter, such ways have frequently been described as skillful 
means. 
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Although skillful means have been said to require a Teacher to construct them, 
many of the things which we have come to know about ourselves, such as the 
concepts of learned optimism and the methods of the deconstructionists, might 
serve to bring us to a point of readiness (perhaps even to the edge of the chasm), 
can prepare us to learn, by bringing to our awareness the effects of false 
consciousness, an awareness which might serve to overcome the unacknowledged 
strength of this construction. In effect, such preparations, such "learning how to 
learn" may be considered as intermediate constructions, between the existing false 
consciousness and some not yet encountered skillful means. To presume that 
such might be the case is, of course, an expression of the quest of which I spoke 
at the beginning, to be undertaken on the basis of accepting this proposal as a 
working hypothesis, with hope, without dogma or certainty of success. 
I believe that examples of such intermediate constructions, as well as arguments 
which lead to an intentional apprehension of the edge of the chasm, are to be 
found in Peter Berger's social construction, Martin Seligman's learned optimism, 
Robert Ornstein's multi-mind hypothesis, the evolving self of Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi, and in Arthur Deikman's observing self, among many others. 
Paul Ricoeur creates such an intermediate means, in his description of false 
consciousness, naming it illusion, " ... a cultural structure, a dimension of our social 
discourse (1978:214)." His integration of illusion as understood by Marx, Freud, 
and Nietzsche, is, along with the others mentioned, to be the focus of this section. 
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I suggest that the trap of illusion, which yields the dogma of despair, is a trap from 
which we may develop the cognitive capacity to free ourselves. following the model 
of the "Moses and the Shepherd" story, without falling into the simplistic solutions 
cautioned against by Purpel and Shapiro. Thus the balance of this chapter is 
devoted to the praxis of the "edgefinders," those whose prodamation of the failure 
of our current means is made in the context of such intermediate constructions, 
such that we see the cultural failure not as a cause for despair, but as a release 
from illusion, a preparation for learning. One of the critical things which I hope we 
have already leamed from the unfortunate lk is that this is not an individualistic 
path but a social one; we find our way in the company of our brothers and sisters, 
or we die alone. Therefore we need to understand something of the way in which 
we construct that social world which the lk have lost and which we are in the 
process of losing in our own culture. 
Social Reality: As you no doubt understand from the foregoing, much of what 
follows is to be a critique of what we generally call our everyday reality. The hope 
is that we are going to find ways to stand in the midst of our own situation and see 
ourselves with some of the clarity we claim to have when looking at the lk. The 
work of Peter Berger is foundational to such a critique and it is to him that I look 
to "define" that upon which this effort is to operate, although in this defining, I 
acknowledge the brackets of phenomenological analysis which Berger uses, saying 
in The Social Construction of Reality that: 
The phenomenological analysis of everyday life, or rather of the subjective 
experience of everyday life, refrains from any causal or genetic 
hypotheses, as well as from assertions about the ontological status of the 
phenomena analyzed ... Common sense contains innumerable pre- and 
quasi-scientific interpretations about everyday reality, which it takes for 
granted. If we are to describe the reality of common sense we must refer 
to these interpretations ... but we must do so within phenomenological 
brackets (1967:20). 
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In that context, he offers some insight into the difficulty, mentioned earlier, of the 
inaccessibility of much of our daily life to our intellectual convictions. It would not 
surprise Berger that our radical deconstructionist, although bereft of "personal 
subjectivity," still seeks tenure; nor that a cynical businessman would comfort 
himself with a religion founded by a revolutionary prophet; nor would he have 
difficulty in understanding the origin of the confusion occasioned by expressing 
religious experiences in everyday language: 
The reality of everyday life is taken for granted as reality. It does not 
require additional verification over and beyond its simple presence. It is 
simply there, as self-evident and compelling facticity. I know that it is real. 
While I am capable of engaging in doubt about its reality, I am obliged to 
suspend such doubt as I routinely exist in everyday life. This suspension 
of doubt is so firm that to abandon it, as I might want to do, say, in 
theoretical or religious contemplation, I have to make an extreme transition. 
The world of everyday life proclaims itself and, when I want to challenge 
the proclamation, I must engage in a deliberate, by no means easy 
effort .... [for example, in the theater, the] transition between realities is 
marked by the rising and falling of the curtain. As the curtain rises, the 
spectator is ''transported to another world," with its own meanings and an 
order that may or may not have much to do with the order of everyday life. 
As the curtain falls the spectator "returns to reality," that is, to the 
paramount reality of everyday life by comparison with which the realty 
presented on the stage now appears tenuous and ephemeral.. .. Aesthetic 
and religious experience is rich in producing transitions of this kind ... finite 
provinces of meaning(1967:23-5). 
All finite provinces of meaning are characterized by a turning away of 
attention from the reality of everyday life .... A radical change takes place in 
the tension of consciousness. In the context of religious experience this 
has been characterized as "leaping." It is important to stress, however, that 
the reality of everyday life retains its paramount status even as such 
"leaps" take place. If nothing else, language makes sure of this. The 
common language available to me for the objectivization of my experiences 
is grounded in everyday life ... Typically, therefore, I "distort" the reality of 
the [finite province of meaning] ... ! "translate" the non-everyday experiences 
back into the paramount reality. This .. .is typical of those trying to report 
about theoretical, aesthetic, or religious worlds of meaning (1967:25-6). 
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Although one who would hope for change must be grateful to Berger for his 
concept of the social construction of this everyday reality, which of course implies 
that what is constructed may be renovated, it is important to recognize that this is 
not, for Berger or for this author, an exercise in solipsism: 
Man is biologically predestined to construct and to inhabit a world with 
others. This world becomes for him the dominant and definitive reality. Its 
limits are set by nature, but once constructed, this world acts back upon 
nature. In the dialectic between nature and the socially constructed world 
the human organism itself is transformed. In this same dialectic, man 
produces reality and thereby produces himself (1967:183). 
Renovation of our social reality is both possible and difficult: possible because of 
its constructed nature, difficult both because of this dialectic (which most often 
constructs false consciousness) and because of what occurs when we peer over 
the edge of the chasm. In A Rumor of Angels, Berger, discussing a dichotomy 
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between the middle ground of everydayness, " ... and various marginal realms in 
which the taken-for-granted assumptions of the former realm are threatened or put 
into question," opens a door that one is inclined to shut very quickly; he offers one 
of those moments, rare in the normally dry environment of intellectual discussion, 
where one may be detracted from the argument by the feeling that the hair on the 
back of one's neck is rising: 
... [that] which we take for granted as normality and sanity, can be 
maintained (that is inhabited) only if we suspend all doubt about its validity. 
Without this suspension of doubt, everyday life would be impossible, if only 
because it would be constantly invaded by the "fundamental anxiety" 
caused by our knowledge and fear of death. This implies that all human 
societies and their institutions are, at their root, a barrier against naked 
terror (1990: 83). 
In the light of the earlier sections on postmodemism, existential Angst and the 
chasm, we are now in a position to more readily appreciate why our popular 
culture supports and demands a marketplace of selves to conceal the terror that 
follows an unexpected view of the chasm's edge: 
A society in which discrepant worlds are generally available on a market 
basis entails specific constellations of subjective reality and identity. There 
will be an increasingly general consciousness of the relativity of all worlds, 
including one's own, which is now subjectively apprehended as "a world," 
rather than "the world." It follows that one's own institutionalized conduct 
may be apprehended as "a role" from which one may detach oneself in 
one's own consciousness and from which one may "act out" with 
manipulative control (Berger, 1967: 172-73). 
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As a member of this society one's "knowledge" thus comes to include the 
information that any culture one inhabits is composed of elements upon whic.'1 one 
may, at will, exercise "subjective detachment." Unfortunately, as we have already 
seen in another context this knowledge has its costs: 
It is such socially shared, socially taken-for-granted "knowledge" that allows 
us to move with a measure of confidence through everyday life. 
Conversely, the plausibility of "knowledge" that is not socially shared, that 
is challenged by our fellow men, is imperiled, not just in our dealings with 
others, but much more importantly in our own minds(1990: 7). 
Those who would see their world from another perspective are not only subject to 
the obvious perils to which dissidents are always exposed, they also become what 
Berger calls a cognitive minority: 
By a cognitive minority, I mean a group of people whose view of the world 
differs significantly from the one generally taken for granted in their society. 
Put differently, a cognitive minority is a group formed around a body of 
deviant "knowledge." The quotation marks should be stressed here. the 
term "knowledge" used within the frame of reference of the sociology of 
knowledge always refers to what is taken to be or believed as "knowledge" 
(1990: 6). 
With such terrifying forces acting to maintain our consensus about what is "real," 
and with Berger's acknowledgement of the brevity of our capacity to hold that 
consensus in doubt, our question seem to have been transformed from "Why (and 
how) would one seek to look over into this chasm," to become, "How could we 
possibly tum away from the means of our culture, failed or not, to believe anything 
else?" 
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The work, on cult-like behavior in our society, of another contributor to our 
understanding of social reality, psychiatrist Arthur Deikman, offers insight into that 
question, through acquainting us with the characteristics of cults and with the parts 
of ourselves which predispose us to such involvement. 
Usually the word cult refers to a group led by a charismatic elder who has 
spiritual, therapeutic, or messianic pretensions, and indoctrinates the 
members with his or her idiosyncratic beliefs. Typically, members are 
dependent on the group for their emotional and financial needs and have 
broken off ties with those outside. The more complete the dependency and 
the more rigid the barriers separating members from non-believers, the 
more danger the cult will exploit and harm its members (1990: 2). 
As a member of a research seminar at the University of California Berkeley on 
new religious movements, he studied these groups and their effect those who fall 
under their sway. Speaking of his clinical work with these people, he said: 
I began to see that cults form and thrive not because people are crazy, but 
because they have two kinds of wishes. They want a meaningful life, to 
serve God or humanity; and they want to be taken care of, to feel protected 
and secure, to find a way home. The first motives may be laudable and 
constructive, but the latter exert a corrupting effect, enabling cult leaders 
to elicit behavior directly opposite to the idealistic vision with which 
members entered the group (1990: 7). 
This understanding of the psychological processes leading to cultic behavior would 
not be outside the experience of the well informed; it is his conclusions and 
insights as to the sites of such behavior that may surprise: 
behavior qualitatively similar to that which takes place in extreme cults 
takes place in all of us, despite our living in an open society, uncoerced, 
free to select our sources of information and our companions. We need to 
understand the cult behavior that operates unnoticed in our everyday life 
(1990: 2). 
Eventually, we in the seminar were unable to maintain the belief that cults 
were something apart from normal society. The people telling us stories of 
violence, cruelty, and perversion of values were like ourselves. After 
listening and questioning we realized that we were not different from nor 
superior to the ex-cult members, that we were vulnerable to the same 
dependency wishes, capable of the same betrayals and cruelty in 
circumstances in which our sense of reality was manipulated (1990: 7). 
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Just as Turnbull cautioned us about the lk which waits within each of us, 
Deikman's own honesty about his professional experience is a challenge to each 
of us in our own praxis: we often offer insightful critiques of others; can we be so 
honest, putting our own profession and our own personal lives under such a lens? 
I assure you that the first instance of such a venture will yield more than 
discomfort. Part of that "something more" certainly includes the opportunity to see 
that Deikman, exposing yet another instance of the chasm, not only proposes a 
path to the edge; but it also illuminates one of the main pitfalls along that way: 
becoming mired in a dependency masquerading as spirituality. 
As I studied the psychological mechanisms that made cult experience 
possible, I began to recognize uncomfortably familiar processes. a little 
reflection provided many specific instances of my own compliance-
conscious and unconscious-with the values and preferences of my peers, 
compliance that I had rationalized or ignored because I preferred to think 
of myself as very independent. Since no radical change or disruption of my 
life occurred and I was not acting at the behest of a charismatic leader or 
occult group, it had not occurred to me that I might be behaving like one 
who had been captured by a cult. Nevertheless, I now realize that the 
motivations and manipulations constituting cult behavior are present in 
varying degrees in my own life and that they play a role in the lives of most 
of us as they operate in our educational systems, the business world, 
religion, politics, and international relations. Just as many of the moie 
notorious cults have proven to be costly and destructive, so ordinary cult 
behavior is damaging and harmful to some degree wherever it occurs, no 
matter how normal its outward appearance .... ! believe that we need to 
bring into awareness the unconscious motivations and excluded information 
that influence our behavior and thought at the personal, national, and 
international levels. This requires that we first understand the dynamics of 
obvious cults and then address similar processes in ourselves and in 
ordinary society .... Although it is important that we study such groups to 
avoid being caught in them, it is even more important that we study such 
groups to become aware of the hidden cult thinking operating •1nnoticed in 
our daily lives. Cults are mirrors of ourselves (1990:7-10). 
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The tragedy of allowing the substitution of cultic behavior for spirituality is that 
often the seeking stops with that substitution, because members assume that they 
have already attained all that is possible. That is a recurrence of the situation 
which we discussed earlier, of ending in despair, because we uncritically accepted 
an unfounded claim of exhaustiveness from some cultural means. To put that more 
baldly, when Deikman cautions us of the danger of behavior that meets these · 
criteria, "no matter how normal its outward appearance," I argue that he is 
providing us with a challenge to test our own religious pretensions, to see if we are 
accepting a "bowl of porridge" in lieu of our spiritual birthright. Although that test 
is for each person to make in his/her own heart, I suspect that almost none of the 
social realities bearing the name religion within our culture would pass. 
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The anthropologist Edward T. Hall, discussing "culture as an irrational force," is 
also assuring us that we should not be reassured by unexamined constructions: 
Experience has taught me not to trust logic and certainly not to use my 
culturally patterned way of thinking to make a point to someone of another 
culture. The core of the problem may be that Western philosophies and 
beliefs are pictures in men's minds as to the nature of what is. Because of 
extension transference, the pictures are taken for reality when all they are 
is an idea or explanation. Such pictures and explanations are real in one 
sense, because they are constructions of the human mind and they tell us 
a lot about how that mind works as a product of a given culture. But they 
are not the mind and they are not the real world either. They are, in 
Poincare's term, "conventions." Such conventions are nevertheless 
essential models on which some behavior can be based. If however, one 
treats them as reality, they are impossible to transcend or even examine, 
except in their own terms. Also, Western philosophies are restricted to 
working with words, and if one is to use words wisely and with validity, it 
is essential to know what the particular word system itself does to men's 
thought processes. To do this, you must know how language structures 
thought, as elucidated clearly by Whorf ... .ln these terms, what we conceive 
as logic is rational only in very limited contexts in the West (1976: 214). 
And, in discussing the difficulty of overcoming cultural misunderstandings, he 
touches upon yet another barrier to finding a path to the edge: 
There is, as far as I know, no way out of the dilemma of the cultural bind. 
One cannot normally transcend one's culture without first exposing its 
major axioms and unstated assumptions concerning what life is all about-
how it is lived, viewed, analyzed, talked about, described, and changed. 
Because cultures are wholes, are systematic (composed of interrelated 
systems in which each aspect is functionally interrelated with all other 
parts), and are highly contexted as well, it is hard to describe them from 
the outside .... This brings us to a remarkable position: namely, that it is not 
possible to adequately describe a culture solely from the inside or from the 
outside without reference to the other .... The task is far from simple, yet 
understanding ourselves and the world we have created-and which in tum 
creates us-is perhaps the single most important task facing mankind today 
(Hall, 1976: 222). 
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Our continued failure to observe these warnings from Hall, Deikman, Berger and 
Turnbull against treating our constructions as reality insures that we will find 
ourselves subject to a false consciousness, "impossible to transcend or even 
examine," and in need of the services of an iconoclast of the first order. 
Our Iconoclasts: In the light of those understandings of how we fabricate and 
protect the illusions which keep us from apprehending our situation near the 
precipice, I propose that the critique of our social reality requires a great idol-
breaking hammer, on several fronts at once. It is necessary to offer a vision of the 
chasm's edge in many different paradigms, if one is to contend successfully with 
our demonstrated capacity to maintain illusions. Paul Ricoeur points to a new path 
through our edge country, in his attempt at integrating the thought of three of our 
most formidable iconoclasts, confronting and seeking a way through the powerful 
"critique of religion" which they have offered, in his attempt to analyze the function 
of suspicion, "and attempt to understand what it signifies at the heart of our 
culture": 
If we are to succeed in understanding as a unity the theory of ideologies 
in Marx, the genealogies of ethics in Nietzsche, and the theory of ideas 
and illusions in Freud, we will see the configuration of a problem-
hereinafter posed before the modem mind-the problem of false-
consciousness. Therefore, it is to illuminate this problem of false-
consciousness that we engage in a common rereading of Marx, Nietzsche, 
and Freud. The term "false-consciousness" appears especially in Marx. 
But, I think that it can be applied usefully to Nietzsche and Freud, for it is 
a specific problem. It is a problem '.!'Jhich is not concerned as suc.'l only 
with the individual as if he were in error in a purely epistemological sense, 
or a falsehood in a purely ethical sense; illusion is a cultural structure, a 
dimension of our social discourse. From here on, with Marx, Nietzsche, and 
Freud, a new type of critique of culture appears 
To be sure, Marx could not conceive of this illusion other than as a 
reflection of the class struggle. Nietzsche could not grasp false-
consciousness other than as vengeance, or the resentment of the weak 
against the strong. And Freud could not experience this same problem 
apart from what I will call the semantics of desire, a history of human 
desire entrapped by cultural prohibitions. 
These are the reasons why the approach to the problem of false-
consciousness differs from one to the other; but each of them, disengaged 
from his narrowness, cooperates in a general exegesis of false-
consciousness, and belongs by this fact in a hermeneutics, in a theory of 
interpretation, under the negative form of demystification. But with Marx, 
Nietzsche, and Freud, beyond their economism, biologism, and 
psychiatrism respectively, demystification is characterized in the first place 
as the exercise of suspicion. I call suspicion the act of dispute exactly 
proportional to the expressions of false-consciousness. The problem of 
false-consciousness is the object, the correlative of the act of suspicion. 
Out of it is born the quality of doubt, a type of doubt which is totally new 
and different from Cartesian doubt (1978: 214-5). 
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This doubt, which differs in that the consciousness which doubts is brought into 
question along with the contents of that consciousness, raises the possibility of a 
masked consciousness which, "calls for a specific reading, a 
hermeneutics .... uncovering what was covered ... unveiling what was 
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veiled ... unmasking what was masked (1978: 215)." In discovering how the critique 
of each is not only specific to the concerns of each of these man. but is also a far 
more general cultural critique, he says of his subjects: 
Marx is interesting, not when he accuses the capitalists as men [a moral 
critique], but capital as a structure which is ignorant of itself as a false 
creation of values. It is this history of the great money fetish which is the 
most important work. of Marx. The denunciation of the religious implications 
of the great fetish is the point of the Marxist critique of religion. We can 
surely apply this critique to ourselves; we must appropriate it to ourselves 
as a task of truth and authenticity (1978: 216). 
In the same manner, the Nietzschean genealogy of morals must, I believe, 
be understood as a certain hermeneutics of our will-the willing will that 
Nietzsche tried to look for behind the ''willed" will in its limited objectives ... .it 
was he who first had the insight that philosophy, as philosophy of culture, 
was a hermeneutics, an analysis of significations. Nietzsche was the first 
to see that hermeneutics is not simply a reflection on the rules of exegesis-
-exegesis limited to texts whether the texts be tests of classical antiquity 
or of biblical antiquity-because culture itself is a text; consequently, 
philosophy is exegetical in the degree to which it is the deciphering-behind 
the masked signs-of the intentions and the implied significations in a 
strong will and in a weak will....(1978: 216). 
And in order to speak of Freud in a few words ... .1 think he would be much 
better understood if we would discern his place in a critique of culture. It 
is through psychiatry that he exercises his critique, but at the bottom it is 
a critique of the ideals and of the values of this culture, to the extent that 
they no longer pertain to a genealogy of the will, as in Nietzsche, but a 
genealogy of desire. The interest of Freud is always to wonder, faced with 
a cultural phenomenon, how this phenomenon pertains to a history of 
human desire .... This critique concerns religion as far as it is effectively for 
us a compensation stemming from fear or a substitute for prohibited 
pleasures. It is obvious this "as far as" which will be the object of our (later] 
study ... (1978: 217). 
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While we are more accustomed to thinking of the destructive aspects of each of 
these critiques, Ricoeur calls us to see the affirmations of each of these thinkers. 
These affirmations, while allowing for a future, arguably a better one, certainly 
bring the modernist to an unobstructed view of the edge of the chasm, plain and 
without equivocation: 
I think one would understand the affirmations of Marxism if one also 
understood the affirmation which also inhabits the great enterprise of 
Nietzschean destruction. Because the great problem of Nietzsche, and in 
this sense he was less naive than Marx, if I can say so, is that God is 
dead, and since He is dead, culturally, man cannot survive. This is why the 
problem of Nietzsche concerns itself with the afterman, the superman. And 
Nietzsche saw very well that the great affirmation, which Marx believed 
attainable by revolution through a political-social process, demands in truth 
a veritable new birth of man. One can only attain and anticipate this rebirth 
through three broken myths: the Superman, the Eternal Return, and 
Dionysus-triple myths of the future and of the will to power. 
To tell the truth, and Nietzsche knew it well, we do not have, we no longer 
have, we do not yet have, the key to decipher this new myth. But perhaps 
this is the myth of modernity par excellence. Modernity is becoming its own 
myth. What Marx called "understood necessity" moving to the transparency 
of consciousness to itself [the end of false-consciousness], becomes with 
Nietzsche the innocence of becoming-Unschu/d des Werdens; this 
innocence of becoming would ultimately be the kingdom of necessity 
having become freedom. 
Such is the key also to the work of Freud. You know how at the end of his 
life Freud had remythologized all of his work .... But this kingdom of 
necessity, this ananke' as it is called in his last works, can only be 
understood in the struggle between Eros and death, between the life and 
death instincts. One would understand the one work by the other if one 
could understand that this relation, this wager for Eros against Thanatos, 
has with Freud the same meaning as the myth of Dionysus for the late 
Nietzsche. It is difficult to understand fully these three myths of the 
classless society or the understood necessity, of the eternal return, and of 
the reality principle. What they have in common, perhaps, is a certain way 
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of necessity (1978: 218). 
If we can follow them this far, we will understand the positive function of 
the dispute with religion by all three. Because what they have in common 
first of all is iconoclasm, the fight against idols, that is, against the gods or 
the God of men .... the critique of religion as a mask, a mask of fear, a mask 
of domination, a mask of hate. A Marxist critique of ideology, a 
Nietzschean critique of resentment and a Freudian critique of infantile 
distress, are hereafter the views through which any kind of mediation of 
faith must pass (1978: 219). 
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And it is just that battle against idols, against "the gods of men," whether religious 
or economic, in which each of our edgefinders is engaged. This is certainly what 
Deikman is asking of us when, in my interpretation, he offers us the opportunity 
to examine structures which we are unaccustomed to examining because they 
have been labeled as religious or professional, when he offers us the same 
opportunity that Ricoeur has, the "critique of religion as a mask." 
Robert Ornstein brings that same critique to our secular world view, the view which 
many who are critical of attempts at spiritual insight like to think of as the "real 
world." The work of Ornstein will figure importantly in several sections of this 
paper; here I want to delve briefly into how he offers us a particularly interesting 
opportunity to see the edge of our chasm, to tickle our Angst, if you will, as he 
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hammers away at the institutions of our society, in his most recent book, with 
James Burke(1995): 
The culture we live in, based on the sequential influence of language on 
thought and operating according to the rationalist rules of Greek philosophy 
and reductionist practice, has wielded tremendous power. It has given us 
the wonders of the modem world on a plate. But it has also fostered beliefs 
that have tied us to centralized institutions and powerful individuals for 
centuries, which we must shuck off if we are to adapt to the world we've 
made: that unabated extraction of planetary resources is possible, that the 
most valuable members of society are specialists, that people cannot 
survive without leaders, that the body is mechanistic and can only be 
healed with knives and drugs, that there is only one superior truth, that the 
only important human abilities lie in the sequential and analytic mode of 
thoughL.(p. 311). 
Those very forces and ideas in our society which seem the most useful and most 
strongly supported by the pragmatics of power and "success" are turning out to be 
non-adaptive! The very behaviors, which we are now helping to spread into the few 
corners of the planet which had thus far managed to avoid our culture by hiding 
in various forms of the Middle Ages, are cornerstones of our corporate false 
consciousness. Burke and Ornstein describe how our heritage as a species has 
contributed to this condition: 
Up to 30,000 years ago, human mental processes had evolved in large 
part to deal with immediate problems: deciding what berries to eat, how to 
survive the winter, how to avoid dangerous animals, and when to find 
shelter. These were the mechanisms with which blind evolution had 
prepared us to handle the world. our mental predispositions, like that if 
every other animal, were circumscribed by the immediate horizon and by 
short-term problems. This was in every sense "natural," because there 
would have been little point in worrying about the long term if immediate 
threats such as tigers and winter were not dealt with. 
Our ancestors also never had to deal with all of humanity as a factor in 
their daily lives .... There was never the need to consider the entire planet 
because it was too big for us to have any meaningful impact .... [however] 
Humanity is now a monster, producing many more people in a month than 
were alive just before the first agricultural revolution and in aggregate 
weighing more than any other land species. 
Because our lives have changed since those primeval times, it is 
imperative above all that we revise our out-of-date perception of the world, 
so that our ancient, small-scale, small-time mind can be expanded to 
consider more distant horizons and more frequent changes. Many 
commentators on current problems seem to suggest that a logical or 
psychological alteration in the way our minds work will, alone, do the trick. 
But we are so mentally separated from the natural world around us by [our 
technology, which has} over millennia, shaped every aspect of our lives 
that both the [technology itself] as well as a change of consciousness need 
to be parts of the resolution. 
The difficulty is that modem human beings no longer directly perceive the 
world they live in and whose condition affects them. As Chemobyl showed, 
the world is too big and complex for that. And it is not the case that we can 
somehow throw away all modem technology and return to a simpler, 
Arcadian life. Even if such a world ever existed and even if some of us 
could survive in that kind of environment, the vast majority of the 
population (who cannot farm) would not want to. (p. 281) 
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We have to carry our house along with us, we have grown so dependent upon 
what we have built that we must save not only ourselves, but our creation. 
Another who sees this one-way ("you can't go home again") aspect of our situation 
is Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, who argues that the evolution of reflective self-
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consciousness produced an incredible quantum jump in the way the brain 
functions, so that consciousness becomes, like any other organism, centered upon 
its own survival, creating the situation that Ornstein and Burke have just described: 
An animal without a conscious self only needs to reproduce the information 
in its genes. A person with a self will want to keep and spread the 
information in his or her consciousness as well. A self identified with 
material possessions will drive its owner to accumulate more and more 
property, regardless of consequences for anyone else. The self of Stalin, 
built around the need for power, did not rest until everyone who might 
challenge his absolute rule was dead .... lt is for this reason that the fate of 
humanity in the next millennium depends so closely on the kinds of selves 
we will succeed in creating ... .lf the selves of our children and their children 
become too timid, too conservative and retiring, and try to stop change by 
retiring into a safe cocoon, eventually they will be overcome by more vital 
life-forms. On the other hand if we just forge ahead blindly, taking what we 
can from one another and from the world around us, there is not going to 
be much left to enjoy on the planet (1993: 23-4). 
Another source calling attention to such an ethic of "taking what we can from one 
another and from the world around us," is Svi Shapiro's description of the 
conservative agenda of "back to basics" as a survivalistic ethic. No part of our 
society seems more important to those who would hide the views of our 
iconoclasts from us than does education, where education, in this case means 
schooling of a special sort. Once again, the shadow of the lk seems to fall upon 
us: 
The "basics" imbued curriculum is connected not with matters of 
awareness, insight, or imagination, but with supplying a set of skills and 
knowledge needed to simply (if not easily) "get by" in the world. Its 
utilitarian emphasis is on the ability to cope with, or adapt to, what appears 
to exist in the immediate present, and in the immediate vicinity. In its 
fragmented and highly circumscribed concerns it mirrors the survivalist 
mentality .... The assumption is of an individual's accommodation to, or 
acceptance of, social reality. The development of individual capacities 
through the acquisition of appropriate knowledge or skill at school 
becomes, in short, the vehicle for human survival in contemporary 
American society. The perspective of "basic skills" and "minimum 
competencies" asserts, ultimately, the individualistic world-view in which 
personal effort and ability, not structural change, becomes the means to 
deal with the present harsh reality .... From this perspective the individual 
enters a Hobbesian world of unmitigated agency, a world in which, through 
the appropriate education, one may be prepared to cope with a 
deteriorating struggle for survivai.. .. The result [of a conservative view which 
while reifing the present, wishes to return to the past] is the conservative 
inability to see the moral and spiritual crisis of American society as rooted 
in its fundamental historic structures, especially those related to capitalistic 
institutions. The disintegrative effect on traditional values of a consumption-
oriented system, and the pervasive commodification of human activity, with 
all its dire effects on moral and spiritual life, is not easily attributed to these 
core institutional influences .... [to maintain the conservative romanticization] 
The moral rot must be seen as an unnatural interruption, an aberration 
from what is the fundamental nature of the society (1993: 297-8). 
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I hope that, as more and more of our paths are seen to go over the edge of the 
chasm, the possibility of adapting a strategy such as "retiring into a safe cocoon" 
is coming to seem not only untenable, but also unattractive. To that end, in 
assailing the idol of the marketplace, I have called upon one more instance of 
support for these positions, from what may well be an unexpected quarter. The 
patron saint of our age, Adam Smith is generally known only for his discovery 
(documented in The Wealth of Nations) of the "Invisible Hand," that force in our 
market economy which is supposed to yield a greater good from the aggregation 
of actions taken in pursuit of individual self interest. Understandably absent from 
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the bibliography of those who most appreciate that discovery is Smith's other major 
work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1966), which provides the moral context 
within which I think that Smith expected his later work to be considered. Speaking 
of the superiority of the virtue of beneficence over that of justice, he said: 
Actions of a beneficent tendency, which proceed from proper motives, 
seem alone to require a reward .... Beneficence is always free, it cannot be 
extorted by force, the mere want of it exposes to no punishment.. .. There 
is, however, another virtue, of which the observance is not left to the 
freedom of our own wills, which may be extorted by force, and of which the 
violation exposes to resentment and consequently to punishment.. .. Though 
the mere want of beneficence seems to merit no punishment from equals, 
the greater exertions of that virtue appear to deserve the highest reward. 
By being productive of the greatest good, they are the natural and 
approved objects of the liveliest gratitude. Though the breach of justice, on 
the contrary, expose to punishment, the observance of the rules of that 
virtue seems scarce to deserve any reward .... We may often fulfil all the 
rules of justice by sitting still and doing nothing (1966: 112-7). 
Even though his last great work does not even mention the concept of human 
sympathy which was the cornerstone of his moral philosophy (Edwards, 1967, V.7: 
463) it seems to me that Adam Smith would agree that we owe each other more 
than the unintended benefit rendered by the "invisible hand" of capitalism, having 
argued during a decade of teaching at Oxford: 
Those whose hearts never open to the feelings of humanity, should, we 
think, be shut out in the same manner, from the affections of all their 
fellow-creatures, and be allowed to live in the midst of society, as in a great 
desert, where there is nobody to care for them, or to enquire after 
them .... The man who is barely innocent, who only observes the laws of 
justice with regard to others, and merely abstains from hurting his 
neighbors, can merit only that his neighbors in their tum should respect his 
innocence, and that the same laws should be religiously observed with 
regard to him (Smith, 1966: 118). 
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The idol of the marketplace, which holds that competition between unrestrained 
self-interests has some moral standing that sets it above mere greed, is thus 
denied by its founder, and its proponents are shut out from the human community 
by their patron saint. 
Iconoclasm Shading into Visions of Bridges: There are others who would gladly 
speak to these points, calling our attention to the inappropriate and ineffective 
nature of our cultural idols, but I suspect I have offered enough testimony to try the 
patience of even those who have an interest in being convinced. I would like to 
turn somewhat in the direction of the next chapter, and explore the margins of this 
chasm with a discussion of an educator who has sought to employ one of our 
cultural means in a skillful way: Martin Seligman, the Director of Training in Clinical 
Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania, and an authority in the study of 
motivation. Because his work in psychology would be so obviously useful in the 
"healing" of Angst, a brief encounter would most likely yield the impression of 
someone less interested in uncovering the limitations of our cultural repertoire than 
in healing those who have recoiled from that edge; one might expect one of those 
"ego repairmen" whom our existentialist friends would be quick to denigrate. As 
we shall see, this is far from the case. The capacity which I think Seligman 
exhibits, to be both an edge-finding iconoclast and one who at least dreams of 
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bridges over the chasm, is certainly not unique among those discussed in this 
chapter; however, since his work speaks directly and in a highly accessible manner 
to the questions of the origins of despair and of hope in our society, it is with him 
that I will close this chapter and introduce the next. 
Seligman has been credited with being the first experimental scientist to offer 
evidence that substantially reduced the credibility of the Skinnerian behaviorists, 
through his development of the concept of "learned helplessness," where failure 
resulting from the inability to control painful stimuli produces "giving up." This work 
has been widely replicated and applied, offering insights into many aspects of the 
human condition, especially depression, as a function of optimistic and pessimistic 
explanatory styles. In an elegant conceptualization of the explanatory styles 
characteristic of pessimism, in explaining a test instrument that measures "hope", 
among other things, he tells us: 
Whether or not we have hope depends on two dimensions of our 
explanatory style: pervasiveness and permanence. Finding temporary and 
specific causes for misfortune is the art of hope: temporary causes limit 
helplessness in time, and specific causes limit helplessness to the original 
situation. On the other hand, permanent causes produce helplessness far 
into the future, and universal causes spread helplessness through all your 
endeavors. Finding permanent and universal causes for misfortune is the 
practice of despair (1991: 48). 
After twenty-five years of research into these states and their associated 
explanatory styles, Seligman reports: 
The defining characteristic of pessimists is that they tend to believe bad 
events will last a long time, will undermine everything they do, and are their 
own fault. Tha optimists, who are confronted with the sama hard knocks of 
this world, think about misfortune in the opposite way. They tend to believe 
defeat is just a temporary setback, that its causes are confined to this one 
case. The optimists believe defeat is not their fault: circumstances, bad 
luck, or other people brought it about. Such people are unfazed by defeat. 
Confronted by a bad situation, they perceive it as a challenge and try 
harder. 
There two habits of thinking about causes have consequences. Literally 
hundreds of studies show that pessimists give up more easily and get 
depressed more often. These experiments also show that optimists do 
much better in school and college, at work and on the playing field. They 
regularly exceed the predictions of aptitude tests. When optimists run for 
office, they are much more likely to be elected than pessimists are. There 
health is unusually good. They age well, much freer than most of us from 
the usual physical ills of middle age. Evidence even suggests that they 
may live longer (1991: 4-5). 
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Rather than suggesting that one is predestined to fall forever into whichever of 
these categories life has thus far assigned, he says: 
Pessimists can in fact learn to be optimists, and not through mindless 
devices like whistling a happy tune or mouthing platitudes ... but by learning 
a new set of cognitive skills ... discovered in the laboratories and clinics of 
leading psychologists ... [to] undo lifelong habits of pessimism and its 
extension, depression (Seligman, 1991: 5). 
At this point Seligman justifies my assertion that he is not of the "ego-doctor'' 
school, with a societal critique of what he styles an "age of personal control." Just 
as others have suggested, Seligman, with his co-authors Peterson and Maier, 
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argues that such emphasis on personal control in our society as is exemplified by 
cognitive techniques, although founded upon real psychological needs, has 
unexamined costs, "Something about modem life seems to have greatly multiplied 
the likelihood of depression, and it may be our glorification of the individual 
(Peterson, 1993: 209)." They suggest that: 
Modernity has raised our goals and expectations that we can achieve them 
("all problems have a solution") beyond any fit with reality. It has increased 
the sheer number of helplessness experiences, of failures .... Finally, to the 
extent that modernity supports and sanctions internal, stable, and global 
explanations of why we fail, it enhances a depressive explanatory style. 
Because we as a people take individual control seriously. it follows that 
when an individual fails, self-blame-about stable and global faults-is a 
plausible explanation (Peterson, 1993: 211). 
In fact, they ascribe profound societal consequences to this aspect of modernism, 
because it has occurred in concert with the "waning of the commons": 
There may well be less obvious manifestations of this emphasis on 
personal control, such things as the rise of materialism and cynicism about 
politics and social institutions. Generally speaking, the incredible 
selfishness of the American people can be phrased in terms of personal 
controi....We have become ensconced in technological cocoons .... [which] 
Rather than allowing us to get to the substance of life in a more efficient 
way ... have become the substance itself, crowding other matters ... out of the 
scene .... The problem is that the outcomes over which they give us such 
exquisite control may be trivial (Peterson, 1993: 307-8). 
They are quick to point out that this is not the only model for social organization. 
Several differing cultures are offered as counter examples, among which are: 
[The Amish] are an agrarian society, with limited individual goals and 
limited personal choice. "Control" lies with their society and with their God. 
With more modest individual goals comes a much greater chance of 
achieving them. And if they do fail, they may have an explanatory structure 
that does net place all the blame en the individuaL Failure is seen in terms 
of unstable and specific causes (an afterlife and God's plan) (Peterson, 
1993: 211). 
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In a society where we are socialized to have the boundless expectations 
characterized by the "every c--hild has a chance to grow up to be President of the 
United States" palaver, these authors are not surprised to find such a heavy toll 
taken by the intrusion of reality into the age of personal control. They suggest that: 
Our task as a society is to find better ways of dealing with control, so that 
we end up with fewer casualties. We should help people satisfy their desire 
for control in less egocentric ways as well as encourage them to value 
additional goals (Peterson, 1993: 308). 
Suggesting several means to that end, including more responsive social 
institutions, they conclude with a call for a retreat from the pathological form of 
individualism that they have ascribed to this "age:" 
More profoundly, we should inculcate an orientation to the common good 
in our society. We need to make the interdependence of people something 
we value. Only when we start to take other people's welfare seriously will 
they start to do so for us. This seems to be a prerequisite for creating a 
world that is responsive, one that will encourage efficacy on the part of all. 
When we stop competing against one another in destructive ways, we all 
can be satisfied about our accomplishments. 
Perhaps at one time such a vision more clearly characterized the United 
States. Perhaps not. In any case, it does not now. Special interests abound 
in our society, and their agendas become more narrow each year. Unity 
has been replaced by diversity. Let us raise the politically unpopular point 
that increased attention to differences among our people will not make this 
society a better place in which to live. 
We do not wish to gloss over the past, the fact that racism and sexism 
have excluded many individuals from the mainstream of our society. But 
a further split between people today is not a solution to past injustices; 
bringing them together in a true coalition is. This sounds like a moral 
argument, but we have arrived at it from our research. Our only assumption 
is that depression, demoralization, underachievement, and illness are bad. 
We think the lack of an orientation to the commons-the incredible 
selfishness that so abounds in our country-is in no small way responsible 
for these ills (Peterson, 1993: 309). 
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Similarly, arguing from his research which links depression with an 
overcommitment to the self and an undercommitment to the common good, Martin 
Seligman (1990) prescribes service to others: 
If you engage in activity in service of the commons long enough, it will gain 
meaning to you. You may find that you get depressed less easily, that you 
get sick less often, and that you feel better acting for the common good 
than indulging in solitary pleasures. Most important, an emptiness inside 
you, the meaninglessness that rampant individualism nurtures, will begin 
to fill (p. 290). 
Seligman's understanding of this abandonment of the commons has a focus 
characteristic of what Bellah and his associates has termed the "utilitarian 
individualism," which is, Bellah maintains, pervasive in our culture and which 
comprises, " ... an understanding of life generally hostile to older ideas of moral 
order. Its center is the autonomous individual, presumed able to choose the roles 
he will play and the commitments he will make, not on the basis of higher truths, 
but according to the criteria of life-effectiveness as the individual judges it (1986: 
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47)." This is a limitation which Seligman recognizes in his own work, and which I 
would suggest is characteristic of the entire range of such social pragmatism-an 
association of radical individualism with despair: 
But our epidemic of depression is not merely a matter of the paultry 
comfort we get from society at large .... The growth of [individualism], for 
example, means that failure is probably my fault-because who else is 
there but me? The decline of the commons means that failure is permanent 
and pervasive. To the extent that larger, benevolent institutions (God, 
nation, family) no longer matter, personal failures seem catastrophic. 
Because time in an individualistic society seems to end with our own death, 
individual failure seems permanent. There is no consolation for personal 
failure (Seligman, 1991: 286) 
Seligman does not make the reductionist error of confusing what his psychology 
can accomplish with the hope which I specified in the first chapter as the one 
which Hesche! grounds in mystery. As he acknowledges, although the efficacy of 
human agency does allow change to take place, it is efficacious only in an 
appropriate context: 
Optimism is just a useful adjunct to wisdom. By itself it cannot provide 
meaning. Optimism is a tool to help the individual achieve the goals he has 
set for himself. It is in the choice of the goals themselves that meaning-or 
emptiness-resides (1991: 291). 
As I quoted him earlier, Seligman said in speaking of the explanatory style of 
pessimists, "[Ascribing] permanent causes produce helplessness far into the future, 
and universal causes spread helplessness through all your endeavors. Finding 
permanent and universal causes for misfortune is the practice of despair (1991: 
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48)." I suggest that his description of this "practice of despair" reveals quite starkly 
one of our "edges," while at the same time offering a quite credible argument that 
there are choices at that edge other than despair. 
Holding this Inquiry Before My Questions 
Where have we come thus far in seeking a pedagogy of hope? What can the work 
cited contribute to our quest? It would seem that we have firmly engaged some of 
our initial questions, having spoken at length on the nature of hope, and of the 
consequences of its absence. Our description of the discontinuity which we have 
named the chasm has set before us a stark picture of our condition, yet that 
picture is one which, by its attempt to remove the veil of illusion concealing the 
systemic failure of our cultural means reveals that this exhaustion is a necessary, 
if painful preparation, one which eventually brings us to see the edge of the chasm 
as a waystation on the path, rather than as a terminus, and one which intends to 
offer a hope that consists, in part, of a path which leads to finding more "skillful 
means" in a new cultural repertoire. 
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Where are We Going from Here? 
!n the next chapter, I will continue my approach to the possibility tt'tat there might 
be something we can say about the chasm, beyond acknowledging its existence. 
I will consider, from the viewpoint of my theological sources, some of the 
bridgeheads which strike me as most compelling, and attempt to defend my 
affirmation of the absolute nature of hope. Following that, the fourth chapter will 
attempt the perilous task of discussing the claims of special knowledge which I 
believe are unavoidable in founding hope upon wisdom, in the context of my 
earlier discussion of apologetics. 
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Chapter Ill. 
MIGHT THERE BE BRIDGES? 
Having declared our accustomed behaviors interrupted, short of hope, by this 
chasm, on what basis might I propose that bridges exist which might take us 
across that chasm to some ground for hope, a ground more sure than that which 
has failed us here at the end of modernity? And, if such bridges do exist (and if 
they go somewhere), in what ways might they be accessible to human agency? 
Surely many of the "answers" which have been foisted upon us in the past are the 
greater part of the problems discussed in Chapter One, and I have no wish to 
contribute to those. Rather, I will offer here several views from the Christian 
theological realm, which strike a chord in me, not as answers to our questions, or 
as prescriptions for others, but as attempts to make a difficult point: trying to 
metaphorically point toward an affinity for truth which seems to occur with great 
frequency among persons of respectable capacity and apparent good-will, while 
acknowledging the lessons learned from our edgefinders about illusion and false-
consciousness. These reports seem to me, even when they take the form of 
systemizing or grand theory, to represent narratives of the sort of search in which 
I am engaged. Just as the previous chapter offered differing views which, 
juxtaposed began to have (at least to this author) some common thread, some 
"edge" found in each, so here I will be looking at several disparate individuals 
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whose work speaks to me across their differences to a deeper commonality: from 
each, I sense a hint of possibility, stronger in some but common to all, that there 
might just possibly be bridges. 
For that reason, I have chosen their help in the initial approach to the 'quest' 
portion of my third theme, which the reader will recall from its initial listing in 
Chapter Two, along with several others: 
• The conviction that, as a response to the condition of our world and 
the inadequacy of our generally accepted means for dealing with it, 
my path to meaning lies in finding a ground for hope (my quest} and 
sharing it (my pedagogy} in a form which is sustainable within such 
a world of despair. My hope that such meaning would contribute to 
the lessening of pain, of the vast sea of unnecessary suffering which 
we inflict upon ourselves. 
In this chapter, we will be dealing with intimations of this ground, dispatches from 
the front, narratives and reports from explorers of the edge; further development 
of the quest for a ground of hope is the theme of Chapter Four, as is my 
pedagogy. As befits persons assigned such a task, the work of the authors who 
are the focus of the current chapter have at their core a relationship with the 
absolute which, while necessary in my opinion, makes them difficult for those who 
have studied under our iconoclasts who led us through the previous chapter. 
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Although such a relationship must inevitably be characteristic of theology (a 
"discourse concerning God"). because of a consequent association with the 
historical records of religions and oppressions, paths which refer to the absolute 
have become more aversive to many of us than the abyss of despair. Visions of 
inquisitors, abusive patriarchs, conversions by the sword, and indoctrination into 
cultic belief systems all cloud our capacity to consider that there might be more to 
such traditional approaches. Yet, our language is already deficient in its capacity 
for discussion of meaning; bereft of the words which are the property of theology, 
it becomes virtually disabled. We must reclaim that language for the entire 
community of seekers if we are to have the means to proceed. I have selected 
these authors because I believe they offer us the opportunity of understanding 
their traditions in the light of the understanding which our edgefinders offered us, 
and of freeing the insights of the founders of these traditions from the subsequent 
accretion of "illusions" which have transformed many of these insights into either 
ossified stultifying idols or lifeless linguistic deserts. This deconstruction-from-within 
might make it possible to acknowledge not only the negative aspects of such 
traditions, but also their strengths. It is possible that their understanding might not 
only reclaim these traditions as skillful means, but also render them less 
dangerous to bystanders. I believe that the sources which I draw upon in this 
chapter are not only engaged in such a task, but are, in varying degrees, exhibiting 
success. 
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As an illustration of both the benefits and difficulties of one such approach to this 
process of reclaiming tl'le language of our traditions from these accretions of false 
consciousness, I would ask the reader to be self-observant in conducting a small 
thought-experiment. Consider how much better prepared for life's developmental 
tasks (including spiritual tasks) a student might be if told what we have already 
discussed about this problem in the preceding chapters-suppose our hypothetical 
syllabus began by saying: 
1. If you want to become human, the first step is to learn to behave 
as if you accepted the moral and ethical constraints on self-interest 
that are proposed by whatever tradition is your own. Even the most 
crassly fundamentalist versions of our traditions usually offer more 
humane guidance for living one's life than does our skeptical-to-the-
point-of-cynicism popular culture, an assertion to which the litany of 
horrors in the preceding chapters stands witness. Consider that the 
behavior which our traditions ascribe to saints is, rather, a minimum 
human duty, to be superseded by capacities that can only be 
attained after such duties are observed. 
2. At the same time, in choosing such a means, you are undertaking 
an obligation to remember the historical costs of fanaticism, cultism, 
and the abandonment of critical faculties, which have allowed the 
perversion and selective application of these moral, ethical, and 
religious systems to support the interests of governance and 
commerce at the expense of the community and human prospects. 
Remember that every one of us has that same capacity 
(predisposition even) to become enrapt in cultic beliefs and behavior, 
a potential against which understanding is our best armor. In 
addition, to minimize the danger to oneself and to others, you must 
understand and remember the instrumental nature of these systems 
of belief, which have all originated as "skillful means" designed by 
Teachers for specific times, places, and persons and which are 
intended to be set aside when their transformative purpose is 
accomplished. A modem exemplar of one of the traditions has 
suggested that our tendency of ignoring that understanding has led 
to the abandonment of religion as a means by his school, " ... because 
we lost so many students when it came time to move on to the next 
step." 
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Of course, such a proposal eventually requires a resolution of the highly contested 
issue of the possibility of the existence and derivation of that "special knowledge" 
said to be required to construct skillful means and to capitalize Teacher. I shall 
offer my personal resolution of that issue in the next chapter; however, in the 
meantime, taking as given the appropriate disclaimers about the constraints of 
language, and because the ground I will propose for hope lies there, I assert: 
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firstly, that we may (in fact must) yield our customary exclusion of the 
transcendental and the absolute from our educational discourse in order to move 
forward in our search for hope, and secondly, that with the perspective I have 
proposed, we may do so while avoiding (or remedying) invoking those demons of 
"the epistemological order of yesteryear" against which Purpel and Shapiro (1995) 
warned us, without an undue risk. 
Discoursing About God. 
As I indicated in my introduction to this chapter, it is necessary for me and for 
many of my colleagues to go through a process of forgiving Christian theologians 
their history, before being able to hear their voices. Although I have not yet 
matured enough in that process to offer a general amnesty, I have been able to 
listen with sympathy to those who follow, and as generally seems to be the case, 
the true beneficiary of forgiveness is the one who, however haltingly, had thought 
of him/herself as bestowing it. 
I want to emphasize that what I wish to present here is not an exercise in Christian 
apologetics; although, I want, through offering crumbs from their generous table 
as samples, to show that these theologies speak to the questions which concern 
us here, and that for those who find their path here, the possibilities are truly 
profound, contrary to the tarnished image of simplistic fundamentalism which many 
intellectuals have undeservedly generalized to all of their faith. Rather than 
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apology, I want to demonstrate that the search for the edge of our cultural chasm, 
and the hope of passing beyond it. extends into the center of their discourse; these 
are not Grand Inquisitors, but fellow seekers. 
In this Christian "discourse about God" (i.e., theology) there is a willingness to talk 
about hope that is absent from many other conversations. The varieties of that 
hope are as broad as those discussed in the first chapter, ranging from the get-
rich-with-God televangelist to the most sublime. Obviously my preference in this 
variable has been one of the main factors in choosing who would follow here. I 
shall look at two sub-themes in this company: the absolute nature of hope and the 
visions that these sources bring to hoping absolutely while living creatively within 
the world; and close with a transition from these views, by way of some critique, 
into the more specific search for bridges that will concern Chapter Four. 
About Holding to the Absolute Nature of Hope While Hoping Within the Wortd: In 
the preceding chapter, I acknowledged that my assertion of the absolute nature of 
hope implies a radical and unfashionable foundationalism, a "skepticism about 
skepticism" that is not comfortable with the solipsism implicit in yielding the field 
to criticism alone. These theologians are powerful voices for such a position, and 
they give it voice in such a way that I do not feel shut out as I would by the 
exclusivistic eschatology characteristic of many of their peers. Their capacity to 
bridge this division between heaven and earth, expressed by their concern for 
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hope in the world as well as after it, is an ally to me in the struggle to resolve my 
own paradox: an absolute hope which also needs human agency (and pedagogy). 
While my sources offer many profound statements of the absolute nature of hope, 
I would like to begin with that of Gabriel Marcel, perhaps because of his being 
doubly credentialed, both as a Christian theologian and as one of the founders of 
existentialism (although he denied the label (1967: 60)). In his Homo Viator. 
Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope (1962), he describes the only type of hope 
that is not eventually a contract with despair, framing a distinction between a hope 
that can stand against the awfulness of our world and a pragmatic (or illusionary) 
confidence in a particular outcome, where confidence is finally just a calculation, 
a 'p-value' in the statistics of fate. His distinction rests upon the difference between 
"to hope" and "to hope that." He says, "in so far as I make my hope conditional, 
I myself put up limits to the process by which I could triumph over all successive 
disappointments ... I own implicitly that if my expectations are not fulfilled in some 
particular point, I shall have no possibility of escaping from ... despair (p. 46)." 
Discussing how hope and despair hinge upon our will, either to set within our 
minds conditions beyond which we are determined to fail, or else to: 
conceive ... of the inner disposition of one who, setting no condition or limit 
and abandoning himself in absolute confidence, would thus transcend all 
possible disappointment. ... This is what determines the ontological position 
of hope-absolute hope, inseparable from a faith which is likewise absolute, 
transcending all laying down of conditions, and for this very reason every 
kind of representation whatever kind it might be. The only possible source 
from which this absolute hope springs must once more be stressed. It 
appears as a response of the creature to the infinite Being to whom it is 
conscious of owing everything that it has and upon whom it cannot impose 
any condition •.a:hatsoever without scandal (1962: 46-4?). 
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Such absolute hope must stand against, "Unhope which is opposed to hope as 
fear is opposed to desire, is truly a death in life, a death anticipated. No problem 
is more important or more difficult than determining how we can overcome 
it...(1964: 54)." 
Marcel frames our paradox of the world and the absolute in the terms of the basis 
for values, exploring the dilemma inherent in ascribing the origin of values to either 
society or the individual. He says (1967: 36-7) that to the extent philosophers have 
accepted the contention that values have no independent reality, but are the 
construction of the self (in the smallest sense of self--perhaps even our 
commanding self from the previous chapter) then we are confronted with an, 
"atomization incompatible with the intention or the exigency implied in the very 
idea of the good .... [which] cannot help but engender a state of war to which only 
victory can put an end" And with regard to "the society being substituted for the 
self," he contends that we will not "be able to escape a ruinous relativism" by that 
means, since, to do so we must find some ground upon which, "the individual 
conscience ... [as] the bearer of universal values can rise against the collectivity and 
oppose genuine justice ... to the false." 
We can only get out of this inextricable situation by declaring that the 
prophetic individual is the bearer of a certain message which translates a 
transcendent truth .... From this moment on it seems that there is no mean: 
one will either waive all evaluation to shut oneself up in a radical 
subjectivism, but there can then no longer be a question of progress in any 
sense-or else one .... ~!! maintain a value judgement, but this -.•Jill cn!y be 
possible by calling in the other dimension (1967: 39). 
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It is exactly the wish to avoid that radical subjectivism, implicit in our otherwise 
useful postmodem "pluralism," that I have come here to the theologians, to tread 
with care between two errors, "the one leading to a fatalism which destroys 
freedom, the other to solipsism and delirium (Marcel, 1967: 56)." And finally, 
speaking of the hope for peace, Marcel orders his ontology for us, describing his 
path along that edge, and the place of the self: 
It is perhaps simply by always making a point of seeing the present 
reality ... as objectively as possible, that we can struggle the most effectively 
for peace .... l will not fail, on the other hand, to recall that there is another 
plane, that of faith, of hope, of charity, that of prayer, which is perhaps the 
only one on which one can serve peace by establishing it first of all in 
oneself .... I will be still more explicit, at the risk of shocking certain of my 
readers. At the same time as we struggle for peace by human means, we 
have, I think, always to assure ourselves more intimately of the reality of 
the invisible world (1967: 142). 
Similarly, the systematic theology of Jurgen Moltmann argues that it is "God's self-
sacrificing love" which is the only ground for hope. If that sounds as if we are 
bound for a discussion of 'angels on the head of a pin', please reserve judgement 
while we hear not only his own discussion of hope and death, but expansions of 
the basic premise of love as the ground for hope and "hope for a just society" into 
discussions by Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel of women's issues. In his contribution 
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to Love: The Foundation of Hope, Moltmann (1988) offers a twenty-year 
perspective on his widely acclaimed Theology of Hope: On the Ground and 
Implications of a Christian Eschatology (1993), and raises immediately one of the 
key questions concerning a spiritual grounding of hope: 
When I wrote Theology of Hope more than twenty years ago, I started with 
the assumption that Christian hope since Augustine had been reduced by 
the Church to saving the soul in a heaven beyond death and that, in this 
reduction, it has lost its life-renewing and world-changing power. In our 
theological tradition, eschatology has always been limited to individual 
eschatology. It actually dealt only with the personal question of human 
beings about eternity: What will happen to me in death and the judgement 
of God? How will I become saved? .... If, however, in God there is only hope 
for the individual soul, then the human community becomes irrelevant, as 
also do the body and the earth .... But what is Christian hope good for 
then? .... ls ~t] supposed merely to give us comfort for all the pain of 
life? .... Hope for eternal life that is only private and that has reality only in 
the beyond deprives people of emotions and the ability to love here on 
earth. People so deprived can pass by the suffering of others, for they 
anticipate something better for themselves .... ! tried to present the Christian 
hope no longer as such an "opium of the beyond" but rather as the divine 
power that makes us alive in this world (1988: 3-4). 
From this excerpt, one might quickly pigeonhole Moltmann as a liberation 
theologian; however, he maintains that both liberation theologians and their 
opponents are missing the point by creating a false dichotomy. In his view, when 
the liberation theologians quote his work to support the conclusion that "our 
expectations must be turned into present realities," they are creating: 
nothing else than a theology of secularization. Out of the "not merely, but 
also" in my statement they have made a "not, but." .... Those who see this-
worldliness and the beyond in Christian hope as an "either/or'' destroy the 
two sides of eschatology and rob Christian hope of the courage to live and 
the comfort in dying .... When Pope John Paul II visited Nicaragua ... he 
demanded the three Roman Catholic priests in the government "net" 
participate in the liberation struggle of the people, "but rather" prepare 
people for eternal life. 
All my life, I have fought against those two erroneous alternatives, the one 
secular and the other pietistic .... We will only be able to overcome the 
unfruitful and paralyzing confrontation between personal and cosmic hope, 
between individual and universal eschatology, if we reject the pietistic path 
of placing the soul at the center of things and also the secular way of 
making this world central and instead focus on God, God's Kingdom, and 
God's glory .... What do we really hope for? .... Those who think that God 
exists only for the sake of their soul have not thought God but rather an 
idol. In the same way, anyone who thinks that God exists only for the sake 
of liberating the oppressed has not thought God but only an idol (1988: 5). 
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The resolution of that dichotomy is perused by a progression from, "personal 
hope ... to the communal and cosmic hope ... to end with the glorification of God for 
God's sake. The first effect of eschatology is personal faith. Then follows 
obedience in this world. From this originates the hope for redemption of the body 
and the expectation of the transformation of the entire world into the kingdom of 
God (1988: 6)." Yet, the church as an institution in our society is seldom an agent 
of transtormative change. In his criticism of the conservative stamp placed upon 
the church by the Confession of Augsburg XVI (see also Brueggemann, below), 
he says it " ... declares that the gospel brings no new laws and ordinances into the 
world, and does not dissolve the political and economic orders (1993: 331)," a 
situation which led the reformers to, "neglect the call to discipleship ... and to 
concentrate on the concern for order and its preservation. The new idea of calling 
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was transformed into a doctrine of the two kingdoms, in which it was more and 
more a matter of adjusting questions of competence as between the divine 
institutions of church, state, business and home (1993: 331)." 
Moltmann finds the church embedded in subjectivism, in danger of losing social 
relevance, and in need of reclaiming its transformative role. He says that the social 
institutions are "means on the way" by which we shape our world as we expend 
ourselves in love. To see love only as transcendent and absolute is to fall into the 
mold that our social structures would prescribe to safely isolate religion: 
If Christianity, according to the will of him in whom it believes and in whom 
it hopes, is to be different and to serve a different purpose, then it must 
address itself to no less a task than that of breaking out of these its socially 
fixed roles. It must then display a kind of conduct which is not in 
accordance with these. That is the conflict which is imposed on every 
Christian and every Christian Minister. The God who called them to life 
should expect of them something other than what modem industrial society 
expects and requires of them, then Christians must venture into an exodus 
and regard their roles as a new Babylonian exile .... Only when their 
resistance shows them to be a group that is incapable of being 
assimilated ... can they communicate their own hope to this society ... to resist 
the institutional stabilization of things, and by "raising the question of 
meaning,' to make things uncertain and keep them moving and elastic in 
the process of history. This aim-here formulated to begin with in very 
general terms-is not achieved simply by stirring up 'historicality', vitality, 
and mobility in the realms which are socially unburdened but have been 
brought socially to general stagnation. It is achieved precisely by breaking 
through this social stagnation. Hope alone keeps life-including public, 
social life-flowing and free (1993: 324). 
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He is quite clear that this means more than what the church does now, sitting 
quietly in its assigned place and avoiding prophetic challenges to the secular 
practices of even its own members. Moltmann's congregation might not be 
permitted the firewall between confession and business which shelters the 
conscience of many: 
The Church lays claim to the whole of humanity in mission. This mission 
is not carried out within the horizon of expectation provided by the social 
roles which society concedes to the Church, but it takes place within its 
own peculiar horizon of the eschatological expectation of the coming 
kingdom of God, of the coming righteousness and the coming peace, of the 
coming freedom and dignity of man. The Christian Church has not to serve 
mankind in order that this world may remain what it is ... but in order that it 
may transform itself and become what it is promised to be .... This means 
in practice that Christianity takes up mankind-or to put it concretely, the 
church takes up the society with which it lives-into its own horizon of 
expectation of the eschatological fulfillment of justice, life, humanity and 
sociability, and communicates in its own decisions in history its openness 
and readiness for this future and its elasticity towards it (1993: 327-8). 
And how does one see the world within such a horizon? I see someone else 
walking along Marcel's ridge between errors, contending with the vertigo at the 
chasm's edge: 
the hope of resurrection must bring about a new understanding of the 
world. This world is not the heaven of self-realization, as it is said to be in 
Idealism. This world is not the hell of self-estrangement, as it is said to be 
in romanticist and existentialist writing. The world is not yet finished, but is 
understood as engaged in history. It is therefore the world of possibilities, 
the world in which we can serve the future, promised truth and 
righteousness and peace. This is the age of diaspora, of sowing in hope, 
of self-surrender and sacrifice, for it is an age which stands within the 
horizon of a new future. Thus self-expenditure in this world, day-to-day love 
in hope, becomes possible and becomes human within that horizon of 
expectation which transcends this world (1993: 338). 
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As I discussed at the beginning of this section, because of the history associated 
with these ideas, there are still many who rightfully have great difficulty with 
engaging them. Certainly there is no group for whom this history is more difficult 
than it is for women. Asking, "what can the Christian God offer women today?" 
Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel says: 
Women, more and more, suffer because of the images of God as governor, 
judge, warrior, and see their views of life and their visions of a new society, 
of peace within and friendship with nature, obstructed by these images: the 
angry, Warring Yahweh of the Old Testament; the judge, lord, master who 
sacrifices his son, who demands compensation and sacrifice. Expressed 
in these images is women's own suffering, caused by society, by systems 
of education, by men and fathers, and also by mothers who were brought 
up in patriarchy. It seems to me that those images are a mirror of our own 
alienation, of our lack of identity, self-esteem, and self-acceptance, of our 
self-hate .... Where are other God images we can refer to that are integrating 
and liberating, healing and reconciling, that can teach us to accept and 
love ourselves (1988:23-4)? 
She finds hope in a response to this question from two streams of church tradition: 
Wisdom, and the unconditional love of Reformation theology: 
Wisdom is a new and helpful image of God. Wisdom is a female figure who 
originated in the Egyptian goddess tradition and shaped the Israelite 
theology from the third century B.C. on. With Wisdom, a whole range of 
new, embracing, saving, healing conceptions of God broke into Israelite 
thinking, all overlooked in our patriarchal tradition .... The God of the Sermon 
on the Mount, who lets the sun rise on the evil and the good and who 
sends rain on the just and the unjust, is such a matriarchal, all-embracing, 
unconditionally loving God. The Jesus who dines with tax collectors, 
sinners, and prostitutes acts and speaks like Wisdom, and the oldest 
Christology actually seems to have been Sophialogy!. ... ln my view, this 
picture of God would yield consequences foi a new undeiStanding of 
salvation that would look like this: Those who live out of the power of this 
matriarchal God are accepted with their whole existence, with skin and 
bones, with inner and outer, with the so-called negative and positive. All 
who live in this realm of God should be able to say today, "I am good, I am 
whole, I am beautiful. (p. 24-5)" 
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The recognition of the Wisdom of the matriarchal God would free women to attend 
to their own spiritual needs; rather than being compelled to an agenda related to 
suppressing pride, characteristically a failing of the patriarch, they would be freed 
to attend to the self-hate which has been their birthright in a masculine church: 
The American Valerie Saiving Goldstein has spoken of the "female" sin as 
the "underdevelopment or negation of the self." Different from the male sin 
of hubris, of wanting to be like God, women are alienated from themselves 
and from God by not even being able to be themselves. By being able to 
say I am good. 
I am whole. 
I am beautiful. 
women create a bit of self-affirmation out of self-love. Self-love, which 
Calvin called "the most damaging plague," which TIIIich also described as 
"paradoxical self-acceptance" or natural self-affirmation, comes back to its 
biblical right in women's experience: love your neighbor as yourself .... God 
needs us as ones who are beautiful and who can break through the vicious 
cycle of self-hate and contempt for others .... ln the Judeo-Christian tradition 
there are experiences of God in which love encompasses everybody and 
everything and thereby goes beyond patriarchy (1988: 36-38). 
As I had indicated parenthetically above, the issues of concern to the Moltmanns 
also find expression in the work of Walter Brueggemann, who, in Hopeful 
Imagination: Prophetic Voices in Exile, relates the world of three prophets to our 
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present situation. Much of his work directed to those in the ministry is also of 
oarticular value in addressina a moral auandarv encountered bv educators who . _, . " " 
know that our lived world is in need of criticism and change; yet who are perceived 
by many {often including themselves) as charged with the transmission of its 
values: in discussing Jeremiah's articulation of the ending of the known world, he 
says, " ... a pastoral model that reassures and provides certitude and tries to keep 
the old world credible is likely a disservice and a misreading of historical reality 
{1986, p. 17)." He condemns the Enlightenment model of "control through 
knowledge" {scientific, economic, political, psychological) as one that is now 
ending, " ... lacking the discernment that permits well-being." He speaks of the 
"disease of autonomy" which suggests that one may " ... live an un-called life, one 
not referred to any purpose beyond one's self {1986: 19)." 
In discussing Ezekiel, he points out the energy that churches spend avoiding the 
sense of the mismatch, " ... between the God we profess ... and the actual reality of 
our world. That mismatch is covered over by our various practices of utilitarianism 
(1986, p. 59)." And to my topic, once again as true of education as of ministry, he 
says, "The final test of vitality in ministry is to articulate concrete hope just when 
the community decides upon hopelessness (1986: 66)." 
Foreshadowing a discussion at the end of this chapter, he speaks of the difficulty 
of refuting Ludwig Feuerbach who is said to have argued that, " .. .faith in God is 
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a projection of our best hopes and our best selves, that God has no real 
independent existence. but that God talk is projection and therefore idolatry (1986: 
p. 85)." As I, and many others, have observed, opposing that position, " .. .is 
something of an affront to our situation, for it appears as intellectually primitive 
(1986: 85)." He goes on to reflect Seligman's critique of radical individualism, 
opposing Maslow and the humanists as contributors to the problem of narcism 
productive of a "social utilitarianism" toward God (1986: 86). 
Brueggemann is, of course, well aware that his views are widely opposed, 
especially by the currently advantaged, either within the church, " ... the ministry 
most often exists in congregations that are bourgeois, if not downright obdurate, 
and in which there is no special openness to or support of prophetic ministry 
(1978: 11 0)," or within the church's cultural matrix, " ... the church is so fully 
enmeshed in the dominant values of our culture that freedom of action is difficult 
(1986: 7)," or, more generally: 
The world does not believe in newness. It believes that things must remain 
as they are. And to those of us well off, it is a deep hope that things will 
remain as they are. Every new emergent is quickly domesticated; and if it 
cannot be domesticated, it is outlawed or crushed (1982: 123). 
Once again, with the substitution of the appropriate nouns, these paragraphs would 
serve quite well as a description of the plight of educators. The moral quandary, 
mentioned earlier, returns once again for the educator who feels charged with the 
transmission of societal values whose results have proven to contradict their 
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admitted aims, as Brueggemann talks about the parts of our traditions which the 
advantaged would have us forget. Speaking of amnesia for the "dangerous" 
prophetic memories of the faith, he says, "The American value system is of such 
overriding and visible force among us that the story of this community is forgotten 
(Brueggemann, 1986: 127)," both on the left and on the right: 
... with liberal Christianity ... we ... want the ethical and political spinoffs of the 
memory, but without the concrete particularity of the memory itself. As a 
result, liberals incline to sound like social scientists who have lost 
confidence in the memory and who have reached a value commitment on 
quite alien grounds .... But the conservative backlash in the church tends to 
be no more honorable. For all the pious sounds of conservative urgency, 
this religion also does not permit itself to be illuminated by the core 
tradition (1986: 128). 
Brueggemann's description of a society which has thus forgotten is strikingly 
reminiscent of Seligman's description of learned helplessness and of Moltmann's 
critique: 
We will, unlike Noah, come to believe that the present guards against 
chaos are the only ones available ... We will become docile, passive, 
submissive subjects of the empire, glad to have our life world contained in 
the imperial system which is the solution .... The combination of 
taking ... [imperial] definitions of reality too seriously and the loss of the 
peculiar memories of the faith community leads to one life-destroying 
result: despair .... For those who yearn for the world to be different, but dare 
not hope, the outcome must be destructive self-hatred or destructive 
violence ... The two parties of despair serve each other, the one bent on 
destructiveness, the other committed to repression and defense at any cost 
(1986: 129). 
97 
He is clear about the cost of our accepting our society's pressures for such 
amnesia. Speaking of the present condition of religious faith, Brueggemann finds 
that what the texts make clear our society contravenes: 
... that the full, hoped-for self is a self who will live in full communion with 
God, enjoying God's presence, being utterly safe, at home, at peace in 
God's presence. This affirmation may strike us as odd and offensive, but 
it belongs to the core of our faith. It is clear, in my judgement, that 
modernity has almost completely talked us out of this hope. We fear that 
such an affirmation sounds mystical, or romantic, or otherworldly, or only 
for those with a particular "spiritual aptitude." .... hope that leans toward God 
in desperate urgent expectation that God will indeed liberate the world from 
its terrible decay and bondage .... cannot be easy to utter in a technological 
society (1993: 44-5). 
Although the prophetic tradition offers us a way to read our situation that leads us 
to "hopeful imagination," Brueggemann understands the point which Berger raised 
in the last chapter about the difficulty of being a 'cognitive minority', saying that, 
"Serious believers are indeed an alien community in American culture (1986: 131 )." 
He proposes that the theological metaphor of exile and homecoming in these three 
prophets provides a resource for a faith which, " ... contradicts dominant cultural 
perspectives that deny grief, co-opt holiness and nullify memory in the interest of 
the absolute present (1986: 132): 
The holiness of God becomes the ground for serious hope, for no hope will 
be found as long as it is reduced to things useful, short of God's 
Holiness .... Holiness is proclaimed against conventional theology that never 
quite faces the otherness and always hopes for and forms a utilftarianism 
that links God's holiness to some historical purpose (1986: 131). 
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The "creation spirituality" of Matthew Fox is a similar effort to reclaim tradition from 
the dominant paradigm, one tt,at ''faces the otherness" of Holiness that 
Brueggemann requires and at the same time is able to meet Brueggemann's 
challenge: to join hope with "things useful" without being reduced to them. He 
proposes that our "quest for wisdom" must pass through a transformation of social 
and religious structures, "a letting go of certain forms of religion, those based on 
fall/redemption theologies .... Religion can and must let go of a dualistic tradition and 
be transformed into that tradition which is more ancient, more celebrative, more 
justice oriented, and more like the tradition Jesus himself lived and preached 
(1983: 305)." Of creation spirituality and hope in the world, Fox says: 
Erich Fromm once wrote, "Those whose hope is weak settle for comfort or 
for violence." The comfort of consumerism and the violence of militarism 
which dominate our times would suggest that we are a people with little or 
no hope. Have we lost or are we rapidly losing hope? One reason for this 
pessimism that leads to cynicism and lack of caring is a faiVredemption 
religious paradigm that begins its theology with original sin ... .To teach 
original sin and never teach original blessing creates pessimism and 
cynicism .... The creation-centered tradition is not optimistic; it is too much 
in touch with the pain and tragedy of existence for that. But it is hopeful, 
and it is cosmically passionate about the blessing that life is (1983: 18-9). 
Seeking to understand why this doctrine of original sin has been so dominant for 
the last sixteen centuries (since its origin with St. Augustine), Fox has decided that 
the reason is basically political: 
an exaggerated doctrine of original sin, one that is employed as a starting 
point for spirituality, plays kindly into the hands of empire-builders, 
slavemasters, and patriarchal society in general. It divides and thereby 
conquers, pitting one's thoughts against one's feelings, one's body against 
one's spirit, one's political vocation against one's personal needs, people 
against earth, animals, and nature in genera!. By doing this it so convolutes 
people, so confuses and preoccupies them, that deeper questions about 
community, justice, and celebration never come to the fore. Blessing is 
politically dangerous; the art of savoring is politically suspect; pleasure is 
too often a route to sharing the pleasure-which is justice making. And 
Justice making conjures up passionate criticism of what is. As W.H. Auden 
put it, "As a rule, it was the pleasure haters who became unjust." ... .It paid 
and paid well and is still paying well (witness for example the financial 
success of fundamentalist preachers on television) to keep guilt going and 
self-doubt going and distrust going, all in the name of an avenging God 
(1983: 54-5). 
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As an indispensable part of this effort for social justice, Fox calls for an inner 
transformation, for a "psychic justice" wherein, "mysticism-what philosopher 
Joseph Pieper defines as 'affirmation of the Whole' and what Rabbi Hesche! 
defines as 'radical amazement'-must be included as part of any valid social 
change (1995: 158)." And the quest for wisdom, which he proposes that we 
undertake through the transformation that is possible in creation spirituality, this 
quest which he says is the ground for both justice and hope, is subject to 
pedagogy, is to be undertaken in "wisdom schools," which, "would honor the heart 
and body, the right brain of awe and wonder, as much as it would the 
analytic .... would pay attention to people's pain, grief, and anger as well as their 
dreams and desires (1995:170). 
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The theology of Dorothea Solie has not only a concern for hope-in-the-world that 
is reminiscent of Matthew Fox. but also a powerful social critique. As a founding 
feminist liberation theologian, Solie might be expected to be susceptible to 
Moltmann's criticism of that view as reductionist and secular; however, as with 
many of her persuasion, that criticism does not apply. It is not that she lacks the 
fire that characterizes those whose concern with the world is revolutionary; indeed, 
her opinion of the failure of liberal theology to address these problems is scathing: 
It seems as though the liberal paradigm has lost the power to communicate 
the confidence of faith and the hope of faith; it still affords consolation in 
difficulties in personal life, but that too remains in the superficial realm of 
individualistic psychology. A combative hope (and there is no other kind) 
for the preservation of creation, an end to militarism and the vision of a 
justice other than the murderous economic 'order' under which we now live-
-none of these things seems to grow within the liberal paradigm (1990: 32). 
And her position with regard to the attempt of the church to 'have it both ways', 
attempting to serve two masters, is reminiscent of the prophetic Brueggemann at 
his best: 
One of the basic problems of a Christianity which has been corrupted and 
become spiritless is that the churches have continually sought to unite the 
Pax Christi and the Pax Romana as though they could enjoy both together. 
Even today, many Christians think that one can live by bearing inwardly in 
one's heart the peace of Christ which comforts us as individuals and 
relying outwardly on the Pax Romana and the order which it imposes by 
force (1990: 160). 
She too speaks of another way to approach the paradox of immanence and 
transcendence, suggesting that they have been held apart by hierarchical thinking. 
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She proposes that we see a different relationship between them, see that: 
"Transcendence is radical immanence." a view which is to free theology from a. 
"thousand year old burden of doctrines ... which start from the notion that human 
society is basically incapable of ordering itself rightly (1990: 190)." With this new 
understanding, if, "in what we experience and do, we really enter into the radically 
of love, then our immanence contains transcendence," and: 
In that case, what we call 'God' appears in our everyday affairs. The 
compassionate man from Samaria finds God and is found by God on the 
road .... the mystics have always said that God is as it were lying in the 
streets, if only we could leam to see. They have said that there are more 
possibilities than the experiences mediated in cultic religious terms in which 
we become sure of God. God condenses and hallows what is around us, 
so that we catch sight of it in God's radical immanence of God .... Radical 
immanence means that God hallows our everyday life, that God is 'in' our 
this-worldliness if we have not destroyed our commitment through hatred-
disguised as normality and indifference (1990: 192). 
Questioned about where people in the peace and liberation movements, "get the 
courage and power to fight and hope in the face of the gigantic superiority of 
weapons and technologies, capitalism and corrupted science," Solie replied that 
there was no "explanation in terms of this world" and quoted St. Paul concerning 
"powers and principalities." At that point, she spoke directly to my concern for 
grounding hope beyond human failure while at the same time holding to the 
importance of our duty to try: 
I think that one danger in our lives is that we often confuse the meaning of 
life with success. In this way we remain at the spiritual level of capitalism, 
which regards success as the supreme value. It is also conceivable to the 
believer that the enemies of God will succeed in destroying this creation. 
In that case the truth of Jesus would end in tragedy. But would it be 
destroyed as tmth? In that case God would sit on the r..:ins of this 
radioactive planet, weeping. Faith does not mean living without anxiety. If 
we are serious about understanding God's being in social terms, thinking 
of God as the power at the beginning, the power of relationship, then the 
continuation of creation depends on the strength of love among human 
beings. Whether or not the nuclear winter comes depends upon how many 
people rise from the death of unrelatedness and are converted. God lures 
anew every day, to repent (1990: 195). 
A Language for Critique and Apologetics. 
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Here at the chasm's edge, it might have seemed that such concerns as we have 
just been sharing were doomed to be relics of a former time, when "God-Talk" was 
more current coin. Yet these are obviously living faiths, beliefs which are life-
giving and strong. How is it that in the face of all that has gone before, the critique 
of these ways has not eliminated them from our culture? It may be because the 
popular cynicism which I described as so highly destructive is not having its effect 
here; perhaps the criticism which is meaningful here is a higher form of skepticism, 
which has a deserved place in our discourse, a skepticism familiar to our 
iconoclasts. Richard Popkin (1967), addressing the value of such criticism in 
philosophy has it that: 
The historical skeptics did not say that they personally regarded everything 
as doubtful. They distinguished believing various matters from having 
sufficient reasons for believing them ... [they] followed Huet's view that it is 
one thing to philosophize and another to live .... From Greek times onward, 
skepticism has functioned as a gadfly to dogmatic philosophy .... Thus 
skepticism has been a major dynamic force in intellectual history .... Without 
skepticism, we probably could not distinguish enthusiasm, prejudice, or 
superstition from serious or meaningful beliefs .... Each ags is abls to asssss 
the views which are valuable to it only if they are subjected to the same 
challenge (1967: 460). 
103 
Much of our 'God talk', especially to the extent that it is represented as truth claims 
about 'the real world', is subject to such a criticism by Wayne Proudfoot: 
Theology must somehow reconstitute itself as genuine inquiry. The most 
common protective strategy in Protestant thought since Schleiermacher has 
been to stress the autonomy of religious and theological language, to 
decouple it from nonreligious beliefs and practices and to leave inquiry 
about the world to the sciences, broadly considered. That decoupling has 
permitted scientific inquiry to flourish without ecclesiastical interference and 
has served apologetic purposes in the short run. The cost, however, has 
been to remove theological reflection from the actual inquiries in which we 
continually engage, and to court the risk of irrelevance (1993: 113). 
Speaking specifically of the noetic claims for religious experience growing out of 
that position Proudfoot says, in his conclusion to Religious Experience (1985): 
The program that Schleiermacher inaugurated with his portrayal of religious 
belief and practice as expressive of an autonomous moment of human 
experience has been extremely influential for both religious thought and the 
study of religion ... The felt quality of an experience from the subject's point 
of view is considered to be the only legitimate account that can be given 
of that experience, and the result is a protective strategy that serves 
apologetic purposes. We have seen that the central thesis of 
Schleiermacher's program cannot be sustained. Religious experience 
cannot be identified without reference to concepts, beliefs, grammatical 
rules, and practices .... We have seen that such limitations [of inquiry] are 
unjustified. The experience to which Schleiermacher appeals assumes 
certain concepts and beliefs. The authority of religious experience rests 
upon certain judgements about how that experience is to be explained. The 
noetic quality cited by James is not given in the experience, but assumes 
a tacit judgement about the kind of explanation appropriate for that 
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cannot be disconnected from other concepts and beliefs. Each of these 
attempts to restrict philosophical or theological reflection to internal analysis 
and elucidation fails because the doctrines and experiences to be analyzed 
assume concepts and beliefs that are not distinctly religious, and because 
the authority of the doctrine or experience assumes a tacit explanatory 
commitment (p. 228 & 236). 
104 
Proudfoot argues that, "One cannot identify the logical status of religious doctrine 
or of the word 'God' in such a way that it remains invulnerable to our changing 
beliefs and desires (1991: 101)." I suggest that in a sense he is contending with 
a 'straw man', since none of those who seem to me to be credible representatives 
of mystical traditions are dependent upon the "logical status of doctrine" or word 
definitions, except possibly in their overly generous efforts to find a language in 
which to communicate with those who are. Of course, there is another possibility. 
Perhaps, regardless of how effective or ineffective such a position as 
Schleiermacher's is as a protective strategy, it also happens to refer to something 
'really real'? Perhaps the failure of Schleiermacher's program before Proudfoot's 
criticism (rightly, I believe) is for my inquiry yet another example of edgefinding, 
another public service by a careful thinker to use skepticism creatively, to point 
once again to the failure of our current constructs, so that we may be encouraged 
to seek farther, lest we pay with despair. 
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The very conversation about the use of experience to resolve such issues is in 
itself a highly instructive and interesting example of such a pursuit. In that 
conversation, two groups of voices have, for me, risen above the babble to clearly 
pose, if not resolve, this question. These are the voices of Steven T. Katz and 
Robert K.C. Forman (and their respective supporters), philosophers whose work 
over several years culminates, in my opinion, in an exchange centered around two 
recent books, one of which each of them has edited on the topic: Mysticism and 
Language (Katz, 1992) and The Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and 
Philosophy (Forman, 1990). 
I was initially attracted to Forman by his effort to defend the positions on the noetic 
qualities of mystical experience taken by those whom he describes as members 
of the "perennial philosophy school" (such as William James, Evelyn Underhill, 
Mircea Eliade, and W. T. Stace) against, " ... the recent 'received view' on such 
questions, which may collectively be called 'constructivism,' the view that mystical 
experience is significantly shaped and formed by the subject's beliefs, concepts 
and expectations .... That a person's language constrains, determines, and informs 
the judgements one makes about oneself and others (Forman, 1990: 3&5)." In an 
era which Forman sees our discourse dominated by this constructivist model, not 
just in relation to this topic, but in all of the humanities and social sciences, it is not 
difficult to understand why there would be widespread criticism of the perennialists, 
who, " ... maintained that mystical experience represented an immediate, direct 
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contact with a (variously described) absolute principle (Forman, 1990: 3)." As 
Forman says: 
Insofar as it seemed to deny that the linguistic background played a role 
in the shaping and perception of the mystical experience (during, not after) 
perennialism seemed to deny this "self-evident" truth .... One question then 
that this book poses: Is this broad constructivist picture of things plausibly 
and convincingly applied to mysticism? Has it been conclusively 
established that mysticism,indeed, is like most other experiences in the 
sense that it results from a process of introducing, imposing, or entertaining 
one's beliefs, expectations, judgements, and categories? .... Are there some 
experiences, or some specifiable aspects of human experience, that are 
not "constructed" by our language and belief (1990: 5)? 
Katz, like Proudfoot, is eager to answer this question in the negative: 
It is my view ... that mystical reports do not merely indicate the 
postexperiential description of an unreportable experience in the language 
closest at hand. Rather, the experiences themselves are inescapably 
shaped by prior linguistic influences such that the lived experience 
conforms to a preexistent pattern what has been learned, then intended, 
and then actualized in the experiential reality of the mystic .... this contextual 
model will be presumed in the present essay (1992: 5). 
It should be noted that Katz (1992: 34) rejects Forman's labeling of him as a 
"constructivist," preferring the description of a "contextualist," in the sense of the 
"contextual model" just quoted. 
Given the assemblage of theologians and assorted perennialists we have 
discussed thus far in this chapter, there can be little doubt as to where the 
sympathies of the present author lie; therefore it may be somewhat surprising that 
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it is not my intention to pick and choose from among the arguments of these 
philosophers a favorable polemic for Forman's position. so much as it is to 
examine the usefulness of their entire discourse. 
That issue is apparent in the case made by Stephen Phillips (1992), one of Katz's 
contributors, as he asks, "Can non mystics understand mystic claims and reports?" 
He begins his chapter by describing the view which his exploration of this question 
supports: 
The view of mystic language and communication that emerges reinforces 
the skepticism of those who would resist attempts to "read off" from 
mystical experiences detailed religious doctrines of individual traditions. But 
it also suggests that there is room for theoretical accommodations within 
a religious or "spiritual" domain, as have been attempted by such 
"universalists" as William James (p. 123). 
Phillips asserts that, "traditional spiritual metaphysics (Buddhist, Christian, and so 
on) loses the advantage of its claims to mystically experiential foundations 
because of its squabbling with other views that also claim such foundations (1992: 
133)." and that it is the frequent incapacity of mystics to offer "higher tier'' 
interpretations of their experiences in appropriate words which produces such 
squabbling. He brings himself into clear conflict with the requirements which 
mystics place upon their understanding when he says: 
To take seriously the possibility that mystical experiences may provide 
significant support for spiritual beliefs, one needs to know what the 
experiences are like. This means that the "peculiarly mystical" has to be 
put into words [emphases added]. And these words, we have seen, must 
for nonmystics be irreducibly figurative, involving invariably open-ended 
analogies. Thus there would appear to be much room for theoretical 
accommodations. Open-ended analogies, unlike credos, are not set in 
stone (1992: 133-4) 
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Phillips' "theoretical accommodations" seems to me to be an offer to engage in 
interesting intellectual dialogue (and subsequent Joss of any noetic quality) about 
the context in which mystical experience is reported; however, it evades what 
mystics actually say about their experiences in two critical areas, missing one point 
and bypassing another. Firstly, the concept of "reading off'' doctrines directly from 
these experiences is even more foreign to the mystics of my acquaintance than 
Phillips claims it is to his skeptics. It is a common claim made by mystics that only 
experience can convey truth, a claim which has often rendered them martyrs at the 
hands of the masters of doctrine. It is the ecclesiastical equivalent of Phillips' work 
which translates records of others' experience into doctrine suitable for squabbling 
over, a practice frequently condemned by mystics as futile and foolish. And 
secondly, it seems to me to be generally true that those who report mystical 
experience are interested in it only to the extent that it represents a truth claim; 
whereas Phillips is perfectly happy to discuss such an experience as "a 
psychological event" and to postpone {apparently indefinitely) the crux of the issue, 
as when he himself says: "It is, of course, the crucial question whether the 
experience is indeed revelatory in the way the mystic takes it to be, but this is not 
our immediate topic (p. 123-4 ). " 
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A contributor to the Forman book, Anthony Perovich, makes an interesting case 
for seeing the current debate as being centered around a misunderstanding of 
Kant, by the "Kantians", among whom he includes Katz. He ascribes, to the 
uncritical acceptance of the universal applicability of the Kantians epistemology to 
all of experience, Katz's position, which Perovich quotes as, "This 'mediated' 
aspect of all our experience seems an inescapable feature of any epistemological 
inquiry, including the inquiry into mysticism (1990: 244-5)" and says: 
Therefore, it seems to me the recent "kantian" philosophy of mysticism 
rests on a mistake, the mistake of assuming that mystical experience is 
narrowly "human" experience and, so, is subject to the same treatment as 
is "human" experience generally. But the mystics insist that their 
experiences result from ecstasy, that their knowledge is gained as the 
result of employing faculties which are not the ordinary "human" ones. At 
the very least, these claims translate as denials of the validity of "Kantian" 
epistemology in the mystical sphere. By studying their reports, we can also 
hope to learn something about the sort of epistemology that is appropriate 
here, given that we have once learned to avoid the pitfalls of a "Kantian" 
analysis of mystical experience. This last lesson-of course the point is not 
without its irony-could easily have been learned form Kant himself (1990: 
250). 
And, in the same vein, rather than Phillips' reference (above) to William James' 
universalism, which refers to a discussion of the speculative differences which 
arise with the attempts of the "various theologies" to perform their 
intellectualization of these experiences, I much prefer to simply acknowledge 
(rather than dispute, as Proudfoot would) that divide which William James 
described so well for us in The Varieties of Religious Experience: 
I have now sketched with extreme brevity .. .the general traits of the mystic 
range of consciousness .... My next task is to inquire whether we can invoke 
it as authort•~tive. Does it furnish any warrant for the truth ... ? !n brief, my 
answer is this ... 
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1. Mystical states, when well developed, usually are, and have a right to be, 
absolutely authoritative over the individuals to whom they come. 
2. No authority emanates from them which should make it the duty of those who 
stand outside of them to accept their revelations uncritically. 
3. They break down the authority of the non-mystical or rationalistic 
consciousness, based upon the understanding and the senses alone. They show 
it to be only one kind of consciousness. They open out the possibility of other 
orders of truth, in which, so far as anything in us vitally responds to them, we may 
freely continue to have faith (1990: 381). 
Such questions are much on the mind of Cornel West in establishing the context 
for his own position: 
Like Kierkegaard, whose reflections on Christian faith are so profound yet 
often so frustrating, I do not think it possible to put forward rational 
defenses of one's faith that verify its veracity or even persuade one's 
critics. Yet it is possible to convey to others the sense of deep emptiness 
and pervasive meaninglessness one feels if one is not critically aligned with 
an enabling tradition. One risks not logical inconsistency but actual 
insanity; the issue is not reason or irrationality but life or death. Of course, 
the fundamental philosophical question remains whether the Christian 
gospel is ultimately true. And as a Christian prophetic pragmatist whose 
focus is on coping with transient and provisional penultimate matters yet 
whose hope goes beyond them, I reply in the affirmative, bank my all on 
it, yet am willing to entertain the possibility in low moments that I may be 
deluded (1989: 233). 
That may be as much as one can say in the terms of the rules of discourse which 
we observe. In fact, my suggestion that Proudfoot contends with a 'straw man' 
would be more fairly lodged against me for so summary a presentation of his 
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argument and my judgement of it; in any case, I am comfortable with Proudfoot's 
skepticism. so long as he lets me see it as the variety which Popkin described. I 
suggest to anyone who wants to take Cornel West's intellectual position with 
regard to their faith and hope, that they must engage not only Proudfoot, but also 
Levinson's Santayana (1992), Feuerbach (1957), Whorf(1956), and the questions 
of mysticism and language upon which I will touch in the next section. I certainly 
do not urge that journey upon the fainthearted, I simply acknowledge that, while 
I include in my personal experience having survived it with whatever you see here, 
I, imitating West, make no claim to answering it in its own terms. 
There are those who do. Among them is John B. Cobb, Jr., who in the following, 
puts Alfred North Whitehead's position into a postmodem context: 
Whitehead and the majority of his theological followers extended his 
realism to the affirmation of a real God. There can be no question but that 
this cuts against the grain of modem sensibility, whether idealist, 
materialist, or relativist, and that it has put off many who might otherwise 
have been attracted to Whitehead .... Whitehead judged that what he called 
the Principle of Limitation was what had been called God by some and 
other names by other religious people. This claim led to the complex 
development of the doctrine of God by Whitehead and some of his 
followers. Whitehead stated that what more was to be said about God must 
be learned from religious experience, and although philosophical and 
religious considerations are intertwined throughout his development of the 
doctrine, this point should be kept in mind. In Whitehead's view, religious 
experience has not been pure projection but is highly conditioned by 
cultural and historical factors. His own interpretation of the evidence of 
religious experience and his formulation of what God is in light of this 
evidence is also highly conditioned .... he appeals to the exceptional 
experience and develops an argument for what may be. He understands 
much of this process as more poetry than hard philosophy, if there really 
is such a thing as the latter. There is no reason for anyone to follow him 
unless her experience and religious sensibility correspond somewhat to 
his .... [and] there is no reason to reject Whitehead's speculations simply 
because they go so far beyond what most modems are willing to 
acknowledge. We should be skeptical of making skepticism into a primary 
virtue (1991: 197-8). 
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There is obviously a world to be said about this question, as when Whitehead says 
of religious experience, "This intuition is not the discernment of a form of words, 
but of a type of character. It is characteristic of the learned mind to exalt words. 
Yet mothers can ponder many things in their hearts which their lips C8rmot 
express. These many things, which are thus known, constitute the ultin.ate 
religious evidence, beyond which there is no appeal (1974: 65)." We will return to 
it again in the next chapter, in the company of the promised attempt at addressing 
"special knowledge" arising from mystical experience. 
This conversation, and the many other opportunities which we might have chosen 
to use to explore this question, seem for me to invariably terminate with this 
question of the presence or absence of faith; and, these questions of faith, in turn, 
seem to have similarly been resolved on the basis of some individual experience 
of a transcendent nature, or in the negative, in the basis of an absence of such 
experience, rather than upon the cleverness of argument. While there are certainly 
many who might claim to be intellectually convinced of their faith, I have yet to 
encounter any such argument which could compel the assent of that hypothetical 
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rational person whose good opinion the logician so values. These arguments, at 
their best. seem designed to narrow the range of propositions for which we must 
pay the intellectual price of faith (a cost perhaps measured in units of hubris). 
Similarly, I have not found an argument of sufficient force to dissuade a person 
from a faith founded upon confidence in such experience. 
As I indicated at the beginning of this section, Katz and Forman have illustrated, 
if not defined, the limits to which I believe their discourse can pursue the topic. 
What they have illustrated is not the boundaries of their sough tatter quarry, but 
rather the limitations upon the capacities of their method. Their own assumptions, 
their faith if you will, in the usefulness of rational discourse has kept them focused 
upon the verbal medium within which the traditions have been communicated, 
have kept them from listening to the content of the claims. Thus, the concept of 
"skillful means," so clearly annunciated in the materials which they have studied, 
has not been of help to them: that a person of sufficient understanding might 
intentionally craft an instrumental piece of literature to have an effect upon a 
reader which was not explicit in that literature-such a concept finds no home 
among such philosophers. As a result, they are confounded in their search by their 
own literalism. In the next chapter, I will address my experience of accepting the 
claim of the authors of skillful means as a working hypothesis, studying their 
material in the manner in which its authors claimed it must be studied. 
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As a bridge to that discourse, the work of Michael Sells has provided me with an 
oooortunitv to move cast these self-imoosed limits bv offerina an amendment to 
• 1 " a • • -
the "modernist and postmodemist construction (1994: 1 )" through which we have 
seemed constrained to view mystical discourse. Sells, by means of his critical 
exploration, provides that opportunity for understanding how the dilemma arises, 
and how it serves those who struggle with it. As I hope to show in the following 
discussion of his view of the language of mystical discourse, his examination of 
this dilemma can be seen in the terms of the current paper to provide an insight 
(at least at the psychological level) into the creation and functioning of some types 
of "skillful means." 
Sells (1994) discusses three responses to what he considers to be " ... the aporia--
the unresolvable dilemma-of transcendence. The transcendent must be beyond 
names, ineffable. In order to claim that the transcendent is beyond names, 
however, I must give it a name, 'the transcendent.' Any statement of ineffability, 
'X is beyond names,' generates the aporia that the subject of the statement must 
be named (as X) in order for us to affirm that it is beyond names (1994: 2)." The 
three categories of response which he recognizes are: silence; an equivocation, 
such as distinguishing between God and "God" (the latter supposedly indicating 
the defects introduced into the concept by the human mind); and finally, the 
approach which he chooses, often called negative theology, which: 
begins with the refusal to solve the dilemma posed by the attempt to refer 
to the transcendent through a distinction betweens two kinds of name. The 
dilemma is accepted as a genuine aporia, that is, as unresolvable; but this 
acceptance, instead of leading to silence, leads to a new mode of 
discourse ... .It is negative in the sense that it denies that the transcendent 
can be named or given attributes ... however, the formal statement of 
ineffability turns back on itself and undoes itself .... As I attempt to state the 
aporia of transcendence, I am caught in a linguistic regress .... The authentic 
subject of discourse slips continually back beyond each effort to name it or 
even to deny its nameability. The regress is harnessed and becomes the 
guiding semantic force, the dynamis of a new kind of language ... Apophasis 
is the common Greek designation for this language ... .its etymology 
suggests ... the discourse in question: apo phasis (un-saying or speaking-
away). The term is commonly paired with kataphasis (saying, speaking-
with) (1992: 2&3). 
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Such language does not serve those whose interest is the advocacy of an 
exclusivist doctrinal position. In fact, the turning back on itself which Sells says 
characterizes such a discourse is nicely illustrated in his catalogue of possible 
views toward its nature: 
Classical apophasis has been viewed as religious and as anti-religious; as 
theistic, pantheistic, and atheistic; as pious and libertine; as orthodox and 
heretical. At its most intense, apophatic language has as a subject neither 
divine nor human, neither self nor other. It can be read as a relentless 
critique of religious traditions or as a realization of the deeper wisdom 
within such traditions. It can be read as grounded in the intimate 
specificities of particular traditions or as an opening onto intercultural and 
inter-religious conversation. These possibilities may not be mutually 
exclusive (1992: 12-13). 
It is, in fact, in " ... the tension between the two propositions [apophasis and 
kataphasis] that the discourse becomes meaningful. That tension is momentary. 
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It must be continually re-eamed by ever new linguistic acts of unsaying (1994: 3)." 
Thus apophasis, as Sells proposes to use the term, is seen as a performance of 
unnameability, a writing wherein each assertion of ineffability or transcendence 
must lead to a retraction, which must in tum be withdrawn. He says that if taken 
out of the context of this performance, individual assertions, isolated from the 
performance, must take on unintended meanings. He suggests that the intensity 
of such a performance can be highly variable, ranging from a mild disclaimer 
before and after a chapter which then "freely employees names and predications 
of the transcendent," to the highly paradoxical exchanges of which the Zen 
masters are likely to be the most widely known example. Sells takes the position 
that such paradoxes are real contradictions, not merely apparent ones; however, 
he claims that such contradiction does not mean that the discourse is illogical. 
Rather, eliminating the tendency to want to "correct" such contradictions to comply 
with a current model is precisely the renovation to the "postmodem construction" 
to which I referred above: 
For the apophatic writer, the logical rule of non-contradiction functions for 
object entities. When the subject of discourse is a non-object and no-thing, 
it is not irrational that such a logic be superseded. Of course, apophasis is 
not the only discourse that cannot directly name its subject. Poetry, drama-
-almost any form of art-risks being trivialized when its meaning is defined 
and paraphrased discursively. Anyone who has attempted to explain 
discursively the humor of a joke knows how the humor disappears when 
removed from its performance. Apophatic texts have suffered in a 
particularly acute manner from the urge to paraphrase the meaning in non-
apophatic language or fill in the open referent-to say what the text really 
meant to say, but didn't (1994: 4). 
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Just as apophasis is not unique in not-naming, so it is not uniquely Sells' alone. 
In fact this is a field with many entrants: it is the difficulty of the texts, rather than 
their rarity which have made them unfamiliar to a broad audience. Referring to 
Sells' discussion of the various levels of intensity to which this process of negation 
might be pursued, I would suggest as an upper limit of intelligibility the intensity 
in a discussion by Mark Taylor (1993) of Derrida's agony over this double 
negation, his struggle to stand in "Heidegger's Temple," by reading Heideggerwith 
"two hands at once." Taylor (1993: 53), commenting on how Derrida's questions 
can be tumed back upon his own texts, says, "Is Derrida saying nothing once 
again? Saying nothing by what he is not saying? Isn't his nonsaying nonetheless 
a saying? A denegation? Isn't his avoidance of speaking the only way he has to 
speak about that which he knows he cannot speak about?" Similarly, Lawson 
(1985: 1 08) describes her experience, "The reflexive whirlpool that Derrida has 
lead us into he calls an aporia, a paradox that is not to be avoided but which is 
unfathomable." Such difficulties in powerful intellects are adequate warnings to the 
prudent to take great care in apophatic discourse. While the authors might escape 
unscathed, the average reader might as easily find him/herself in need of the 
therapeutic philosophy ofWittgenstein, whose philosophy, like those of Heidegger 
and the sages of many ancient traditions, is claimed to be a battle against the, 
"seduction and bewitchment of language (Cooper: 22)." Of course, it must be 
apparent that I have every intention of ignoring my own advice, since this 
discourse seems to offer the only means at hand to frame my search. In 
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concentrating upon Sells, I am selecting the path which seems most accessible to 
me, acknowledging the omission of innumerable "roads not taken." 
Critical to understanding the implications of Sells' work for our search is the 
concept of the "meaning event." Both because his definition of this key concept 
involves an analogy with "mystical union," and because such union is central to 
many mystical reports, I will attend first to an apophatic view of that state. Sells 
describes how the hierarchies generated by speaking (kataphatically) of intentional 
creation are: 
unsaid from within. At the heart of that unsaying is a radical dialectic of 
transcendence and immanence. That which is "beyond" is revealed or 
reveals itself as most intimately "within" .... When the transcendent realizes 
itself as the immanent, the subject of the act is neither divine nor human, 
neither self nor other .... Conventional structures ... the distinction between 
reflexive and nonreflexive action ... (is] broken down. This moment in which 
the boundaries between divine and human, self and other, melt away is 
commonly called mystical union (1994: 7). 
A central issue in taking a critical approach to such a discourse is obviously 
whether one can understand it without being a mystic, without the personal 
experience of the mystic, an issue whose problematic nature is indicated by the 
previous discussion of the article by Steven Phillips (1992). To allow for 
continuance with, " ... no presuppositions concerning mystical experience on the part 
of the writer or reader," Sells sets himself a different goal: "to identify the 
distinctive semantic event within the language of unsaying, what I will call the 
119 
'meaning event' (1994: 9)." His effort to clarify this term involves contrasting it with 
the distinction generally drawn between. "meaning (as sense and reference) and 
event (as predication. Meaning event indicates that moment when the meaning 
has become identical or fused with the act of predication. In metaphysical terms, 
essence is identical with existence, but such identity is not only asserted, it is 
performed (1994: 9)." Recalling his earlier reference (in the definition of apophasis, 
as a performance of unnameability) is useful here in getting the sense of dialectic 
necessary to, "identify the semantic location of this performance, and the manner 
in which the identities of meaning and event, reference and predication, essence 
and existence, are fused (1994: 9)." In seeking a way to avoid the other two 
choices in the face of the aporia (silence or equivocation), Sells has brought us to 
consider how language might offer to understand to this otherwise inaccessible 
IIX": 
The meaning event is the semantic analogue to the experience of mystical 
union. It does not describe or refer to mystical union but effects a semantic 
union that re-creates or imitates the mystical union .... The mystical writers 
discussed below claim a moment of "realization"-a moment in which, 
again, the sense and reference are fused into identity with event. In 
contrast to the realization as an instance of mystical union which entails a 
complete psychological, epistemological, and ontological transformation, 
the meaning event is a semantic occurrence (1994: 9). 
This new term is to be used by Sells in contrast to the modem concept of 
experience, so as to avoid the presuppositions which that concept entails: a 
grammatical object of experience, mediation, and a constructed nature. While 
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acknowledging the likelihood that the use of evocative language will be criticized 
as a "protective strategy" (see Proudfoot, above), he claims that his readings of 
apophatic language of mystical union allow him to: 
focus upon how such language displaces the grammatical object, affirms 
a moment of immediacy and affirms a moment of ontological pre-
construction, as in the paradoxical refrain that in mystical union the soul 
reverts "to where it was before it was." The meaning event is 
transreferential. Rather than pointing to an object, apophatic language 
attempts to evoke in the reader an event that is, in its movement beyond 
structures of self and other-subject and object-structurally analogous to 
the event of mystical union (1994: 10). 
This talk about union raises the question of what Sells calls "God-language" and 
what many of the postmodemist persuasion call with condescension (or worse) 
"God-talk." Sells ascribes much of the difficulty encountered by such critics with 
these terms to the confusion generated by carrying our current constructions of a 
capitalized, generic "God" into the medieval discourse, "It may be that the modern 
'God' is a form of property, allowing an easy purchase on the meaning of religious 
traditions, a purchase that can be used to stake out positions and mark off 
boundaries (1994: 12)." In any case, it is clear that, for example, in Sells' reading 
of Eckhart, both the soul and the deity have to give up their properties to be born 
into mystical union. Such confusions also are common in relation to what Sells 
calls the ''what:" 
Much discussion of mystical union and comparative mysticism has been 
based upon substantia list language of whatness or quiddity. Do adherents 
of differing traditions ''worship the same God," "believe the same thing," or 
"experience the same thing"-i.e., is what someone from tradition X 
experiences or believes the same or different from that experienced or 
believed by someone from tradition Y. The question of whatness shades 
into the question of conditioning: is "what" the mystic experiences 
conditioned or unconditioned? .... The nonsubstantialist understanding of the 
transcendent common to apophatic mystics does not fit the premises of 
such questions ... .ln the words of Eriugena, the transcendent is nothing, i.e., 
no-thing, beyond all entity and quiddity. The apophatic language of 
disontology, in continually moving toward a removal of the "what" (a 
removal that is never achieved, always in progress) suggests a different 
mode of comparison (1994: 11). 
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The reader will remember the warning which Sells has given about, "rephrasing 
apophasis into single-proposition assertions about a substantialist deity (1994: 
12)." Such abstraction must be misleading, since, "Apophasis is a discourse in 
which any single proposition is acknowledged as falsifying, as reifying. It is a 
discourse of double propositions in which meaning is generated through the 
tension between the saying and the unsaying (1994: 12)." In a similar vein, he 
discusses the temptation to explain away the "anarchic moment" (without arche, 
or first principle) which is a component of the meaning event in apophatic 
language, "To attempt to interpose discursive distinctions by claiming that the 
mystic doesn't really mean "nothing," when she says nothing ... is to explain away 
the anarchic moment...to tum apophatic language into conventional theology 
(1994: 209)." 
Yet such anarchic moments have significant risks. The abandonment of self 
suggests giving up will, ethical direction, and rationality--risking madness. The 
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hierarchies upon which moral and intellectual distinctions depend are continually 
challenged by the apophatic anarchic moment The tnreat of chaos is quite real. 
However: 
for the apophatic mystic, within his or her kataphatic religious or 
philosophical context, the risk of the anarchic moment is worth taking. The 
moral alternative, continued enslavement to the subtle forms of self-will 
within the will to do or be good, is ultimately (to use the nutritor's language) 
the death of the ethical spirit. The intellectual alternative, the worship of 
images constructed from beliefs, is ultimately the death of the rational spirit 
(1994: 213). 
The passing away of the ego-self which is generally acknowledged to be 
antecedent to union, since it involves abandoning will and knowing, renders such 
union unintentional. Thus Proudfoot's contention that religious experience has 
content and is intentional leads Sells to construct a syllogism concluding that 
mystical union is not an experience: 
All experience must have a grammatical object, but the prime motivation 
of apophatic language is to subvert or displace the grammatical object. 
Similarly, the notion of the unmediated at the heart of apophatic 
mysticism ... contradicts the common opinion that all experience is mediated. 
If it is true that all experience is constructed, it is equally true that the 
concept of experience is a modem construct ... [He has chosen] to bracket 
the concept of experience and choose a concept that fits apophatic 
language but opens that language onto a field of critical inquiry (1994: 
214). 
Sells claims for apophatic discourse the perquisites of poetry: the right to resist 
paraphrase, protection from the insistence on express meaning ("if the meaning 
could be expressed discursively, it would not have required a poem"), and 
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immunity to the insistence upon a common agreement on meaning. Despite our 
general willingness to grant these protections to poetry. " ... what has been 
commonly accepted for poetic discourse-a resistance to semantic reduction-is 
frequently viewed as a form of mystification in apophasis (1994: 216)." 
Having attempted to refrain "apophatically" from a definition of the event with which 
we have been concerned, Sells finally relents, saying that we might call the event, 
"the evocation of a sense of mystery:" 
This sense of apophatic mystery is not a mystery in the sense of a secret 
known only to an initiated few. It is not a doctrine that is to be accepted as 
true but which is held beyond rational explanation. Rather it is a basic 
human response-at least among apophatic writers and their appreciative 
readers-to the nothingness in which being is situated (that what is might 
not have been). It is a sense of wonderment..., bewilderment..., that is 
rediscovered not outside of, but within our cultural, religious, theological, 
and philosophical world views at the horizon where they point beyond 
themselves .... To evaluate mystical union as an experience of mystery is a 
kataphatic judgement. The experience has a grammatical object (mystery). 
From the apophatic perspective, such analysis is partial, even misleading, 
if left without the apophatic complement. Mystery would then become 
reified into another name, another God of belief. the category of mystery 
is useful insofar as writer and reader tum back upon it to ... unsay the name 
(1994:216-7). 
Recalling the similarities which Sells noted between this language and the 
language of poetry and humor, I would close this chapter and point toward the 
next by returning once again to Paul Ricoeur, who says of poetic discourse that 
it, "calls into question the reduction of the referential function to descriptive 
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discourse and opens the field to a nondescriptive reference to the world (1995: 
222)," who distinguishes the special character of that poetic discourse which is 
religious language by its, "naming of God ... .the poetics of the name of God .. .is not 
abolished but intensified through paradox, hyperbole, and all primary expressions 
that give rise to the 'negative way' at a higher degree of conceptuality (itself only 
conceivable in relation to the analogical way for which it is the complement and the 
corrective) (p. 234 ), " and who, speaking of the function of the parable, seems quite 
at home in our present discourse, saying that it: 
combines a narrative structure, a metaphorical process, and a limit-
expression. In this way it constitutes a short summary of the naming of 
God. Through its narrative structure, it recalls the original rootedness of the 
language of faith in narratives. through its metaphorical process it makes 
manifest the poetical character of the language of faith as a whole. And 
finally, in joining metaphor and limit-expression, it furnishes the matrix for 
theological language inasmuch as this language conjoins analogy and 
negation in the way of eminence: "God is like ... , God is not..." (1995: 230). 
Holding this Inquiry Before My Questions. 
This chapter began with one of the central elements of my quest: seeking a 
ground for hope. In this chapter I have attempted to share my experience of 
theologians who have supported me in my quest, both intellectually and in those 
intimations from faith which hint at bridges across our chasm. With their aid, the 
questions of the absolute nature of hope and of the indispensability of the 
transcendent element in hope as well as the implications which that has for the 
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remainder of this quest have been raised and addressed to the extent that their 
nature and my capacity a!!ow. My opinion of the place of skepticism in such an 
inquiry has been offered, as well as a model for a discourse to frame the personal 
experiences upon which Chapter Four will hinge. 
Where Are We Going from Here? 
In the first section of the next chapter, I shall discuss my own experience of the 
themes which we have been pursuing, culminating in the experience of 
unexpectedly finding hope within my own heart. In that context, there will be a 
discussion of the difficulties of dealing with the question of that "special 
knowledge" which rests its truth claims upon the noetic quality of mystical 
experience-this is to be the culmination of the exercise in apologetics promised 
in the first two chapters. In the second section, my encounters with some specific 
examples of "Paths to Wisdom" will be examined, and the argument made that 
such paths comprise both our surest way across our chasm of despair, and our 
pedagogy of hope. Concluding the chapter, a mirroring of the paths of mysticism 
and prophecy will lead to my synthesis and Credo. 
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Chapter IV. 
HOPE IN AND FOR WISDOM 
Thus far this paper has been generally analytical and critical in form; however, it 
would be disingenuous to suggest that these efforts were the sort of inexorable 
rational progression from observation to conclusion which our modernist friends 
were once so fond of finding in the "scientific method". No, these efforts are 
unabashedly intended as supporting structures for my own experience, as efforts 
toward giving form to turns in my life for which my previous education and 
socialization had provided no behavioral repertoire. What follows is an attempt to 
place my own history in the context of the analysis which I have offered thus far, 
and to share with the reader how this experience has supported the forgoing 
apology, and will produce the Credo with which this work is (temporally) 
suspended at its end. 
My own edge: seeing into the chasm. 
The convoluted process of arriving at this point may have made it less than 
apparent to the reader where we now stand in the quest upon which I embarked 
in Chapter One: a quest which I said sought an explanation, suitable to both 
myself and to others, of what might ground the hope which I had found in my heart 
(my apology) and sought to find a means by which I might share that hope 
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professionally (my pedagogy). To offer a chance for reorientation, I shall reflect 
briefly on the stages of that journey through which I think we have passed since 
that initial chapter. 
In Chapter Two, I examined the exhaustion of our cultural repertoire, finding that 
the paths to which our popular culture suggests that we entrust our hope all seem 
to lead instead to a seemingly unbridgeable chasm of despair. I considered the 
benefits and hazards of deconstructing those belief systems without giving 
consideration to their replacement; and assigned the job title "edgefinders" to a 
fine assortment of iconoclasts who have served me in illuminating a small portion 
of the chasm's edge, as it slices across our accustomed lifeways. While 
acknowledging the pain and difficulty which accompany such corporate self-
examination, I suggested that absent some effort toward intentional consciousness, 
we risk awakening without warning at a precipice of meaninglessness. I proposed 
that these same edgefinders can also be seen as the harbingers of hope, in that 
the work of each also suggests possibilities beyond those accustomed lifeways, 
beyond the limits of our exhausted repertoires, beyond what we commonly 
acknowledge as human possibility. 
In the process of Chapter Three, that critique and a sense of those possibilities led 
me to an assertion of the absolute nature of hope, and of an attendant 
consideration of the transcendent as requisite to my search. The work of several 
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Christian theologians assisted me in that process, to both give voice to this 
absolute nature and to help me in an affirmation of the ''worthiness of the world:" 
an affirmation which justifies and requires that we attend not only to the 
transcendent, but also to the immanent. In the second part of that chapter, I gave 
attention to some of those who feel that such discourse is misleading and should 
be subject to the sort of critique and deconstruction to which I have recently 
subjected other aspects of our culture. Concluding that section, I offered an 
example of the kind of discourse one might use to avoid some of those problems, 
suggesting that one might view a negative theology of mysticism as an outline of 
a process crudely analogous to the creation of a "skillful means." 
Now, with Chapter Four, I propose to illustrate the foregoing by offering a few 
details of how my own journey thus far has followed that general model: how I 
struggled in my early life to find hope in the ways my culture had provided; 
recalling the process of exhausting these "easy" options and catching a glimpse 
into the chasm from my own edge; and how my struggle to be an iconoclast--
without cynicism-in the chaos attendant upon that exhaustion led me to my 
current search. I shall recall how I was sustained during the early stages of this 
journey by intimations of hope from some whom I now regard as old friends, to 
that time much closer to now, when I experienced from someplace deep within my 
heart the intervention of an unreasonable assurance, of hope, seemingly founded 
somewhere other than in my intellect or in my emotional life. 
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That hope has seemed to resonate with the work of those whom I have mentioned 
previously, seeming not to be derived from their work, but rather to have originated 
from some common source; and it has a special affinity for those discussed in this 
chapter, among whom are exemplars of traditions which I shall characterize by 
saying of them that they have the capacity to contain and appreciate 
simultaneously the prophetic, pragmatic and mystical. As I intend to show in my 
recollections of these exemplars in the last half of this chapter, the natural 
reluctance which one might have to accepting the attribution of that range of 
capacities to a tradition derives not from its impossibility, but from our experience 
having been limited to an exhausted culture. 
Each of us has a story about our struggle for meaning, in the world which 1 
described in Chapter One. This narrative of my own struggle, which (I feel) has 
been kept mercifully brief, comes to me from my memory in related but distinct 
streams: my struggle to find a meaningful education, my religious search, and 
issues of conscience in both my business career and my political views. In the 
course of this narrative, these streams of memory will flow into and intertwine with 
the themes just annunciated. Lest this emphasis on struggle be taken as an 
unrelenting lament, I hasten to express gratitude for the fact that this narrative 
need not include the travails offractured relationship so endemic in our time, a fact 
which I can only attribute to the blessing of having in my wife Margaret one of 
those rare souls who has simultaneously the capacity for compassion necessary 
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to tolerate and support one whose fate is to pursue this quest, as well as the 
fortitude and strength of character to grow and thrive as her own person at the 
same time. 
Just as it has been central to this paper thus far, the theme of exhaustion of the 
cultural repertoire was central to my early life, and nowhere more so than in 
education. My memories of life as a young student are almost entirely of social 
issues--the academic content of the thousands of school hours to which I was 
sentenced as a child are recalled only as a background cloud of triviality. I was 
acknowledged by the system to be highly competent at manipulating that cloud, 
but with the exception of one great soul, my eighth grade English teacher Mrs. 
Bradbury, who demonstrated to us daily that compassion and intellectual discipline 
belonged together, I came to regard the process of schooling with contempt rather 
than with love. 
Apart from that one year in Mrs. Bradbury's class (and sustained by the memory 
of it), the important intellectual content of that time derived from fortuitous 
accidents while browsing libraries, from serious conversations with parents and 
friends, from interests pursued on my own initiative, apart form formal schooling. 
I struggled with Greek classics from my father's library, studied biology in my 
backyard, mistook Voltaire's skepticism and wit for cynicism, was fascinated and 
repulsed by Dante's Inferno, and worshiped Henry David Thoreau. Any who have 
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shared my youthful fascination with Thoreau, know the difficulty of passing an old 
pond without suffering a pang of loss. Yet what I become most nostalgic for at 
those times is not the life in the woods, but the intimations of what he learned 
there: 
We are all sculptors and painters, and our material is our own flesh and 
blood and bones. Any nobleness begins at once to refine a man's features, 
any meanness or sensuality to imbrute them. 
John Farmer sat at his door one September evening, after a hard day's 
work, his mind still running on his labor more or less. Having bathed, he 
sat down to re-create his intellectual man. It was a rather cool evening, and 
some of his neighbors were apprehending a frost. He had not attended to 
the train of his thoughts long when he heard some one playing on a flute, 
and that sound harmonized with his mood. Still he thought of his work; but 
the burden of his thought was, that though this kept running in his head, 
and he found himself planning and contriving it against his will, yet it 
concerned him very little. It was no more than the scruff of his skin, which 
was constantly shuffled off. But the notes of the flute came home to his 
ears out of a different sphere from that he worked in, and suggested work 
for certain faculties which slumbered in him. They gently did away with the 
street, and the village, and the state in which he lived. A voice said to him,-
-Why do you stay here and live this mean moiling life, when a glorious 
existence is possible for you? Those same stars twinkle over other fields 
than these,-But how to come out of this condition and actually migrate 
thither? All that he could think of was to practice some new austerity. to let 
his mind descend into his body and redeem it, and treat himself with ever 
increasing respect (1960: 150-1). 
Certainly for me there can be no more clear cut symptom of a despairing world 
than to say that the call, "out of a different sphere" is silent there; and no more 
hopeful sign than when many hear it. Among the voices which this time brought 
to me another also taught me to dream of transcendence--the science fiction of 
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Arthur C. Clark's Childhood's End-as when the emissary from that consciousness 
which was evolving by uniting incipiently conscious species spoke to the last 
parents on Earth: 
We do not know how it is produced-what trigger impulse the Overmind 
employs when it judges that the time is ripe. All we have discovered is that 
it starts with a single individual-always a child-and then spreads 
explosively, like the formation of crystals round the first nucleus in a 
saturated solution. Adults will not be affected, for their minds are already 
set in an unalterable mould. In a few years it will all be over, and the 
human race will be divided in twain. There is no way back, and no future 
for the world you know. All the hopes and dreams of your race are ended 
now. You have given birth to your successors, and it is your tragedy that 
you will never understand them .... For what you have brought into the world 
may be utterly alien, it may share none of your desires or hopes, it may 
look upon your greatest achievements as childish toys-yet it is something 
wonderful, and you will have created it (1953: 184-5). 
In that time, and often since, such thoughts and feelings seem most at home in 
poetry. It may have been in reading Leaves of Grass (1955) as a high school 
student that I initially experienced that sudden addition of dimension to ianguage 
which is poetry. There can be no doubt that it is the bestowal of a blessing, a 
grace, a Gift, to be shown that a reality lies behind our efforts to describe a visit 
of the Muse. Almost all of Walt Whitman's work spoke then, and still, to me of 
what I seek; almost at random (yet surely not), I recall "A Persian Lesson:" 
For his o'erarching and last lesson the graybeard sufi, 
In the fresh scent of the morning in the open air, 
On the slope of a teeming Persian rose-garden, 
Under an ancient chestnut-tree widely spreading its branches, 
Spoke to the young priests and students. 
"Finally my children, to envelop every word, every part of the rest, 
Allah is all, all, all-is immanent in every life and object, 
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May-be at many and many-a-mere removes-yet A!lah, Allah, A!!ah is there. 
"Has the estray wander'd far? Is the reason-why strangely hidden? 
Would you sound below the restless ocean of the entire world? 
Would you know the dissatisfaction? The urge and spur of every life; 
The something never stilled-never entirely gone? the invisible need of every seed? 
"It is the central urge in every atom, 
(Often unconscious, often evil, downfallen,) 
To return to its divine source and origin, however distant, 
Latent the same in subject and in object, without one exception." (p. 413) 
Because of the hints of "something more" which such glimpses offered, I came to 
expect (to hope!) that the triviality and the deadly dreariness that I associated with 
my early schooling would disappear at some higher level. These voices sustained 
me in the meanwhile, comforting me with stories uncommon to that time. And, in 
fact, that expectation of positive change was being encouraged at the same time 
by the modernist doctrine, which promised us perfectibility through study and 
rationality. Temporarily shocked (but never humbled) by the appearance above our 
horizon of a Soviet moon, my generation was swept forward on a stream of 
renewed commitment to hope in science and hard work. 
Yet, by the time I left high school a year early to enter college, I could no longer 
take seriously the contention that the process which constituted my schooling held 
any such prospect of meaning for me. The hope for transcendence awakened by 
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the earlier work began, through disillusionment, to be transformed into an attraction 
for apocalypse: although we never spoke of it. I wonder now how many of my 
classmates who sat with me before dormitory lounge televisions, watching to see 
if Cuban missiles were the beginning of the end, held within their hearts a similar 
ambivalence as to what would be the best outcome. Later, the assassinations and 
war and racial conflict seemed almost to resolve that ambivalence, to say that an 
earlier end would have been better. During this same time, a similar rupture of my 
relationship with my early religious beliefs was characterized by what I perceived 
to be the refusal or incapacity of my church to respond to what I saw in the world--
absent any theodicy, the services came to resemble, in their effect upon me, those 
dry and irrelevant lost days locked in classrooms, beclouded with trivia, falsely 
assured, intent upon being sheltered from any perception of the edge. 
And yet, as one might expect, these storms abated with time. As a young husband 
and parent, my life came to resemble that stage of development which many 
spiritual disciplines characterize as the "householder'' and which Daniel Levinson 
(1978: 139) would call the "settling down period"-preoccupied with the needs of 
a family and comfortable in the role, a decade of my life passed in achievement 
and contentment. Unlike the preoccupations of schooling, the issues were not 
trivial; love and nurturance, responsibility and citizenship, identity and sense of 
place; all were welcome themes for that time. For that time, this role sheltered me 
from the questions which had tormented me earlier, but did not resolve them. As 
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I approached my early mid-life, those questions returned to demand attention, as 
Levinson (1978) would have predicted, brought back at least in part by my 
confrontations with the fault line, which our culture attempts to ignore, between our 
ideals and our marketplace. 
As my responsibilities in my work-world grew, I could no longer ignore the 
dissonance between, on one hand, what I (and almost everyone else) claimed to 
believe about equity, justice, and compassion, and on the other hand, the practices 
of everyday commerce, wherein it was necessary, in order to be rewarded and 
appreciated, to contravene each of these virtues, in small ways or large. The 
limitations of this path became increasingly clear as I watched senior friends and 
associates willingly throw themselves over the edge of this chasm in pursuit of our 
quarry, and as I considered doing the same. Certainly it might have been more 
from faintness of heart upon seeing their fate than from any virtue on my part that 
I decided I must attempt to find another way. With a sense of desperation born of 
looking into a chasm of hopelessness, I returned to serious reading, beginning 
what I now regard as the initial stages of my quest. 
One author whose work has been central to my search from that period to the 
present is Robert Ornstein, whose theme of conscious evolution-beginning with 
the concept of expanding kinship altruism to all of humanity--instantly reminded be 
of my childhood fascination with Childhood's End. With an urgency that reflected 
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my own concern, he insisted that our current situation does not allow us time to 
continue to depend on the slow progress of biologicaL neural, and cultural 
evolution. Although from a later work, the following captures the sense of both 
crisis and possibility which his work held (and still holds) for me: 
We are no longer tribes living with a small horizon; our minds need to 
encompass a view that has been limited to an elite group; a truly modem 
reconciliation of the scientific and the spiritual. I believe it can be done, 
since both spheres, understood best, are about the same animal-us. We 
don't want a world of 15 billion people in the next century if 75 percent of 
them are going to starve. We don't want a world where gangsters have 
nuclear weapons. We don't want a world where people don't know how 
their minds work, or know about major new facts of life, their identity, their 
society, the fate of the earth. This is an era of reeducation, a time when 
we will either take our evolution into our own hands or do far worse than 
we can imagine (1991: 12). 
During this period I first encountered two figures whom I feel have been especially 
important to my development--Dag Hammarskjold and Doris Lessing-each of 
whom played critical roles in offering me a path away from cynicism toward the 
variety of iconoclasm which I have previously praised. Aside from, and in addition 
to, that rationale for the inclusion of these two authors, they are, like the others in 
this narrative, also here because I now honor them as old friends, friends who 
have given me heart in dark times, who certainly have played their parts in the 
discovery of that hope for which I now attempt to learn apologetics. It is my 
impression of each of them that their capacity for analysis, had they chosen to 
exercise it (or where they have), would not have been inferior to the very best, yet 
for the work which has nurtured me they have chosen novels and poetry and 
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storytelling; because, I believe, they found this a more effective way of coaxing 
meaning into and out of language. If that is a correct presumption of their intent, 
then the idea of performing analysis upon their language, in fact of addressing 
their work in any way other than citation in a proper context, is highly problematic. 
Thus, here even more than in other instances where this may be the case in this 
paper, what follows is not so much an effort to delimit the work of those authors 
as it is to describe the state of this one, by noting and sharing portions of their 
work which have been formative in my experience. If you have never encountered 
some of these pieces, then I may need to ask your patience for some rather 
overlong citations, a patience for which I think you will be rewarded with priceless 
jewels. 
Dag Hammarskjold heard that call which Thoreau answered in an earlier citation; 
in response he wrote Markings (1966), a journal, "for myself, not for the public." 
While a life of public service, culminating with his death while Secretary General 
of the United Nations, presented to that public an image of confidence and 
accomplishment; his journal revealed to me a fellow pilgrim, much further along his 
path than I, but still subject to self-doubt, as well as hope: 
Do not seek death. Death will find you. But seek the road which makes 
death a fulfillment.. .. The arete that leads to the summit separates two 
abysses: the pleasure-tinged death-wish ... and the animal fear arising from 
the physical instinct for survival. Only he can conquer vertigo whose body 
has learned to treat itself as a means. No choice is uninfluenced by the 
way in which the personality regards its destiny, and the body its death. In 
the last analysis, it is our conception of death which decides our answers 
to all the questions that life puts to us (p. 136}. 
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The struggle with vertigo, balancing over the abyss, our live as a means: these are 
primal elements of my search, and elements which dictated to Hammarskjold a life 
of service to humanity. They came to me at a time when I had great need of them, 
a service which I acknowledge and affirm: 
Courage and love: equivalent and related expressions for your bargain with 
Life. You are willing to "pay" what your heart commands you to give. Two 
associated reflexes, the sacrificial act, conditioned by a self-chosen 
effacement of the personality in the One. One result of "God's marriage to 
the Soul" is a union with other people which does not draw back before the 
ultimate surrender of the self (p. 136-7}. 
His own experience of hearing that call, lost to his memory and central to his life, 
must surely stir within others a homesickness similar to that I felt when he said: 
I don't know Who-or what-put the question, I don't know when it was put. 
I don't even remember answering. But at some moment I did answer Yes 
to Someone-or Something-and from that hour I was certain that existence 
is meaningful and that, therefore, my life, in self-surrender, had a goal. 
From that moment I have known what it means "not to look back," and "to 
take no thought for the morrow." 
Led by the Ariadne's thread of my answer through the labyrinth of Life, I 
came to a time and place where I realized that the Way leads to a triumph 
which is a catastrophe, and to a catastrophe which is a triumph, that the 
price of committing one's life would be reproach, and that the only 
elevation possible to man lies in the depths of humiliation. After that, the 
word courage lost its meaning, since nothing could be taken from me (p. 
169}. 
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His life was a testimony to his answer and an invitation to others to seek the 
thread of their own Way, Just as this prayer was a testimony to the source of that 
call: 
Have mercy 
Upon us. 
Have mercy 
Upon our efforts, 
That we 
Before Thee, 
In love and in faith, 
Righteousness and humility, 
May follow Thee, 
With self-denial, steadfastness and courage, 
And meet Thee 
In the silence. 
Give us 
A pure heart 
That we may see Thee, 
A humble heart 
That we may hear Thee, 
A heart of love 
That we may serve Thee, 
A heart of faith 
That we may live Thee. 
Thou 
Whom I do not know 
But Whose I am. 
Thou 
Whom I do not comprehend 
But Who hast dedicated me 
To my fate. 
Thou- (p. 176) 
Like that of Hammarskjold, the work of Doris Lessing, entering my life at a time 
when I had great need of it, has influenced me so profoundly as to confound 
reporting. When I think that I understand a portion of her work so well as to take 
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it as intellectually obvious, I find myself ambushed by a new aspect, or am startled 
by a sudden emotional impact from a piece being re-read for the tenth time I will 
try to capture a little of that experience with two pieces; the first is from an essay 
in which she is discussing social change. I had often felt that, although we have 
discovered a great many useful things-it might be maintained that we have in 
hand the solutions to many problems that are the cause of great human suffering-
yet, these insights go unused; seemingly we lack the vision or will to change, or 
more ominously, as Doris Lessing said in this piece, perhaps the very basis upon 
which we attempt change may be fundamentally flawed: 
I think when people look back on our time, they will be amazed at one 
thing more than any other. It is this-that we do know more about ourselves 
now than people did in the past, but that very little of this knowledge has 
been put into effect ... There is this great mass of new information ... but our 
ways of governing ourselves haven't changed. Our left hand does not 
know-does not want to know-what our right hand does .... [speaking of the 
human tendency to form groups based upon bigotry and 
intolerance] .... such groups continually spring into existence everywhere, 
have periods when such beliefs are their diet, while they hate and 
persecute and revile anybody who does not agree with them. It is a 
process that goes on all the time and I think must go on, because the 
patterns of the past are so strong in us that criticism of a society and a 
desire to change it fall so easily into such patterns. I believe that we are in 
the grip of something very powerful and very primitive, and that we have 
not begun to come to grips with it. To study it, yes, that goes on in a 
hundred universities. But to apply it, no (1987: 5 & 28). 
In the context of her work, this darkly prophetic view takes on the coloration of 
hope, knowing that such insight is the beginning of consciousness, a look over the 
edge. Later in that same essay, speaking of how difficult it is for young people to 
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have faith in their ability to change things, she struck a powerful chord in me. My 
own sense of frustration and futility desperately needed to hear her recollection 
and the hope which this next section brought to me: 
I remember very clearly how it seemed to me in my late teens and early 
twenties, seeing only what seemed to be impregnable systems of thought, 
of belief-governments that seemed unshakable. But what has happened 
to those governments like the white government in Southern Rhodesia, for 
instance? To those powerful systems of faith, like the Nazis, or the Italian 
Fascists, or to Stalinism? To the British Empire-to all the European 
empires, in fact, so recently powerful? They have all gone, and in such a 
short time. 
Looking back now, I no longer see these enormous blocs, nations, 
movements, systems, faiths, religions, but only individuals, people who 
when I was young I might have valued, but not with much belief in the 
possibility of their changing anything. Looking back, I see what a great 
influence an individual may have, even an apparently obscure person, 
living a small, quiet life. It is individuals who change society, give birth to 
ideas, who, standing out against tides of opinion, change them. This is as 
true in open societies as it is in oppressive societies, but of course the 
casualty rate in the closed societies is higher. Everything that has ever 
happened to me has taught me to value the individual, the person who 
cultivates her or his own ways of thinking, who stands out against group 
thinking, group pressures. Or who, conforming no more than is necessary 
to group pressures, quietly preserves individual thinking and development 
(1987: 72-3). 
This essay, which speaks to me of the hope for transformation at the center of my 
work, also provides context for a scene from her novel The Memoirs of a Survivor 
(1988: 78-9) which, for me says as much about the importance of individuals, while 
saying other things which would, I think, disappear if spoken more plainly. The 
novel is a woman's journal, set, as one of its reviewers said, in the midst of, " ... a 
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beleaguered city where rats and roving gangs terrorize the streets, where 
government has broken down and meaningless violence holds sway." As she rests 
for a moment from a life so chillingly like what our world might be (and already is 
for many), she begins to experience another world, into which she periodically 
enters, as a wall of her living room seems gradually to dissolve into another view. 
You may read it as a dream, if you need to: 
Behind the wall I found a room that was tall, not very large, and I think six-
sided. There was no furniture in it, only a rough trestle around two of the 
sides. On the floor was spread a carpet, but it was a carpet without its life: 
it had a design, an intricate one, but the colours had an imminent 
existence, a potential, no more. There had been a fair or a market here, 
and this had left a quantity of rags, dress material, scraps of Eastern 
embroideries of the kind that have tiny mirrors buttonhole-stitched into 
them, old clothes-everything in that line you can think of. Some people 
were standing about the room. At first it seemed that they were doing 
nothing at all; they looked idle and undecided. Then one of them detached 
a piece of material from the jumble on the trestles, and bent to mach it with 
the carpet-behold, the pattern answered that part of the carpet. This piece 
was laid exactly on the design, and it brought it to life. 
It was like a child's game, giant-sized; only it was not a game; it was 
serious, important not only to the people actually engaged in this work, but 
to everyone. Then another person bent with a piece chosen from the 
multicolored heap on the trestles, bent, matched, and straightened again 
to gaze down. There they stood, about a dozen people, quite silent, turning 
their eyes from the patterns of the carpet to the tangle of stuffs and back 
again. A recognition, the quick move, a smile of pleasure or relief, a 
congratulatory glance from one of the others-there was no competition 
here, only the soberest and most loving co-operation. I entered the room; 
I stood on the carpet looking down as they did at its incompleteness, 
pattern without colour, except where the pieces had already been laid in 
a match, so that parts of the carpet had a bleak gleam, like one that had 
been bleached, and other parts glowed up, fulfilled, perfect. I, too, sought 
for fragments of materials that could bring life to the carpet, and did in fact 
find one, and bent down to match and frt, before some pressure moved me 
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people who would in their tum drift in here, see this central activity, find 
their matching piece-would lay it down, and drift off again to other tasks. 
I left that tall room, whose ceiling vanished upwards into dark where I 
thought I saw the shine of a star, a room whose lower part was in a bright 
light that enclosed the silent concentrating figures like stage-lighting. I left 
them and moved on. The room disappeared. I could not find it when I 
turned my head to see it again, so as to mark where it was. But I knew it 
was there waiting; I knew it had not disappeared, and the work in it 
continued, must continue, would go on always. 
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Later in the novel (156-7), as terror and starvation draw closer, the awfulness of 
the city has intruded into the world behind the wall, just as this world had intruded 
into my youthful hopes, yet still she is sustained by her vision of what she 
encounters there: 
And yet, with all these evidences of destructiveness, even now I could not 
move behind the wall without feeling something of the old expectation, 
hope, even longing. And rightly, for when the anarchy was at its height, 
and I had almost lost the habit of expecting anything but smashed and 
dirtied rooms, there was a visit when I found this: I was in a garden 
between four walls, old brick walls, and there was a fresh delightful sky 
above me that I knew was the sky of another world, not ours. This garden 
did have a few flowers in it, but mostly it had vegetables. There were beds 
neatly filled with greenery-carrot tops, lettuces, radishes, and there were 
tomatoes, and gooseberry bushes, and ripening melons. some beds were 
raked and ready for planting; others had been turned and left open to the 
sun and the air. It was a place filled with industry, usefulness, and hope. 
I walked there under a fruitful sky, and thought of how people would be fed 
from this garden. But this wasn't all, for I became aware that under this 
garden was another. I was able easily to make my way down into it along 
a sloping ramp of earth, and there were even steps of-1 think-stone. I was 
down in the lower garden, which was immediately under the first and 
occupied the same area: the feeling of comfort and security this gave me 
is not really describable. Nor was this lower garden any less supplied with 
sun, wind, iain than the upper one. Here, too, were the tall warm walls of 
weathered brick, and the beds in various stages of preparedness and use. 
There was an exquisite old rose growing on one wall. It was a soft yellow, 
and its scent was in all the air of the garden. Some pinks and mignonette 
grew near a sunny stone: these were the old flowers, rather small, but 
subtle and individual: all the old cottage flowers were here, among the 
leeks and the garlics and the mints. There was a gardener. I saw him at 
the moment I realized I was listening with pleasure to the sound of water 
running near my foot, where there was a channel of earth, with tiny herbs 
and grasses growing along its edges. Near the wall the channel was of 
stone, and wider: the gardener was bending over the stone runnel where 
it came into the garden from outside through a low opening that was green 
and soft with moss. Around every bed was a stream of clear water, the 
garden was a network of water channels. And, looking up and beyond the 
wall, I saw that the water came from the mountains four or five miles away. 
There was snow on them, although it was midsummer, and this was melted 
snow-water, very cold, and tasting of the air that blew across the 
mountains. The gardener turned when I ran towards him to ask if he had 
news of the person whose presence was so strong in this place, as 
pervasive as the rose-scent, but he only nodded and turned back to his 
duties of controlling the flow of water, of seeing that it ran equably among 
the beds. I looked across the mountains and at the plain in between, where 
there were villages and large stone houses in gardens, and I thought that 
what I was looking at was the underworld-and one just as extensive and 
productive-of the level to which I now had to return. I walked up to the first 
level again, and saw the old walls warm with evening sunlight, heard water 
running everywhere, though I had not heard it when I stood here before; 
I took small cautious steps from one solid but moist spot to the next, with 
the smell of apple-mint coming up form my knees and the sound of bees 
in my ears. I looked at the food the earth was making, which would keep 
the next winter safe for us, for the world's people. Gardens beneath 
gardens, gardens above gardens: the food-giving surfaces of the earth 
doubled, trebled, endless-the plenty of it, the richness, the generosity ... 
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I have never read that selection without its invoking for me that sense of 
remembrance of a moment of primordia! peace and of hope which it wrought upon 
our first encounter; yet, looking at these recent pages, it is obvious that such 
excerpts are like the pieces of Lessing's carpet, where there was only potential: 
the design is there, but separated from the organic whole of the story, the life that 
is imminent is not obvious. If it were not so, I would need not have set these works 
somewhat apart: for me the aesthetic is defined by its organic, indivisible quality, 
and I hope that my authors will forgive me bringing them into my house as cut 
flowers, for my own pleasure, and for that of my guests. 
These voices and many others, quite a few of whom grace my Bibliography, had 
a hand in that mid-life struggle, a struggle which I gradually came to see as an 
attempt to go beyond the cynicism with which I had greeted each new 
disillusionment in my youth and which lay latent but unchallenged during my early 
householder phase. As years pasted, I gradually came to realize, not only in times 
of reflection, but especially in my daily life, that the uneasy truce between my 
conscience and my societal role, made possible by my cynicism, would end if I 
insisted on a life of meaning, a life which made space for that vision which these 
authors were offering me. To an even greater extent, I came to feel that only in the 
absence of meaning which my cynicism fostered could I fail to attend to the 
consequences and implications of the way in which I (and everyone else of my 
acquaintance) made my living. 
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Concurrently with these thoughts and readings, that living placed me in a 
managerial position entailing responsibility for hundreds of minimum wage 
employees, in an industry driven by fierce price competition. My internal conflict 
was equally severe: I was obedient to and rewarded by the values of our market 
culture; and I could find no peace with my conscience in doing what that 
obedience required, in doing the very things which other managers now face daily 
in the world of corporate downsizing. From today's viewpoint, I can see now that 
the very callousness and lack of concern for employees for which the chairmen of 
various large corporations have only recently begun to be excoriated have always 
been required of those managers who would succeed in industries peopled by 
employees who were powerless and poor. What I did not see at the time, and 
what few apparently did, judging from the very recent "discovery" of the moral 
dimensions of downsizing and other corporate behaviors, was the pervasiveness--
the universality-of the problem. At the time I experienced this conflict, I was able 
to conceal from myself the systemic nature of the problem-1 thought these faults 
lay only in the places I had seen; I failed to see at that time the exhaustion of our 
cultural repertoire to which I have now come to refer. 
Even now the socialization which served to conceal the heart of the problem from 
me continues to render this narrative difficult. Even now I hear within me those 
same voices of rationalization which I also hear in what passes for public 
discourse. Only by suppressing the spontaneous occurrence of compassion for our 
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fellow human beings can I (and others) unquestioningly manipulate the lives and 
loyalties of employees (or citizenry) to the extent necessary to meet the ends 
which our culture defines. Among other things, this narrative is a struggle to be 
unashamed of compassion, to defeat a shame which our culture fosters by libeling 
any dissent from the predatory in present corporate (or political) behavior-naming 
any dissent as some combination of self-righteousness, incapacity, laziness, 
ignorance, or malice. 
In the midst of the formative stages of those conflicts, and near the end of that 
truce which characterized my householder phase, I began to read even more 
voraciously, seeking some way to live that could accommodate these conflicts 
within a life. That period, which began my acquaintance with Ornstein and Lessing, 
also brought three others into my life: the philosopher Franklin Merreii-Wolff, the 
Cistercian monk Thomas Merton, and I dries Shah, the current exemplar of the Sufi 
tradition. Although starkly different in message and style, my collision with each 
struck a powerful and similar chord in me, one which still resounds in my heart and 
my work. 
I must tell you about them; and, here is perhaps the most paradoxical task of all: 
to speak of that which cannot be spoken, and then to speak with others' voices, 
by means of excepting and condensing-omitting words, words which those who 
knew better thought should be said! Yet this is the only way available to me to 
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speak of what may not be said, by saying and unsaying, yet again; seeking to 
glimpse an intuition arcing the space between the two halves of the dichotomy. 
Here I tum to an attempt to point to "skillful means" as an instrumental function, 
a pointing toward which the effort expended in Chapter Three explaining the 
"meaning event" in Sells' version of negative theology was directed. 
The value of finding Sells' work to be analogous to the means we shall be 
discussing here is that he has already made so many of the obviously necessary 
equivocations, qualifications, and cautions. He has introduced the concept of the 
instrumental nature of the "moment" held in tension between opposites. The most 
obvious difference at which the analogy begins to wear thin is that of time scale: 
the "meaning event" presents an affirmation in the immediate company of its 
retraction, whereas a skillful means might either do the same (e.g., a Zen master's 
stick) or might require decades unopposed in a student's consciousness (e.g., a 
formal religion) before being presented with a retraction in the form of whatever 
new path the Teacher has determined for the next developmental stage. In either 
case, I have come to suspect that the tension between the affirmation and its 
retraction is the point. In the moment when those parts of ourselves which we 
have come to describe as the emotional and intellectual faculties are enthralled by 
this tension, out of control, so to speak, a brief opportunity arises for the action of 
what we might choose to call intuition. And here the analogy breaks down, for, 
unlike systems based upon intellection or emotive response, in a skillful means the 
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specific content of the affirmation and retraction are important for only one reason: 
it must be the content suitable for bringing the specific student to the "moment." 
Claiming that there is an experiential source of the Knowledge of what constitutes 
the content appropriate for a particular person, at a specific time, place and 
circumstance, is the reason that one precedes "means" with the qualifier "skillful." 
It is this claim which, more than any other point in my experience, defines the 
difficulty upon which any purely intellectual approach to hope must founder: 
according to those who claim to have it, this Knowledge is not accessible through 
means current in our culture-you can't get there from here! 
Browsing through a bookstore in Columbia, SC, yielded the first of these authors. 
At the time I had almost given up entirely on philosophers, concluding from my 
unguided study that their discipline was for me of a piece with chess or 
recreational mathematics-pleasurable but diverting, leading nowhere near 
whatever it was which drove me to search for meaning. So, more from habit than 
hope, I took down from a shelf a heavy text, filled with aphorisms, entitled 
Consciousness Without an Object, by Franklin Merreii-Wolff (1973b). (His works 
were generally written and privately distributed during the period 1935-1970; as a 
result, the publication dates are somewhat confusing.) To move quickly to the 
point, I bought that book, and his work is here because I thought that he 
succeeded, as far as is possible, in his self-imposed task of demonstrating, " ... the 
actuality of noetic value springing from mystical or gnostic roots (1994: xii)", and 
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because, in so doing, his intended audience, like mine, was not limited to the one 
which might ordinarily be expected to care for the mystical; to those who are 
favorably inclined to mysticism. He spoke in one of his introductions in a voice I 
would hope to emulate in speaking of my own work: 
To him who has the poet's insight or the intuitive feeling of the unfettered 
religious nature, much of the critical part of the discussion will appear 
unnecessary and many modes of formulation unduly devious and 
recondite. To such I would say, "Be patient, and remember that I am not 
writing only for those who believe easily. Know you not that there are men 
of intellectual power and honesty in this world who view you patronizingly 
as little well-meaning, but credulous children? I would command for you 
respectful attention even though there may be much honest disagreement 
(1994, p. xii). 
What I found there certainly served me in the way he intended. Remembering that 
my view of the world at the time varied across a rather narrow spectrum from 
cynicism through disillusionment to uncertainty (on good days), as I paged through 
his book, I almost certainly considered myself glad to be one of those without the 
"poet's insight," preferring the protection from appearing foolish which is conferred 
upon, "men of intellectual power and honesty ... who view you patronizingly as little 
well-meaning, but credulous children." By the time I had struggled through my 
second reading of the two works then in print, I was moving beyond the minimum 
of honest disagreement which he sought to gain and was considering that it might 
just be possible that in the midst of all the confusion (and snake oil) attendant on 
these topics, there might truly be paths to Knowledge. 
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At almost every tum I found his early experience to be similar to mine, raising 
hooes that I miaht aooroximate the fascinatina later exoeriences which his ioumals 
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and his philosophy portrayed. Speaking of being forced, by a loss of childhood 
faith, to pass thorough a period of atheism before being able to realize that Jesus 
also carried the same Light of Wisdom he had, in the interim, found elsewhere, he 
spoke directly to me: 
It is the old, old story of the followers of a Great Light mutilating and 
obscuring that Light through misunderstanding. It is, indeed, a question 
whether the great corporate religious organizations have not been more of 
a curse than a blessing with respect to the mission of the very Saviours in 
whose names they are formed (1994: 83) 
Franklin Merreii-Wolff, by reference to his own mystical enlightenment, offered me 
another way to conceptualize the problems of Truth which at the time stood 
between me and a sense of meaning, while he also provided his own response to 
Proudfoot (See discussion in Chapter Three) fifty years before the event: 
The Pragmatists ... have generally sought to establish themselves, first of all, 
by a challenge of the validity of rational Idealism. William James gives as 
one of the primary postulates of Pragmatism the principle, "There is no 
difference of truth that does not make a difference of fact somewhere." .... ! 
submit my own Recognition as an instance which controverts this 
challenge. I mounted to the Moment of the Transition in the framework of 
rational Idealism, and the critical step hinged upon the isolation of the pure 
apperceptive moment of consciousness itself. Thus Truth, as conceived by 
rational Idealism of the monistic type, did effect a difference of fact for me. 
The difference of fact is a new relationship to the subject-object 
consciousness and a state of far greater peace and happiness than had 
been known previously. But the cause of this "difference in fact" was not 
an experience but the attainment of "Knowledge through Identity," which, 
as I have already pointed out is neither experience nor formal knowledge, 
but a third kind of knowledge (1994: 148). 
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Having made this point, he then provided me with one of the keys to my own 
internal conflict by finding at least a partial reconciliation between these seemingly 
incompatible views of the Idealist and the Pragmatist, albeit, a reconciliation certain 
to enflame the passions of any other proponent of either position: 
The Pragmatists are right in that formal knowledge is not enough to 
determine effective or final Truth, but they are wrong in asserting that such 
Truth, or the knowledge of it, must depend upon experience. On the other 
hand, the rational Idealists are right in maintaining that the effective Truth 
must be absolute and, therefore, cannot be derived from experience, which 
of necessity must be finite. But they are wrong in so far as they claim to be 
able to establish this Truth by formal demonstration alone. The effective 
establishment of this Truth requires "Knowledge through Identity," i.e., a 
direct Recognition on the level of Infinity, which is never attainable by any 
expansion of experience alone. (1994: 148). 
Here at last I had encountered someone who offered me an affirmation of the 
absolute seemingly without extracting my intellect in payment. Rather than asking 
that I forfeit intellect, he was telling me that I had the capacity to go beyond it. 
Speaking of the radical difference between formal and empirical knowledge on the 
one hand and Knowledge on the other, Merreii-Wolff says, "The result is that 
intellectuality, if not consciously or unconsciously united to Real Knowledge, has 
the effect of emptiness or 'thinness' which so impressed William James (1994: 
65)." This knowing directly through Identity was a foundational concept to grasp 
if I were to travel very far with Merreii-Wolff; at least he was not reticent about 
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being specific, even if it were sure to gain him few friends either among formal 
religionists. or among the skeptical and the post-modernists: 
God is either Known directly through Identity, or He is not known at all .... ln 
contrast to formal and empirical knowledge, Real Knowledge is essentially 
wordless, for it does not deal with objects. This is Knowledge through 
Identity. Hence, it does not represent Substance, but is Substance Itself. 
So, it is true that "1"-the self or Atman-am not different from that 
Knowledge. The speech and writings of the God-Realized Men are not 
representations of external existences, but are the actual embodiments of 
the SELF ... (1994: 65). 
The last statement I take to be a reference to the instrumental nature of such 
writings, of which previous mention has been made. Not unexpectedly, Merrell-
Wolff found ethics and morality to be similarly grounded. Like Marcel, he had no 
sympathy with founding ethical behavior in humanism: 
In fact, I very much question whether without the mystical ground there 
ever could be developed a true morality, that is, a morality that was more 
than mere social expediency. The mystic's morality would be just as 
imperative for the last man in a dying world as for a man in the midst of a 
living society, while mere sociological morality would have no ground 
whatsoever in such a setting (1978: 223). 
By offering an intellectually defensible position from which to do so, Merreii-Wolff 
gave me the opportunity to reconsider the perennialist position, at a time when I 
had followed the last of my cultural repertoire to its point of exhaustion, at a time 
when I stood on the edge of my chasm. And now, in retrospect, I see his influence 
when I say the same for hope that he said for morality-that the absence of the 
experience of a mystical ground for hope in our culture is the reason for our 
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despair, that the "social expediency" in which we are told to ground our hope may 
serve here no better than Merrell-Wolff says it may for morality. 
Encountered for the first time within weeks of my reading Merrell-Wolff, I dries Shah 
seemed to bring together in one body of work so many of the elements which I 
had previously seen as mutually exclusive. In his work the juxtaposition of the 
disparate was not only possible, but necessary: the most effective iconoclasm with 
a profound sense of the pivotal importance of mystical experience, a pragmatic 
commitment to "what works" for the student with a claim to Knowledge of how 
"what works" is to be constructed, and a challenge to our social constructs which 
asked to be entertained not as an uncritical belief, but as a ''working hypothesis." 
He asserted that we must learn to refrain from approaching truly important things 
(like Knowledge and "God") with our commercial mindset, as commodities, to be 
bought and sold. It would be fair to say that this influence is pervasive in my 
current views, probably discemable by the reader in much of what has preceded 
this section of my narrative, and inextricable to the point where I cannot fairly 
credit or cite it 
Here my earlier reluctance to snip samples for the consideration of the reader 
meets a specific instruction to avoid such behavior, based upon the instrumental 
and organic nature of the works. Fortunately for this effort to give you a sense of 
the man and his work, I have available an introduction to one of his works (Shah, 
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1978), which I feel free to quote; and for the sake of the cohesiveness of the 
narrative, ! am additionally fortunate that this introduction is by Doris Lessing: 
What I am sketchily, inadequately, outlining here is a whole series of 
blocks and impediments that amount to a mental prison. Well, the Sufis say 
we live in such a prison, and it is their concern to give us the equipment 
to free ourselves. We are all conditioned, as we now claim so trippingly; 
but perhaps being able to say that is not enough to enable us to see 
how .... lf we want to approach the Sufis, their ways of looking at life, at 
some point it is necessary to swallow the unpalatable fact that they think 
of us as backward, barbarian, ill-equipped, ill-informed, and primitive, with 
closed minds in areas where it is vital to our futures that we open 
them .... Many words and concepts have fallen out of real use. Reading this 
book, we are forced to recognize that in our scientifically-oriented, 
materialistic culture, words like humility, pride, greed, love, idolatry, charity, 
tend to be disposed of into areas labeled "religion" or "ethics." Shah 
rescues them, strips them of sentiment and vague emotion, and re-
introduces them-as tools .... Abjure the why and seek the how as one Sufi, 
the explorer Richard Burton put it. Well, this book is about how we, 
individually and collectively, may learn to look at ourselves and our 
institutions differently. And if what we are being taught is unexpected and 
sometimes disconcerting, then that is in the great tradition too (pp. 11-13). 
Immediately prior to my initial encounters with Shah and Merreii-Wolff, I had begun 
to read the works of Thomas Merton, primarily those which offered Westem 
insights into Zen. It was only in the light of the work of the two previously 
mentioned that I was able to retum to Merton as a Christian. They had convinced 
me that it was both futile and unnecessary to attempt to "remake myself as a 
Fourteenth Century Japanese" in order to seek truth, and offered me the 
beginnings of a long and painful return to my own heritage, one still in progress 
in the present. 
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Yet it was Zen, especially Thomas Merton's Zen, which was then foundational for 
my search. In his reading of that tradition, much of what I am {and hope to be) 
may be found. Certainly my metaphor of the chasm and its edge as a description 
of our cultural exhaustion might be seen to spring from that time and his work: 
Zen cannot be grasped as long as one remains passively conformed to any 
cultural or social imperatives, whether ideological, sociological or what have 
you .... Zen implies a breakthrough, an explosive liberation from one-
dimensional conformism .... This means a totally different perspective than 
that which dominates our society-and enables it to dominate us .... The 
point is that facts are not just plain facts, There is a dimension where the 
bottom drops out of the world of factuality and of the ordinary. Western 
industrial culture is in the curious position of having simultaneously reached 
the climax of an entire totalitarian rationality of organization and of 
complete absurdity and self-contradiction ... But the majority persist in seeing 
only the rational machinery against which no protest avails: because, after 
all, it is "rational," and it is "a fact." So, too, is the internal self-
contradiction .... The thing about Zen is that it pushes contradictions to their 
ultimate limit where one has to choose between madness and innocence. 
And Zen suggests that we may be driving toward one or the other on a 
cosmic scale. Driving toward them because, one way or the other, as 
madmen or innocents, we are already there ... lt might be good to open our 
eyes and see (Merton, 1968a:140-1). 
And in his Christian garb, in Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander(1968b), he spoke 
to me of my own condition and of the condition of the church in those times, giving 
voice to a failure which I had seen but not understood: 
Martin Luther King, who is no fanatic but a true Christian, writes a damning 
letter from Birmingham jail, saying that the churches have utterly failed the 
Negro. In the end, that is what the Black muslims are saying too. And there 
is truth in it. Not that there is not a certain amount of liberal and sincere 
concern for civil rights among Christians, even among ministers, priests, 
and bishops. But what is this sincerity worth? What does the "good will" 
amount to? Is it anything more than a spiritual luxury, to calm the 
conscience of those who cultivate it? What good does it do the Negro? 
'.".'hat good does it de the country? !s it a pure evasion of rea!it'l (1968b: 
301)? 
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He reminded me in Faith and Violence (1968c} that my own tradition was no 
stranger to a larger view of reality, that, "Contemplative Wisdom is then not simply 
an aesthetic extrapolation of certain intellectual or dogmatic principles, but a living 
contact with the Infinite Source of all being (p. 222)" and that this contact was, "not 
only of minds and hearts, not only of "I" and ''Thou," but a transcendent union of 
consciousness in which man and God became, according to the expression of St. 
Paul, 'one spirit' (p. 222}." 
Having seen what you have of that almost young man we have been considering, 
you might imagine the interest (and comfort} I might have taken in meeting Merrell-
Wolff's sentiments in this not-so-gentle monk. As Merton told me about the 
Wisdom tradition which I had not even known existed in my own faith, the 
congruence with the others whom I was studying gained another dimension of 
meaning for me. Speaking of "the true spiritual life," Merton said: 
It is a life of wisdom, a life of sophianic love. In Sophia, the highest 
wisdom-principle, all the greatness and majesty of the unknown that is in 
God and all that is rich and maternal in His creation are united 
inseparably ... Faith is what opens to us in this higher realm of unity, of 
strength, of sophianic love where there is no longer the limited and 
fragmentary light provided by rational principles, but where the Truth is One 
and Undivided and takes all to itself in the holiness of ... Sophia (1961:141). 
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This finding of things needed but unexpected has since that time become thematic 
in mv life: in one case. mv narrative seems to sav that mv motives miaht on 
" ' .I i , -..I 
occasion have been better than I knew, rather than worse, as seems more 
generally the case; my discovery of the ground of hope which had been 
unknowingly nurtured in my heart was certainly another. And, in looking for a path 
through the confusion of our culture, as I eventually came to feel that I needed 
additional resources to resume the struggle between my world and my conscience, 
both in the presence of external and internal critics, that feeling eventually sent me 
back to school as an adult student, first of psychology, then of business, and now 
of education. Those seeming eclectic choices in each case seemed at the time to 
be appropriate paths: as a psychologist I would have hoped to heal both my own 
divisions and those of others; as an MBA, I had expected that I might find a way 
to do business which was both sustainable and non-toxic; as an educator, I felt 
that I might be in a position to share whatever I might eventually come to 
understand. 
Throughout that process of adult schooling my capacity for cultural criticism grew--I 
certainly developed a powerful habit of searching out and deconstructing 
unexamined initial assumptions in our discourse-but at the same time, I came 
increasingly to value the need for finding something in their place. As in the 
discussion, cited earlier, by Matthew Fox (1994: 209) of Suzi Gablik's 
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"reconstructive postmodernism", I discovered that I too, "must choose whether to 
follow a path of demystifying alone or a path of being instead [a] cultural healer" 
I came to feel a certain confidence in the need to include the path of a "cultural 
healer'' in my journey, and did not consider it a byway or a turning aside from my 
quest. In fact, it is probably fair to say that it was the other way round: I suspect 
that my personal history would say that it was this desire to "heal the world" which 
turned my attention initially to the question of hope, and eventually to the mystical 
bent which it has now taken. As should be clear at this point, I came to consider 
the process in which I have engaged to be not only a search for individual 
transcendence, but also an attempt to join with those who might hope to renovate--
to reinvigorate-our culture, so that it might nurture rather than obstruct the 
flowering of each of us, and all of us, into what we might be. My apologetics were 
to be addressed not only to myself, but primarily to my community; similarly and 
even more to the point, it was obvious that a pedagogy of hope could have no 
place to act unless it was within the context of a culture in the process of being 
transformed. 
Yet holding to such views in the climate of skepticism which the flowering of our 
deconstructive skills has fostered, in fact holding such views while maintaining my 
fondness for my own skepticism, proved to be an undertaking involving 
considerable self-contradiction, a self-contradiction as striking and as difficult in its 
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own way as my earlier struggles of conscience in the workplace. My search also 
confirmed the obvious: if the 
effort to effect individual change is heroically difficult, the process of intentional 
cultural change might serve to define "problematic." Despite this self-conflict over 
means and the problematic nature of finding specific workable remedies for cultural 
renovation, I eventually came to frame these issues in the terms which have come 
to characterize my quest. I came to see that my own frustration with my search for 
a way to live and my own difficulties with trying to change a small comer of the 
world so that I might live well while being good was once again being reflected in 
my experience, this time as both a student and a teacher of material containing a 
substantial moral and social critique. In both those roles, I found that there I had 
a strong tendency to come to a saturation point after a period of intense study of 
such materials, at which time a sense of moral outrage intervened: I wanted to cry, 
"Enough discussion! The problem is more than obvious. What is to be done about 
it?" And in practice, I both offered and received such a question as a criticism of 
pedagogy--my students repeated my student experience-they too came to react 
in anger and frustration at the perversity of our world, at the hypocrisy of a culture 
claiming the moral high ground attendant upon egalitarianism, while fostering in its 
heart a social darwinism productive of the most predatory elitism. While I came to 
believe that the absence of a proposed solution should not constrain one's right 
to "name the intolerable," I did (and do) accept this cry as a fair question to ask 
of those of us in a profession so dominated by praxis as is education, and a 
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necessary question for those concerned with the litany of horrors with which we 
began Chapter One. With all the opportunities-such as that litany-which our 
culture offers, there could surely be few who had not experienced something which 
caused them to feel "moral outrage;" and probably there are as many who have 
felt the need for some significant change in our world as a result. 
Yet, wherever I looked for previous attempts to respond to these problems, there 
seemed to me to be a societal reflection of my internal conflict, a fundamental 
divide, even between persons of good will, which became apparent in examining 
both the framing of and the responses to the questions associated with the means 
for change--a dichotomy most difficult to resolve. For example, both my own mind 
and the public discourse seemed divided between those who would make a better 
world by structural social changes and those who counsel transformative changes 
in individuals as a prerequisite to any meaningful social change. The retorts were 
familiar and difficult to counter: the former would ask how one might transform any 
except the most exceptional individual apart from a nurturing interpretive 
community, while the latter would ask how one might fashion such an interpretive 
community from unregenerate persons. 
Similarly, my own "moral outrage," while it energized me, at the same time 
reduced my capacity to engage powerful people in conversations about such 
change. And, similarly, in our public discourse, the inflexibility of opposing 
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positions, the shrillness of voices, came to stand in rhetorical gridlock. At a time 
when so much that we thought we had accomplished by confrontation was falling 
away, it began to seem appropriate to test pragmatically the results of such tactics 
over time. For example, there are certainly few who are not inspired by the non-
violence of Dr. Martin Luther King, yet the political process that converted those 
ideas into social reality in the sixties was often fueled by (a quite justified) anger 
and frustration. I began to feel that it was not coincidental that many of the gains 
from those marches, protests and sit-ins were falling victim to the pent-up 
resentments of the conservatives, nor did I think that we should be surprised that 
a similar fate had overcome much of what the anti-war and campus reform factions 
of that period had hoped was accomplished. The more recent example of the 
Balkans also offered a lesson about the short-lived nature of the gains of acting 
upon even the most righteous anger. While I felt what I would have presumed to 
be a broadly held aversion to applying starkly utilitarian criteria in judging the 
outcome of moral issues, in the context of those failures I began to be inclined to 
feel that a treatment of the anger which has so often been the product of our 
critique serves to bring forward Doris Lessing's concerns about whether there 
might be some deep-seated flaw in our capacity to reform ourselves. In any case, 
there were certainly immediately obvious pragmatic difficulties: an angry, 
combative, blaming personality might certainly be very effective in capturing one's 
attention; unfortunately, such a personality also predisposes most people to 
oppose whatever agenda has inspired that unpleasantness. 
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Along with many whom I have cited before, I came to hold that a critical element 
in the reduction of the risk of simplistic or fundamentalist solutions is to keep 
always before oneself the need to recognize the effects of our ego constructs, and 
I have held this awareness to be especially important in preparation for "working 
in the world." I understood this need to be widely apprehended; many of my 
sources made the argument that unenlightened efforts to improve the lot of others 
are frequently ineffective, or even counterproductive. Yet the prospect of 
remaining calm and detached in the face of suffering was anathema to my 
Western conscience, a conscience which most generally informs those of us who 
desire structural change: in that view, detachment is a psychopathological 
diagnosis, not a spiritual virtue. Certainly we are more comfortable with the voice 
of Jeremiah in such a circumstance than we might be with a voice which focused 
on conscious transformation, as a prerequisite for engaging such problems. 
Thus my response of feeling moral outrage in the face of the intolerable societal 
conditions which we have discussed conflicted with this other part of my self. My 
anger was not at home in this alternate tradition; a tradition which might be 
mistaken for indifference, because it proposed a response which does not include 
anger. That tradition, in which many of my sources stand, might be exemplified by 
Cheri Huber's Zen Buddhism, which, "involves sitting still as we bring all our 
suffering to be embraced in compassion (1995: 18)." Of course, one must make 
haste to emphasize that her Buddhism is not about resignation, but about the 
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necessity of escaping suffering by means of overcoming an illusion such as those 
we discussed in Chapter Two, an illusion in this case which makes us think that 
we are individual egos, " ... separate from all that is. If you do not believe that you 
are a somebody to whom things are happening, then nothing will happen to you 
(Huber, 1995: 17)." 
In my initial stages of struggling with this internal conflict between moral outrage 
and a detached compassion, I took some comfort in noting with a smile that one 
widely proposed means for attaining the transformation necessary for the viewpoint 
which Huber represents is-service to others! I considered this difficulty to be an 
example of a paradox to be treasured, not to be resolved-in that time, I might 
have said that by the time we understood them, they would probably no longer be 
problematic. Yet as time passed, I came to see this problem differently, and in a 
way which would eventually affect my pedagogy. I began to listen to voices such 
as that of Gabriel Marcel, who, as cited earlier, asked us to consider that one 
might best, "serve peace by establishing it first of all in oneself (Marcel, 1967: 
142)." 
There have been other meaningful efforts to speak to these questions. Michael 
Lerner, in an early editorial which contributed significantly to the development of 
his "Politics of Meaning," struggled to bridge this same divide, saying: "A Neo-
Compassionist politics will affirm the healthy part of the complex of reasons that 
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draws people into religion and will fight for a progressive politics that 
acknowledges the spiritual truths in the religious worldviews. even as it rejects 
sexism, national chauvinism, and the uncritical subordination of intellect to an 
irrationally constituted authority (1987: 12)." Yet Lerner left us with obvious and 
unresolved questions, as to who will choose which are the "healthy parts" of this 
complex of reasons and what is a properly constituted authority. We are stuck 
once again with the earlier problem of constituting the interpretive community. As 
Purpel and Shapiro have it, "Our discourse has its share of inner tensions and 
paradoxes--affirmation of both criticality and commitment, of firmness and flexibility, 
community and individuality, freedom and equality, harmony and diversity. As 
intellectuals, we cannot but be wary, skeptical, and critical of any creed, 
formulation, or manifesto; but as moral agents, we cannot be paralyzed by 
complexity and tolerance (1995: 156) ."It is to the question of how we are to avoid 
that paralysis, how we are to make the choices which Lerner proposed, and how 
my questions occasioned by "cultural healing" are to be engaged to which I now 
tum, attempting to speak of hope in and for the wisdom identified with 
transcendent experience. 
Unreasonable Assurance and Transcendent Experience. 
In the midst of these concerns, and at a point where I was myself once again at 
the edge of the chasm, there occurred what I have described as the intervention 
of an "unreasonable reassurance." The reader may recall the "fourth theme" from 
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Chapter Two, which described a significant turning point in my research-having 
originally set out in search of hope. my task was fundamentally changed by a 
discovery of pivotal importance: 
• The discovery that my quest has become an effort in apologetics, 
because, in searching, I have found within myself a reservoir of hope 
that I had not previously acknowledged. My awareness that, despite 
the hope which is in my heart, I am confronted by the paradox of not 
knowing how to defend its presence (apologetics), or how to describe 
to others how it might be attained (pedagogy). 
This discovery, foreshadowed in much that I had written and thought over the 
course of this work, finally came to me in its greatest clarity in the midst of what 
I had intended as an intellectual, analytical discussion of the ground of hope. As 
a part of my effort to break out of a period of "writer's block," I was attempting to 
illustrate to my advisor why I had come to hold that there is something in the heart 
of every human being which gives us the sense of energy and possibility to carry 
on in the face of unspeakable things, intending to use a scene cited in the 
previous section of this chapter, from Doris Lessing. The following excerpt from my 
journal (October 13, 1995) offers a recollection recorded shortly afterward: 
No matter how many times I am presented with evidence of the truth 
of Ornstein's Multi-Mind hypothesis, I am still astounded anew. Just 
as I have many times noted that the intellect seems oblivious to the 
wellness (or lack thereof) of the body, so too the condition of the 
heart, of the Spirit, seems veiled from the part of me that drives this 
keyboard. When I attempted to read the "garden vision" from 
Lessing's Memoirs of a Survivor to Dr. Purpel on Tuesday, I was 
overwhelmed [ambushed] by emotion: my voice failed and tears 
flowed down my face. It was only in this context that I was able to 
come to realize that there was an unexamined source of the malaise 
I had been suffering. After expressing a reluctance bam of a fear of 
sounding grandiose, I told Dr. P. that, even though my personal life 
was in better shape than ever before, I still felt an incredible level of 
pain, seemingly as if I were sensing the 2:iguish of the whole world 
as it suffered from the wounds we have inflicted upon ourselves. 
Those tears and that expression of feeling, of compassion for my 
fellows, granted me the first peace I had felt in a long while. Even 
though all the tasks still remained to be done, the veil between me 
and my hope had been lifted. Although I had not expressed that to 
Dr. Purpel, it must have been apparent to him. He said, "You are in 
the garden now." 
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Reflecting on that experience in other journal entries over the following month, 1 
found the interpretation of that experience forming a larger and larger portion of 
my work: 
Finding hope in my heart is the pedagogy. The hope I seek is hidden 
by the assumption that it rests in politics or criticism. or science or 
history, when it truly rests in God. As long as only the intellect is 
convinced, doubt will eventually win and establish despair. That must 
be the outcome if we insist that the outcomes of our work are limited 
to the "Seen." .... Finding that there is something within each human 
heart that gives us the sense of energy and possibility to carry on 
even in the face of unspeakable things, one also discovers that that 
same something requires of us that we also seek to remedy however 
much of that awfulness might fall under our hand: if we have great 
power, we must change the world; if we are grievously oppressed 
and void of material resources, we must comfort a child and offer 
unrequired and unrequited civilities to our neighbors .... Unconditional 
hope is sustained even when failure is certain. Standing in front of 
a friend's coffin and afterward contemplating one's own mortality, it 
is still undimmed, even if it may be temporarily veiled by my pain. 
Finding such hope includes finding the duty to persevere; certainty 
of failure does not excuse one from this duty--it makes it clearer. 
This is not to say that one should needlessly sacrifice oneself in 
useless causes. Strategy is appropriate and needed. But when one 
discovers something that is morally necessary, then continuance in 
the absence of cause for optimism is a task to be undertaken with 
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a good heart. This may well be some of what Doris Lessing 
meant.. .. Hope is as vital for the person who draws the duty of 
"turning out the lights" as it ever is in the sunny days. If we fail, if 
the whole thing goes down in flames, we can and should tend to our 
tasks of hope until the end. 
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This insight into what I take to be a fundamental part of my self suggested to me 
that the absence of hope from much of our discourse and many of our classrooms 
had grown out of our abandonment of Wisdom as the goal of education. In raising 
the issue in those terms, I realized that many might take my position to be a 
prescription that we simply resume the claim that we have Wisdom in hand and 
ready to dispense to obedient scholars; however, what I wished was to offer a 
diagnosis: that through having not only failed to pursue Wisdom, but having even 
yielded the possibility of its existence, our culture has constructed a world in which 
only pragmatic goals are viable: a condition which I contended could only result 
in despair. The Wisdom to which I was referring is now familiar to the reader from 
the works recently cited; it is a truth claim in the most unrepentant sense, although 
not of the modernist stripe. As I began to envision it, Wisdom represented the fruit 
of the transformative experiences to which I was referring with increasing 
frequency, experiences that are in essence spiritual, whether or not they have a 
religious context. Each of the sources discussed thus far had contributed in some 
way to my version of that claim, even though they might not have made it themselves. 
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Within this paradigm, it became possible to see more clearly why the concept of 
"cultural healing" in general, and "moral outrage" in particular. produced such a 
quandary in my earlier period. There have been innumerable examples from the 
literature of spiritual traditions which stress that there is clearly a developmental 
sequence in this process of seeking wisdom. While this sequence certainly varies 
for each person, along with those variables of time, place, company, etc., which 
Shah (1978) describes, general outlines are clearly perceptible in the various 
traditions. I proposed that the root of the problem which we continue to confront 
in our own culture, whose repertoire I had repeatedly described as exhausted, was 
the absence of Wisdom, in concept as well as in substance. In my own case, since 
I, like most of my peers, had been trained to see myself as a highly autonomous 
individual-to the extent that Bellah (1986) diagnoses the trait as a pathology--! 
was expected, at maturity, to be self-directed, acknowledging no possibility of 
teachership. Thus, when I had come to the end of a developmental stage (i.e., had 
exhausted the developmental potential of a certain behavior or study) there was 
no tradition which assigned to someone the right and duty to observe that fact and 
prescribe a new and appropriate behavior or belief. And in the absence of the 
capacity to bring (capitalized) Knowledge to bear on the question, that could not 
be considered inappropriate: in a culture which denies the reality of such gnosis, 
those who claim it must, by definition, be either deluded, or frauds. 
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Thus, when I had progressed as far as I might with the concept and practice of 
"moral outrage," had derived and shared whatever developmental benefit that 
stage had for me and would have benefited from some other view of the problems, 
I was required to rely on good fortune, chance encounter, or age to prompt me to 
drop the methodology that no longer served me and to find an appropriate 
replacement. Similarly, in that search, since as I had previously discussed, it is 
widely maintained that means appropriate for any individual are highly specific, my 
unguided (could we say random?) search was almost certain to result in my 
adopting behaviors which would range from inefficient, through ineffective, to 
harmful, just as if I had broken into a pharmacy to seek a remedy for a cold. Not 
much of a pedagogy. 
So, Where Do We Go From Here? 
I must accept the probability that both the preceding contention and the 
capitalization of Knowledge will place the balance of this work beyond the pale for 
many readers (although probably not many who have bothered to read this far); 
but, I believe that this contention is critical, bringing us to the crux of our cultural 
bankruptcy. As I said at the beginning of this work, our problem revolves around 
a very difficult issue in the search for Wisdom: the claim by many (if not all) of 
those whom I find to be credible representatives of some degree of attainment in 
a spiritual tradition to have acquired in that process some "special knowledge" not 
available to those who maintain their prejudice toward a linear view of reality. As 
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the reader has seen, the original assertion of the claim that Knowledge rests upon 
the "radical experientialism" which mystics claim radically expands one's range of 
perception, can still produce great discomforts for us if we are happy in our current 
constructions, feeling otherwise secure from the traps and snares of credulity or 
the edges of chasms. The final chapter is for those who will do with smaller and 
more uncertain comforts 
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Chapter V. 
PEDAGOGY & CREDO 
Here in the last and shortest of my chapters I want to consider what the preceding 
analysis and narrative might tell me about how to be a teacher. What sort of 
pedagogy is implied in believing what I have asserted thus far? Has it any 
applicability to the conditions about which I have joined the chorus of complaint? 
Can it make any difference? Is there in this work any hope? Can I offer anything 
which can stand against the despair surrounding our cynicism, our critique-without-
redemption to which so many of us have turned, to answer Abraham Heschel's 
(1965) challenge: 
The tragedy of this creeping self-disparagement is in the cultivation of the 
doubt whether man is worthy to be saved. Massive defamation of man may 
spell the doom of all of us .... lf man is contemptible, why be upset about the 
extinction of the human species? The eclipse of humanity, the inability to 
sense our spiritual relevance, to sense our being involved in the moral task 
is itself a dreadful punishment (p.27) .... Just as death is the liquidation of 
being, dehumanization is the liquidation of being human. What qualifies a 
being to be called a human being? ... To claim that the question is 
unanswerable ... would be to surrender the hope of attaining knowledge 
concerning significant issues, since .. .the significance of all other questions 
we ask depends on the answer we are ready to offer to this one. (p.29) 
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I have repeatedly contended that our cultural repertoire has been exhausted in 
attempting to respond to such challenges, to no good effect: yet, I do not propose 
that we abandon that repertoire, only that we come to see it as incomplete. As I 
indicated earlier, I have no doubt that employing what we already know would 
solve vast numbers of our problems. I propose that what is at issue is that we lack 
the understanding necessary to know which means are appropriate and when to 
employ them. Certainly their heretofore random and piecemeal employment, done 
in good faith but without such understanding, has produced the present situation, 
in which "school reform" has joined with "business ethics" to comprise the definitive 
oxymorons of our time. As should be apparent by now, I have come to hold that 
the pivotal defect in our culture is its exclusion of the "special knowledge" derived 
from transcendent experience, a defect which deprives us of access to Wisdom 
and insures that our paths must lead only to despair. If at this point, the reader 
were unable to so much as entertain the possibility of such knowledge as a 
working hypothesis, then for that person I have even less to offer than those 
whose offerings have been unhelpful to me. On the other hand, if you would care 
to venture a little further out on this limb, feel free to join me, to hope for a moment 
that we might somehow repair our culture by rediscovering Wisdom. 
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Thoughts About a Bridge. 
! said that I do not advocate discarding our cultural repertoire; rather I propose that 
we seek to learn how to use it in the light of Wisdom. Many of those whom we 
have already consulted have much to offer in that regard; for example, Martin 
Seligman and his co-authors offer a specific prescription for a pedagogy of hope: 
Our schools today are called on to do all sorts of things. Why not call upon 
them to educate people in the most basic way possible, to prepare 
themselves to live in the world as happy, healthy, and productive 
individuals? Teach them how to persevere, how to maintain hope, how to 
be realistic on the one hand and visionary on the other. Encourage them 
to care about others and society as a whole. Reward them for competence 
and achievement. Acknowledge failings and shortcomings as well. Worry 
less about self-esteem of students and more about the skills from which 
self-esteem will follow as a natural consequence. 
At our most utopian, we envision the creation of Optimism Institutes, 
centers in which basic research on personal control is conducted and then 
applied, to schools, to work settings, to society itself. Staff these centers 
with individuals who themselves are optimistic about the possibilities of 
enlightened change using the lessons of psychological research. Involve 
citizens in the planning and evaluation of this kind of research and its 
applications. Make public opinion count. Let society judge whether these 
ideas are preferable to those that pervade our current age of personal 
control (Peterson, 1993: 310). 
His pedagogy thus makes use of the pragmatically justified elements of our cultural 
repertoire, yet it would also acknowledge the need for "something else," as seen 
in Seligman's disclaimer which I cited in Chapter Two, where he reminded us of 
the usefulness and the limitations of optimism: 
Optimism is just a useful adjunct to wisdom. By itself it cannot provide 
meaning. Optimism is a tool to help the individual achieve the goals he has 
set for himself. !t is in the choice of the goals themselves that meaning-or 
emptiness-resides (1991: 291). 
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This sort of cultural repair in the context of Wisdom is also at the center of the 
pedagogy of Robert Ornstein. Seeking to expand the growing scientific 
understanding of altruism as a base for creative adaptation to the world we have 
been describing, Ornstein (1991) talks about how bonding together in kinship 
groups follows from the process of learning in early childhood who is to be cared 
for. He asks if we might intervene to go beyond the current model, where children 
only learn concern for, " ... their tribe, their company, their team, their army, their 
nation, their religion (p. 272)," to a larger view, wherein they would, " ... consider 
their people to be all of humanity (p. 272)": 
I hope that, by understanding that the survival questions that face us are 
much more collective than individual, we may be able to wire up the next 
generation of people in a very different way. They would be connected to 
this understanding simply by receiving the right kinds of information in 
infancy about who our "relatives" are .... Within religious traditions, no matter 
how encrusted they are now, is a different perspective on life, could we but 
connect it with the rest of modem knowledge .... For millennia individuals 
have been attracted to the idea of "higher knowledge" or "mystical 
experiences." We now need to be aware that these experiences are 
important for our future and recognize that they are within the range of all 
(p. 272-3). 
I am proposing that we respond to the emptiness of our cultural repertoire by 
heeding Marcel's caution about facing the temptation toward nihilism in our own 
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lives and that we seek, through our personal quest, to become one of those 
exceptional persons whose work does foster hope, regardless of their field. The 
pedagogy that I propose for bringing hope into our classrooms is, simply put, to 
employ the personal journey of the teacher in search of Wisdom. Whatever 
curriculum employs the interests and capacities of the teacher could be employed 
as a "skillful means" by a teacher properly engaged in such a quest, although of 
course he/she might find some material more useful than others. It is our paradox 
once again: mundane means which are unimportant in themselves, utilized in a 
spiritual context, can have extra-mundane outcomes-the relative is interpenetrated 
by the transcendent. Paradoxically (naturally), I am not suggesting that we teach 
our own hope directly to our students; rather that we might take as an example the 
following advice from Arthur Deikman, who, although speaking to those in his own 
field, offers a perspective that I find highly applicable to the classroom. After his 
diagnosis of the meaninglessness that characterizes modem psychotherapy, he 
cautioned that it is not a task of the practitioner to burden others with a particular 
doctrine or ideology; but rather for the practitioner to first seek freedom from 
his/her own conceptional prisons and despair: 
We gradually come to understand that meaninglessness and the despair 
of "I am alone" are products of obscured vision and inappropriate 
extrapolation of rules covering objects, rules that are useful only for a 
narrow range of phenomena .... To the extent that therapists understand this 
wider context, their work will be oriented by a basically positive and 
optimistic perspective, instead of covertly supporting meaninglessness and 
existential despair. 
Thus the value of mysticism for psychotherapy lies not in the application 
of its technical devices to patients, as if these devices were a mental 
antibiotic or a superior tranquilizer, but in the c.~ange that mystical science 
can bring about in the therapist's world view and concept of the possibilities 
of human life (1982: 173). 
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In a work previously cited in connection with our need for iconoclasts, Deikman 
paused to offer us an even clearer idea of his vision of what those possibilities are: 
The goal of religion should be to facilitate the direct experience of the 
spiritual dimension. Although human beings carry within them the potential 
for regressive dependency, they also contain the potential for the intuition 
of the spiritual-that perception, however dim of something that transcends 
the reality accessible to the senses and ordinary thought (1990: 90). 
In order to add another piece to this model, allow me to redeem my promise to 
return to the thought experiment from Chapter Three, in the light of what we have 
shared since. I repeat it mostly as stated then; however, because of the larger 
context in which it is now presented, I can suggest that it now be read not as a 
thought experiment, but as a proposal for the first page of the Owner's Manual of 
a new curriculum, to be read at assembly on the first day of school, as the preface 
to my pedagogy of hope. Once again, consider how much better prepared for life's 
developmental tasks (including spiritual tasks) a student might be if told what we 
have already discussed about our problems in the preceding chapters--suppose 
we were to propose to that student the following: 
1. If you want to become human, the first step is to learn to behave 
as if you accepted the moral and ethical constraints on self-interest 
that are proposed by whatever tradition is your own. Even the most 
crassly fundamentalist versions of our traditions usually offer more 
humane guidance for living one's life than does our skeptical-to-the-
point-of-cynicism popular culture, an assertion to which the litany of 
horrors in the preceding chapters stands witness. Consider that the 
behavior which our traditions ascribe to saints is, rather, a minimum 
human duty, a point of beginning to be superseded by capacities 
that can only be attained after such duties are observed. 
2. At the same time, in choosing such a means, remember that you 
are undertaking an obligation to keep in consciousness the historical 
costs of fanaticism, cultism, and the abandonment of critical faculties, 
which have allowed the perversion and selective application of these 
moral, ethical, and religious systems to support the interests of 
governance and commerce at the expense of the community and 
human prospects. Remember that every one of us has that same 
capacity (predisposition even) to become enrapt in cultic beliefs and 
behavior, a potential against which understanding is our first armor. 
In addition, to minimize the danger to yourself and to others, you 
must understand and remember the instrumental nature of these 
systems of belief, which have all originated as "skillful means" 
designed by Teachers for specific times, places, and persons and 
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which are intended to be set aside when their transformative purpose 
is accomplished. 
If we are not to discard our mundane and otherwise exhausted cultural means, 
then we must find such Wisdom, so that we might employ these means in ways 
which provide us with a bridge across the abyss, rather than an idol to divert us 
from our quest. I believe that we must risk using science, engineering, philosophy, 
the pursuit of our individual traditions, and the other tools at our disposal, which 
by themselves are insufficient for hope, while maintaining the attitude of Chuang 
Tzu (Merton, 1969, 154) towards such means and ends: 
The purpose of a fish trap is to catch fish, 
and when the fish are caught, the trap is forgotten. 
The purpose of a rabbit snare is to catch rabbits. 
When the rabbits are caught, the snare is forgotten. 
The purpose of words is to convey ideas. 
When the ideas are grasped, the words are forgotten. 
Where can I find a man who has forgotten words? 
He is the one I would like to talk to. 
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Over the Edge: My Credo as a Confession of Faith in Hope. 
I said at the beginning of the last section that I wanted to avoid discarding our 
cultural repertoire, through learning how to use it with Wisdom. Yet to the extent 
that I have offered helpful and pragmatic equivocations which avoided the 
worrisome issue of needing to learn how to Know, I am guilty of obscuring the 
main point. Helpful or not, the trap which pragmatic means contain consists of the 
absence of the Knowledge of how, when, where, and with whom to apply them. 
This trap is the origin of our continued piecemeal reformations, which have proved 
to be ineffective paths to transformation. It is therefore unavoidable that I assert 
once more that each of the things which I suggested above cannot ultimately 
succeed without the successful individual undertaking of the spiritual path by each 
of the participants. 
It might also seem that I must, in the spirit of the preceding analysis, immediately 
retract all that has gone before, constrained by my analysis of negative theology 
and the work of Sells to simultaneously unsay so direct an affirmation. However, 
I feel no such need, because our culture, seen as I have seen it, now serves us 
by standing in itself as a great megalith of negation, needing no help from my 
small voice. Here in my Credo I am thus free to affirm what I wish to have stand 
against that other pole; I speak my theology to stand in tension with our world, 
hopefully to create a "moment" in the space between. I do consent to one 
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equivocation: this Credo is a report from my frontier, faithful to what I have just 
seen, and subject to amendment by what I hope to understand. 
As I have said elsewhere (1996), I believe that as teachers, we should speak hope 
to our students, not though offering them some idol created from our own belief 
and experience, but through offering them the opportunity of witnessing the 
changes that are wrought in our lives by our own spiritual search. It is through the 
sense of energy and possibility associated with those engaged in the search for 
faith or enlightenment that I believe we may offer students the opportunity to 
"catch" hope. This can be done. I have been in educational settings (including 
classrooms) with Teachers where this happened, as I hope you have. I have heard 
Beatrice Bruteau-a doctor of Christian philosophy and a Vedantist, a scientist and 
the head of a Benedictine order--speak in one breath of both transcendence and 
of the worthiness of the world. I have heard her Radical Optimism at a level of 
which I did not know. She has taught me that I am not compelled to create joy and 
hope, that it is a fundamental error to think that they have to be caused, when in 
reality they flow from a universal, impartial and creative love. I have listened to 
David Purpel sharing his mystery, speaking at once with the ringing voice of the 
prophet and with the voice of compassion, calling us to the need to hold both in 
our hearts-wherever in the world we teach-balancing moral outrage with the 
possibility of redemptive action. I have cherished his assurance that even those 
of us who have "set out to save the world" can learn to draw a line between 
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humility and despair, by finding that redemption from the Faustian notion of being 
alone responsible for the righting the world is not only possible. but already 
accomplished. In my dark hours, I hear his amazement at the mystery of the 
persistence of hope, his faith that it is a sign of holiness when in the deepest 
despair, we still hear the call. And from both of these Teachers, I have, like the 
Grand Inquisitor, received what I could not believe I deserved. 
In its application to the classroom, such a pedagogy does not require a complex 
strategy for reformation; any curriculum may be a vector for such contagion. Hope 
may simply arise (from wherever it arises) in response to that unhardening of the 
heart that comes with seeing a living exemplar. In fact, the absence of a specific 
agenda (a doctrine) is its protection from becoming a vehicte for ideology. And this 
pedagogy is not only for the classroom, it is for all of the paths we walk, in the 
marketplace, in the world of political discourse, in the task of healing our culture. 
Through our own hope, we would be saying to a client, to a student, to a 
classroom, to a generation, "Your personal future and your social future can be 
different from your past. Meaning is discoverable. You can rebuild your community 
and repair your world. You may not yet know how, but understand that coming-to-
know-how is your life's work. Knowing and sharing with others that you are not 
helpless is the place of beginning." 
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I believe that it is the duty of those who would teach to find their own hope and to 
stand before their students openly affirming that hope; but in an atmosphere of 
safety, freedom and trust which invites diversity and nurtures students' own voices. 
This is vastly different from affirming nothing or everything. To affirm nothing (or 
everything), to deny Wisdom, is a pretence of moral and spiritual neutrality which 
is disingenuous, except in those victim to a primitive relativism bam of despair. Not 
only my faith in the perennialist view, but also my experience with large numbers 
of persons of good will tells me that as more and more people are willing to take 
the risks of making such affirmations, the opportunities for justice, compassion and 
civility will abound. 
But the risks are quite real. One of the questions which I receive most frequently 
from my students will form a critical element in the affirmation of hope and 
possibility with which I intend to approach my future work. Awash in the moral 
outrage which we have seen to be so frequent a part of our path, they ask me, 
"Where could I practice a pedagogy of hope, a pedagogy growing out of 
compassion, a pedagogy which reflects the love for children which our traditions 
require of us?" They ask this because they see the chasm without being told--they 
see that the contradictions between what our culture claims to value and what it 
actually values would be fatal to their job prospects, if they stand for the interests 
of children. They tell me with pained voices that they came to teaching because 
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they really cared about the nurturance of children and the spiritual fulfillment of 
adults. only to find that we have betrayed them by schooling for other ends. 
A world in which those students could practice a pedagogy of hope would be a 
world quite different from the world we now have, and it is a world we may hope 
to have. I believe that we must keep these contradictions constantly but gently 
before ourselves, refusing to either allow them to sink out of consciousness or to 
present them with such anger that our reaction drives them away. Whether in the 
marketplace, politics, or a classroom, I believe that such an affirmation of the 
values which bring children to grow up wanting to become teachers will wear away 
our capacity to do the intolerable things which we now do under the cover of 
pretense. 1 believe that these pretenses, the personal and cultural divisions which 
keep us from hope, are constructions which can be consciously deconstructed; and 
that if we do so in the light of Wisdom, then our pedagogy will bear the fruit which 
our hearts have always told us should be the birthright of our students and of 
ourselves. 
And so ... 
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In gratitude for the great good fortune of living the life from which this work is 
drawn. I give thanks to that community of faith and struggle within which it stands: 
to all of the foregoing, to those with whom I have worked and studied, to all those 
who have gone before, to Margaret and Billy, to Alice and Mac, to Beatrice, David, 
Mushkil Gusha, eta/. I thank each of you for teaching me how to find hope, on our 
path together ..... . 
Over our bridge 
Which is not a bridge 
To an other side 
Which is Not. 
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